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Abstract
The problem of informal work and informal networks (blat) in Ukraine is long-standing.
Until now, research on the informal economy in Ukraine has largely focused on
measuring its size rather than exploring the nature and motives of the people engaged
in informal activities. Moreover, few studies in relation to Ukraine have sought to
evaluate the validity of the contrasting theorisations of the informal economy and no
studies in Ukraine have considered the issue of contemporary informal networks (blat).
The intention of this thesis is to fill these gaps. In doing so, the objective is to start to
resolve the lack of knowledge on the nature of the informal economy which leads to
ineffective and even destructive policy approaches to tackling it.
The aim of this thesis is to critically evaluate the existing theorisations of the
informal economy and their applicability to Ukrainian society in order to start to enable
a move towards developing policy solutions for tackling the informal economy. To
achieve this aim, a mixed methods approach is adopted in this thesis. The survey,
consisting of 200 semi-structured interviews, was carried out in an urban area of
Ukraine – the city of Mykolayiv. The data collected was analysed both qualitatively and
quantitatively.
The results of the survey affirm that informal activities are diverse in nature and
are driven by a variety of motives. Thus, no single existing theory fully explains the
informal economy in Ukraine; instead, there is evidence to support each theory of the
informal economy. As such, policy responses need to be tailored in order to effectively
deal with the challenges faced by the different types of informal activity. Such a
response is more likely to result in the formalisation of such activities by removing the
barriers to formalisation and nurturing fledgling business activities rather than simply
trying to eradicate them.
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11. INTRODUCTION
Informal work and blat in Ukraine are an extensive and long-standing aspect of daily
life, and tackling such endeavour is a potentially very difficult task. During World War II,
when the Germans were occupying what is now Ukrainian territory, it was noticed that
huge numbers of agricultural products (e.g. flour, eggs) were being sent in private
parcels from Ukraine to Germany by German local officials. German special services
(i.e., the bureau of investigations) then investigated the issue and they found that
Ukrainians had managed to corrupt German local officials (Herasymov, 2002;
Ivanushenko, 2011), who were often thought to be the exemplar of order and
incorruptible.
Today, the informal economy in Ukraine is extremely large. Its share is
estimated to be anywhere between 30 and 80 percent of GDP. In 2011,
PriceWaterhouseCoopers estimated informal work to be more than 40 percent of the
overall economy in different sectors (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2011). Similarly,
Schneider and Enste (2002) estimated it to be equivalent to 47-54 percent of GDP,
whilst Dzvinka (2002) found that it constitutes 55-70 percent of GDP, albeit based on
very different measurement methods. Whatever the measurement method used,
however, the informal economy is a large and enduring feature of Ukrainian society.
Large businesses contribute much to the monetary value of informal cash flows
using off-shore locations for their fraudulent financial schemes. For example, Aslund
(1999) argues that in the 1990s, Ukrainian government officials, bankers and outright
criminals prospered by means of government subsidies and permits (rent-seeking). He
determined four different forms of such rent-seeking and calculated the sizes of each
form on the basis of the IMF data for the years 1993 and 1995. The first was to
purchase metals and chemicals at cheap prices regulated by the state and resell them
abroad at the world market price which was possible through access to export permits.
As a result, total export rents amounted to some $4.1 billion or 20 percent of GDP in
21992. The second form was to import Russian gas at a low subsidised exchange rate
and resell it at a higher price. The third method was subsidised credits at a very low
interest rate for the privileged ones. Thus, in 1993 when hyperinflation rate was higher
than 10,000 percent, some credits were issued at a rate of generous 20 percent per
annum. The government credits to enterprises amounted to 65 percent of GDP in 1992
and 47 percent of GDP in 1993. The fourth form was budget subsidies to agriculture
and energy (gas and coal industry) enterprises. As a result, much of these rents have
been laundered in off-shores. Although inflationary rents are now more possible since
1996, other forms of rents remain intact.
At the same time, many small firms and individuals participate in the informal
economy. This thesis concentrates on these smaller economic actors – namely
households. Not only does it focus upon their participation in the informal economy but
also their engagement in informal personal connections (known as blat in the past), as
the informal economy in Ukraine is often assumed to be closely associated with such
informal connections and corruption. Moreover sometimes the distinction between the
informal economy, blat and ‘corruption’ becomes very blurred. There is an established
system of getting things done and tackling the informal economy requires profound
understanding of this system. Furthermore, corruption is one of the most pressing
problems in Ukraine that constitutes an obstacle on the way to formalisation of the
economy and the development of formal sector entrepreneurship. Transparency
International rated Ukraine 134th - 143rd among 178 countries in the Corruption
Perceptions Index in 2010. PriceWaterhouseCoopers rated it 181st out of 183
countries in terms of the ease of paying taxes. According to the World Bank,
meanwhile, it is 145th of 183 countries in terms of ease of doing business. As
Schneider and Enste (2000: 29) argue,
‘the relationship between the share (size) of the shadow economy and the
amount of corruption is strong and consistent, as different measures show.
3Countries with more corruption and briberies have a higher share (size) of the
shadow economy’.
The influence of the informal economy on the economic and social development of
Ukraine is not the only reason for choosing this subject. The topic is of personal
importance for me as it relates to close people that both participate in the informal
economy and also suffer from the ‘informal activities’ of local authorities and the lack of
social security. Being brought up in the city of Mykolayiv, I first saw the people
struggling to survive in the 1990s, and then trying to earn a decent living in 2000s and
cope with unemployment, corruption and societal degradation. Informal economic
relations and blat negatively affect the welfare of the state. Although the informal
economy and blat are positively viewed by the Ukrainian society and it frequently
occurs in the form of mutual aid, this research will show that in the majority of cases,
informality is used not to help but to cheat, evade the laws, steal, do careless work or
as a source of resistance and opposition when one is being cheated, extorted or
robbed. Therefore, exploring the extent of and motives for informal work and possible
ways of tackling it is of great interest for me.
This research can be viewed as a part of wider and longstanding intellectual
debates on the nature of the informal economy and relevant policy approaches in the
context of an urban area of Ukraine. It covers the gaps in academic literature on the
informal economy and focuses on the region that has not been previously researched –
Mykolayiv, a city in the South of Ukraine. However, the key contribution is that this
thesis suggests a new approach to theorisation of informal networking (blat), which is
an integral part of the informal economy in Ukraine. After in-depth qualitative and
quantitative analysis of data and evaluation of theories of the informal economy
towards the findings, it was suggested that the phenomenon of blat is not interrelated
with the informal work. It rather can be explained as mediator of transactions within
either formal or the informal economy.
41.1. Aims and objectives
The aim of this thesis is to critically evaluate the existing theorisations of the informal
economy and their applicability to Ukrainian society in order to start to enable a move
towards developing policy solutions for tackling the informal economy.
The rationale for this thesis is that there is a major gap in literature on the
informal economy of Ukraine as well as insufficient empirical evidence for adequate
analysis of the problem. To date, the research on the informal economy in Ukraine has
largely focused on measuring its size rather than exploring the nature and motives of
people engaged in informal activities. Only a few authors have addressed this latter
question (Thiessen, 1997; Dzvinka, 2002; Williams and Round, 2008; Williams et al.,
2011). Moreover, in relation to Ukraine few commentators have sought to evaluate the
validity of the contrasting theorisations of the informal economy (Williams, 2007;
Williams and Round, 2008; Williams et al., 2011a; Williams et al., 2011b) and none of
the commentators have considered the issue of contemporary blat in Ukraine.
However, without understanding the nature and motives of the informal
economy, it is difficult to design effective policies to tackle it. For example, when
tackling informal sector entrepreneurship, policymakers might erroneously choose
solely a deterrence approach. By doing so, authorities can push entrepreneurship
further into the shadows or even eradicate it (Williams and Round, 2009). Yet to do so
is to fail to recognise that informal sector entrepreneurship is the main seed-bed out of
which entrepreneurial ventures arise in Ukraine. The result is that governments will end
up stifling with one hand through their policies towards the informal sector precisely the
entrepreneurship and enterprise culture that with another hand they wish to nurture.
Lack of qualitative research on the informal economy is not the only gap in the
knowledge in this field. The other gaps include a lack of studies of particular regions,
not enough empirical evidence for theoretical conclusions and no consensus on the
theorisation of the informal economy. Importantly, moreover, there exist only a small
number of publications about informal networks and contemporary blat is not explored
in-depth. Furthermore, there exists no theoretical framework that explains the nature of
5informal networking in post-Soviet countries. This thesis seeks to fill these gaps in the
knowledge.
Therefore the objectives of this thesis are to analyse the extent and nature of
informal work in general, and blat more particularly, in an urban area of Ukraine; to
evaluate opinions and attitudes towards participation in the informal economy and blat;
to evaluate existing theorisations of the informal economy; and to start to move towards
proposing policy solutions to tackle informal work. Below, a more detailed explanation
of each of these goals is given.
This objective may be broken down into the following sub-goals:
a) To evaluate the prevalence and nature of the informal economy in general in an
urban area of Ukraine.
How many people participate in the informal work? Is this work their primary or
secondary source of income? How many people are fully informal (do not have any
formal source of income). Who are those people working informally? What is their age,
income, gender? Do they conduct informal work as a waged employee or on an own-
account/self-employed basis? What were their reasons for doing this work informally?
b) To evaluate the prevalence and nature of the informal work used to complete
domestic services in an urban area of Ukraine.
How many people have participated in the informal work in the past 12 months? What
did they do? How much were they paid? How was the activity remunerated (in money,
in kind, mixture)? Do they conduct such work as a waged employee or on an own-
account/self-employed basis? Who do they work for? Are their clients kin, friends,
neighbours, acquaintances, previously unknown to them, or what? What were their
reasons for doing this work informally?
c) To evaluate opinions and attitudes towards participation in the informal economy.
6This will evaluate perceptions of working informally, the importance of informal sources
of income, the perceived risks of being detected, the motives of both employees and
employers and the role of current state policy.
d) To evaluate the prevalence of blat.
In what spheres is blat most widely used? Is this ‘help’ paid? How are blat and informal
work connected? What groups of people use blat more widely (gender, age, social
status, income etc)?
e) To evaluate opinions and attitudes towards blat
How do people perceive blat? Why and what do they use blat for? Is it possible to
manage in various aspects of everyday life without the help of blat? Is the role of blat
increasing or decreasing as a result of economic transformation?
f) To evaluate existing theorisations of the informal economy and blat; and to start to
move towards proposing policy solutions to tackle informal work
What theory of the informal economy is most prevalent in the Ukrainian society? What
theories are most applicable to each type of the informal work and blat identified by the
research? Which policy directions could be chosen to respond to the heterogeneous
character of the informal economy in Ukraine taking into consideration these
theorisations?
1.2. Scope
This research is on the informal economy in general and blat more particularly as an
integral part of unofficial activities. The informal economy is a very broad concept and
therefore it needs to be defined precisely for the purpose of this research, carefully
7delimiting what is included and excluded from the investigation.
1.2.1. The informal economy
At the outset, the subject of the research, the informal economy, needs to be defined in
order to determine what is included within the scope of this thesis and what is not. The
term ‘informal economy’ became popular in the 1970s and since that time has been
amended and improved to include a diverse array of types and forms of informality. For
many years there was no global consensus on the definition of the informal economy.
Indeed, to date, three contrasting types of definition have been used, namely
enterprise-, jobs- and activity-based definitions (Williams, 2009a). Nowadays
international scientists and organizations came nearer to universally accepted
definition. However, on the basis of the examined literature on the definitions of the
informal economy, the conclusion can be made that there are two main semi-official
definitions: by OECD and ILO. So the vast majority of existing definitions in most
relevant sources belong either to OECD-‘camp’ (mostly European authors), or to ILO-
‘camp’ (mostly third world authors). No other relevant comprehensive approaches to
defining the informal economy were found.
Therefore it will be appropriate to divide this section into three parts:
1. ILO enterprise-job-based definition ‘camp’ (ICLS, Chen, Hussmanns, SIDA,
WIEGO);
2. OECD activity-based definition ‘camp’ (OECD, CIS Statistical Committee,
Schneider, Sepulveda, Pavlovskaya, Williams, Renooy);
3. Definition by Ukrainian authors (Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, State
Statistical Committee of Ukraine, Mandybura, Motoryn and Motoryna).
ILO enterprise-job-based definition ‘camp’
One of the most widely-used definitions of the informal economy belongs to the ILO. Its
evolution was traced in the Decent Work and The Informal Economy report (ILO,
82002). According to this report, the concept of the 'informal sector' was first popularised
by the ILO in the 1970s. It was used to refer mainly to the survival activities of those
working in the marginal or peripheral segments of the economy.
The 1991 Report of the Director-General to the International Labour Conference
defined the informal sector as very small-scale units producing and distributing goods
and services, and consisting largely of independent, self-employed producers in urban
areas of developing countries, some of whom also employ family labour and/or a few
hired workers or apprentices; which operate with very little capital, or none at all; which
utilize a low level of technology and skills; which therefore operate at a low level of
productivity; and which generally provide very low and irregular incomes and highly
unstable employment to those who work in it. This description failed to capture the
various forms of informality and informalisation that have since grown in significance
(ILO 2007).
In 1993, the 15th International Conference of Labour Statisticians adopted an
enterprise approach to definition of the informal sector. According to 15th ICLS,
employment in the informal sector comprises ‘all jobs in informal sector enterprises, or
all persons who, during a given reference period, were employed in at least one
informal sector enterprise, irrespective of their status in employment and whether it was
their main or a secondary job’. This definition was also criticised for the different
reasons among which was its inability to capture all aspects of the increasing
informalisation of employment. For example, it excludes households employing paid
domestic workers from the informal sector that is included by the17th ICLS.
At the 2002 International Labour Conference the broader term 'informal
economy' was proposed instead of ‘informal sector’. It included the considerable
diversity of workers and economic units, in different sectors of the economy. The
informal economy was defined as ‘all economic activities by workers and economic
units that are – in law or in practice – not covered or insufficiently covered by formal
arrangements’ (ILO, 2002a: 53)
9In 2003, the 17th International Conference of Labour Statisticians complemented
the definition of employment in the informal sector with a definition of informal
employment, as it refers to different aspects of the ‘informalisation’ of employment and
to different targets for policy-making. The concept of informal sector refers to
production units as observation units, while the concept of informal employment refers
to jobs as observation units. These two concepts constitute the term 'informal
economy'.
In order to provide a visual reference, a two-dimensional matrix has been
developed, providing a possible framework for mapping the informal economy, in that it
relates the statistical concept of 'employment in the informal sector' to the broader
concept of informal employment (Hussmans, 2005).
Table 1.1. Conceptual framework: informal employment (Hussmans, 2005: 27)
Production
units by type
Jobs by status in employment
Own-Account
workers Employers
Contributing
family
workers
Employees
Members of
producers’
cooperatives
Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Informal Formal Informal Formal
Formal sector
enterprises 1 2
Informal sector
enterprises(a) 3 4 5 6 7 8
Households(b) 9 10
(a) As defined by the Fifteenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians (excluding households
employing paid domestic workers).
(b) Households producing goods exclusively for their own final use and households employing paid
domestic workers.
Note:
Cells shaded in dark grey refer to jobs, which, by definition, do not exist in the type of production unit in
question.
Cells shaded in light grey refer to formal jobs. Un-shaded cells represent the various types of informal jobs.
Informal employment: cells 1 to 6 and 8 to 10.
10
Employment in the informal sector: cells 3 to 8.
Informal employment outside the informal sector: cells 1, 2, 9 and 10.
According to the 17th ICLS matrix, informal employment comprises:
i. own-account workers employed in their own informal sector enterprises (cell
3);
ii. employers employed in their own informal sector enterprises (cell 4);
iii. contributing family workers, irrespective of whether they work in formal or
informal sector enterprises (cells 1 and 5);
iv. members of informal producers’ cooperatives (cell 8);
v. employees holding informal jobs in formal sector enterprises, informal sector
enterprises, or as paid domestic workers employed by households (cells 2,
6 and 10);
vi. own-account workers engaged in the production of goods exclusively for
own final use by their household (cell 9).
Informal employment outside the informal sector includes:
i. employees holding informal jobs in formal sector enterprises (cell 2) or as
paid domestic workers employed by households (cell 10);
ii. contributing family workers working in formal sector enterprises (cell 1);
iii. own-account workers engaged in the production of goods exclusively for
own final use by their household (cell 9). (Hussmans, 2005: 26-7).
Since the last general discussion of the informal economy by the ILO at the 2002
International Labour Conference, no changes and additions to the definition have been
made (ILO, 2007).
OECD activity-based definition ‘camp’
OECD noticed an absence of a strict definition of the informal economy and the
11
existence of different approaches to defining the subject matter. They have noticed the
co-existence of two major definitions: ‘undeclared work’ and ‘informal economy’. The
latter is slightly broader and is preferred for use in developing countries (OECD, 2004).
Moreover, apart from the core definition of the informal economy, authors suggest to
include additional issues relating to the activities not included in the national accounts
(social security fraud, VAT fraud, pilfering, theft, extortion, household production of
services for own use, illegal production) to the broader definition of the informal
economy.
The above reflections drew the OECD to determine two spheres of interest.
First is what they call the ‘core’ definition of the informal economy. It consists of:
i. wholly undeclared work (employment status and earnings are concealed, in
collusion with the employer);
ii. under-declared work (employee’s status is declared, part of earnings
concealed in collusion with employer);
iii. black market work (work in a secondary job with earnings concealed in
collusion with the purchaser);
iv. purely informal employment (no concealment, because no requirement to
declare employment or earnings).
A particular feature is that all mentioned activities are included in GDP by different
means as far as they can be counted.
Second is the broad definition of the informal economy. It consists of the core
definition and is enhanced by including following phenomena into the study:
i. pure tax evasion on earnings that includes self-employment; earnings are
concealed from tax authorities, but not in collusion with the purchaser;
ii. employment in illegal production – is concealed production, sale and
consumption with typical employment status – employee or self-employed;
this is included to GDP, but typically not published;
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iii. employment in household production of goods (included to GPD) and
services (not included to GDP) for own use;
iv. social security fraud, VAT fraud, pilfering, theft, extortion; these are quite
influential factors, though they may appear on any level with any
employment status and are hard to measure (OECD, 2004).
A number of authors employ an activity-based definition of the informal economy
similarly to the OECD. Thus, Pavlovskaya (2004) created 'spheres of dichotomies',
from which components of the informal economy can be identified. She divided the
informal economy into four sectors distinguished by whether they are state or private,
monetized or non-monetized.
i. state monetized: price subsidies in special stores, second economy, money
resources and consumption, bribes, wages, profits;
ii. state non-monetized: barter exchange between enterprises, privileges and
perks, non-money recourses and consumption, networks of political and
economic elites;
iii. private monetized: rents, wages, help with money, profits, investments,
money resources and consumption, buying goods and services;
iv. private non-monetized: Non-money resources and consumption, networks
of family and friends, help with labour, help in kind, domestic labour
(services, production, shopping).
The definition (what-is-included list) of Pavlovskaya correlates with the broad definition
of the informal economy by the OECD. In addition, the author included a
monetization/non-monetization parameter to the characteristics of the informal
economy. This allows her to distinguish the notion of 'favours' – non-monetary
exchange based on interpersonal connections. The notion is also considered by Smith
and Stenning (2004) using the terms blat, 'reciprocity', 'economy of regard', 'arranging
of matters'.
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The article of Pavlovskaya (2004) presents an innovative approach to the
classification of employees. Financial difficulties (the official inability of a state to
provide work places and satisfy the needs of its citizens) created a phenomenon of
multiple identities i.e. a person’s activity is divided into several roles connected with
income earning. So one person can be employed at different jobs and be classified
differently. This issue is also examined by Smith and Stenning (2004). They explored
multiple job strategies which are employed by workers and families in order to maintain
income security and access to a range of in-kind benefits through their primary
employment and high levels of remuneration and access to wider social (capital)
networks through secondary, informal employment. They argue that the ‘informal
economy under emergent capitalism represents a form of self-exploitative social
relations, appropriating one’s own labour to sustain a livelihood, often in conjunction of
course with other economic practices’ (Smith and Stenning, 2004: 6).
One more interesting point related to the informal economy in the work of Smith
and Stenning (2004) is the phenomenon of the 'multicoloured' economy. The authors
differentiate economic practices into those involving market relations, those involving
non-market relations and those concerning alternative market relations, akin to Gibson-
Graham (2006).
Sepulveda and Syrett (2007) agree with Schneider (2002) that the informal
economy includes both illegal and legal activities, monetary and non-monetary
transactions (this is similar with the broad definition by the OECD). Legal activities
include unreported income from self employment; wages, salaries and assets from
unreported work related to legal services and goods (monetary); employee discounts,
fringe benefits, barter of legal services and goods, all do-it-yourself work and neighbour
help (non-monetary).
Illegal activities include trade with stolen goods, drug dealing and
manufacturing, prostitution, gambling, smuggling and fraud (monetary); barter of drugs,
stolen goods, smuggling, production or growing drugs for own use, theft for own use
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(non-monetary).
Williams and Renooy (2009) used one of the most widespread definitions from
the OECD Handbook 2002 (OECD, 2002), where it is defined as all legal production
activities that are deliberately concealed from public authorities to avoid the following:
i. payment of income, value added or other taxes;
ii. payment of social security contributions;
iii. having to meet certain legal standards such as minimum wages, maximum
hours, safety or health standards, etc;
iv. complying with certain administrative procedures, such as completing
statistical questionnaires or other administrative forms.
This activity-based definition includes informal income in the formal job (envelope
wages) which is excluded from job-based definitions. It was accentuated that criminal
activities and unpaid work (‘unpaid community work’ if a household member engages in
unpaid work for a member of a household other than their own, or ‘self provisioning’ if a
household member engages in unpaid work for themselves or another member of their
household) are excluded from the definition (Williams and Renooy, 2009; Williams and
Round, 2008; Williams, 2009a).
Smith (2007: 5) agrees with Schneider and Enste (2000: 78-9) who employed
an activity-based approach and defined the informal economy as ‘unreported income
from the production of legal goods and services, either from monetary or barter
transactions, hence all economic activities that would generally be taxable were they
reported to the tax authorities’. This definition is also similar to the OECD definition.
Current definitions by Ukrainian authors
There are two major influential policy-making institutions in Ukraine that also define the
phenomena of the informal economy: the Ministry of Economy and the Statistical
Committee. This approach is widely recognized among Ukrainian authors who seem to
prefer staying within these boundaries (Motoryn and Motoryna, 2001; Mandybura,
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1998). According to the official Ukrainian definition of the informal economy, employed
by the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, the informal economy includes:
i) illegal production, including:
a. production of goods/services prohibited by the law;
b. activity permit (if necessary according to the law);
ii) concealed production that includes legal but undeclared activity with the aim of:
a. tax evasion;
b. inobservance of standards: wage level, working hours, safety instructions;
c. statistical reporting and questioning evasion;
iii) Separately distinguished is the informal sector based on entities characterized by:
a. low level of organizational structure;
b. employment originating from family or social connections, other than formal
employment agreements.
Self-provisioning is not included except for production of food, construction and repairs.
This definition looks like an unsystematic mix of different approaches: the 1st
paragraph is based on the parameter of legality/illegality, the 2nd is the activity-based
definition and the 3rd is entity-based which includes informality of the employment
factor. The other confusing element is self-provisioning: food, repairs and construction
are included while all other self-provisioning is not. However for statistical purposes,
the OECD definition is used by the Statistical Committee of Ukraine (as well as by
other state statistical committees of CIS members).
To conclude, the variety of particular approaches to defining the informal
economy is slightly confusing and complicates possible discussions. This variety also
represents the complexity and diversity of the nature of the informal economy. One has
to choose the most suitable definition for any particular case.
In this thesis, the intention is to adopt the OECD approach to defining the
informal economy and therefore to use the activity-based definition which defines such
activity as ‘any paid activities that are lawful as regards their nature but not declared to
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the public authorities’ (Williams and Renooy, 2009: 4). Thus the scope of the research
excludes illegal goods and services and unpaid work. Two possible components of the
informal economy, that are included in this broad definition by OECD, self-provisioning
and illegal activity, should not be considered because self-provisioning is not paid and
illegal activity is not lawful according to the core definition. This sub-section provided
the definition of the informal economy. We now move to the next sub-section, where
the definition of blat is discussed.
1.2.2. Blat
The second and more particular focus of this thesis is the phenomenon of personal
networks - blat. This term has become possibly outdated today presumably due to the
changes in the ‘socio-economic system’ (Arnstberg and Boren, 2003: 23). It is rarely
used in popular parlance in Ukraine today and is viewed as an out of date and old
fashioned term that does not capture the realities of present-day life. Therefore its
synonyms, namely ‘personal connections’, ’informal networks’, ‘pulling strings’,
‘znakomstva’ (acquaintances), ‘sviazi’ (connections), are often used in various studies
rather than the traditional phrase of blat. However, this phenomenon deserves
separate careful study for two reasons. Firstly, ‘personal networking in former socialist
societies differs from the West in terms of how extensively it is rooted and activated in
social and business life and how business success is inﬂuenced by the quality and
cultivation of personal relationships’ (Michailova and Worm, 2003: 509). Secondly, blat
does not fit into the informal economy definition above as it is not paid activity and as
such, discussion of Ukrainian informality will not be comprehensive without taking into
consideration this peculiarity.
Here, the definition of blat needs to be discussed. To begin with, ‘there is no
uniﬁed, agreed meaning of blat and the term cannot easily be translated into English’
(Michailova and Worm, 2003: 509). Indeed, different authors define blat differently. The
major Russian blat commentator, Ledeneva (2006: 1), defines blat as ‘the use of
personal networks for obtaining goods and services in short supply and for
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circumventing formal procedures’. Meanwhile, Arnstberg and Boren (2003: 23)
consider blat as ‘informal everyday methods of obtaining goods and services’ or ‘a
system of redistribution of public resources in favour of those who are a part of one’s
personal network of relatives, friends, neighbours and colleagues’. Michailova and
Worm (2003: 510) agree with another blat definition of Ledeneva (1998) as ‘an
exchange of favour of access in conditions of shortages and a state system of
privileges where the favour of access is provided at public expense’. Despite the
variety of definitions, these do not contradict each other.
One should take into account that these definitions apply to blat in its traditional
meaning (i.e. as it was understood in the Soviet times). In the post-Soviet period, the
meaning of blat has been transformed as a result of political, social and economic
changes and therefore a new term and definition of the phenomena should be
suggested. In this thesis, in consequence, blat will be defined as the use of personal
networks for obtaining goods and services in a beneficial way for the individual and for
circumventing formal procedures. It also should be noted that for the sake of clarity the
term blat (although outdated) will be used in this thesis.
This section has focused on the scope of the research: what is included into the
informal economy and blat and thus what is going to be examined. The next section
provides an outline of the thesis including a brief description of each chapter.
1.3. Outline of thesis
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 includes the literature review on the
informal economy and in particular empirical research on (i) who does informal work
(e.g. populations socio-economic groups, economic sectors) (ii) who receives informal
work and (iii) why they engage in informal work (i.e., motives/rationales). The above is
analysed for (i) the third world countries, (ii) developed countries (iii) post-socialist
countries in general and (iv) Ukraine in particular. Speaking about Ukraine and other
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post-socialist countries, publications about blat phenomena will be also examined and
gaps in the knowledge will be identified. These gaps are: insufficient empirical evidence
for theoretical conclusions about the informal economy and blat in Ukraine; lack of any
in-depth qualitative research and profound understanding of the nature and causes of
the informal economy and blat and, therefore, a lack of the theorisation of the informal
economy and blat in Ukraine
Having identified the gaps in the literature on the informal economy in Ukraine,
Chapter 3 then develops a methodology for filling in these gaps. Possible methods,
both direct and indirect, are discussed and justification for the semi-structured face-to-
face interviews method is given. Following this, the questionnaire and sampling
procedure are elaborated. Finally, the chapter focuses on the characteristics of
Mykolayiv, the urban area chosen for the fieldwork.
On the basis of the methodology developed in Chapter 3, in Chapters 4 and 5
the collected data is analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively. The findings are
interpreted and the questions in the Aims and Objectives section of Chapter 1 are
answered and the theories of the informal economy and blat in Ukraine are evaluated
with regard to the findings. Chapter 4 is divided into two sections focusing respectfully
on the informal economy in general and informal work used to complete domestic tasks
in particular. Chapter 5 examines blat and the various forms of blat which have
emerged as a result of social and economic transformation.
Chapter 6 then draws together the main conclusions and implications of the
research as well as theoretical implications and practical policy suggestions as to the
way forward. Afterwards it identifies the limitations of the thesis, the need for further
research and the overall conclusions with regard to the aims and objectives set out in
the Chapter 1.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the theories, nature and extent of the informal
economy in Ukraine and in the rest of the world. Firstly, the contrasting theorisations of
the informal economy will be explained. Secondly, empirical evidence to support these
theorisations will be analysed. Thirdly, the nature and extent of the informal economy
will be reviewed including its relationship with globalisation, approaches to
classification, regional peculiarities and blat (as a feature of the informal economy in
Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries).
2.1. Contrasting theorisations of the relationship between formal and informal
work
This section provides a review of the literature on theories of the relationship between
the formal and informal economy. Williams and Round (2008) have produced a
classification of existing theorisations. They distinguish four different theoretical
approaches that consider informal employment as a residue; a by-product of the formal
economy; a complement to the formal economy; and an alternative to the formal
economy. They suggest however, that universal theorisations are not possible due to
the diverse nature of the informal economy. This can be viewed as the fifth post-
structuralist perspective.
2.1.1. Residue theory (dualistic approach)
The first perspective, residue theory, is based on the assumption that the informal
economy is a leftover from an earlier mode of production and consumption and will
disappear as a result of economic advancement. This theory corresponds with the
theory of binary oppositions by Derrida (1967) where the two elements are in
hierarchical relationship with each other: one is considered superordinate, while the
other is subordinate. Informality is subordinate and considered a negative phenomenon
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which is associated with underdevelopment while the formal economy is superordinate,
positive and connected with progress (Williams and Round, 2008).
In the middle of the last century, there was a belief that industrialization would
pull workers in developing countries from the unproductive informal sector towards a
modern industrial formal sector (Willman-Navarro, 2008; Moser, 1977). This theory
stemmed from ‘the experience of rebuilding Europe and Japan following World War II,
and the expansion of industrialization in the United States and Britain’ (Willman-
Navarro, 2008:369). However in the 1970s, the informal sector around the world was
still growing and these expectations were not borne out. The empirical data showed
that development policies were slow to trickle down and that the formal economy could
not absorb the large pool of unemployed (Willman-Navarro, 2008; Swaminathan,
1991).
However, the actual growth of the informal economy is not the only reason to
criticise this residue theory. Potts (2008) sees the main problem of the dualistic
conceptualisations (residue theory) of less developed economies in the fallacious view
of ‘disconnection’ between the two sectors. She accuses the colonisers and the
‘modern’ society of the restrictive framework they imposed on the ‘backward’ sector
hindering the ‘transformation’. To display this, Potts provides examples of polices
adopted in southern African societies that were led by this misleading theorisation. One
of the examples is that land was massively alienated from indigenous people and
restrictions on agricultural production were imposed while subsidising settler farmers.
Another example of inadequate policies is that colonisers invested little in non-
extractive sectors of economy disregarding ‘comparative advantage’ as ‘employment
and productivity at ‘home’ were the key imperatives of the colonial state’. (Potts 2008:
152). These and many other developments based on the residue theory were of great
importance for southern African societies. Therefore, Potts (2008) concludes that the
residue theory ‘has descriptive value but is dangerously misleading if translated into
policy that is founded on an idea that the sectors are functionally separate’ (Potts,
2008: 152-153).
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On this issue of indisputable fallacies, the view of the informal economy as a
residue has ‘resurfaced’ in a vast range of studies. For example, Chen et al. (2004)
argues that the residue theory has to be rethought due to the fact the informal economy
not only grew but also emerged in unexpected places and in various forms. She
summarises the main differences between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ concepts of the informal
economy (Table 2.1).
Table 2.1. Old and new views of the informal economy (Chen et al., 2004: 20)
The old view The new view
The informal sector is the traditional economy that will
wither away and die with modern, industrial growth
The informal economy is ‘here to stay’ and expanding
with modern, industrial growth.
It is only marginally productive. It is a major provider of employment, goods and
services for lower-income groups. It contributes a
significant share of GDP.
It exists separately from the formal economy It is linked to the formal economy—it produces for,
trades with, distributes for and provides services to
the formal economy.
It represents a reserve pool of surplus labour. Much of the recent rise in informal employment is due
to the decline in formal employment or to the
informalisation of previously formal employment
relationships.
It is comprised mostly of street traders and very
small-scale producers.
It is made up of a wide range of informal
occupations—both ‘resilient old forms’ such as casual
day labour in construction and agriculture as well as
‘emerging new ones’ such as temporary and part-time
jobs plus homework for high tech industries.
Most of those in the sector are entrepreneurs who run
illegal and unregistered enterprises in order to avoid
regulation and taxation
It is made up of non-standard wage workers as well
as entrepreneurs and self-employed persons
producing legal goods and services, albeit through
irregular or unregulated means. Most entrepreneurs
and the self-employed are amenable to, and would
welcome, efforts to reduce barriers to registration and
related transaction costs and to increase benefits
from regulation; and most informal wage workers
would welcome more stable jobs and workers’ rights.
Work in the informal economy is comprised mostly of
survival activities and thus is not a subject for
economic policy
Informal enterprises include not only survival activities
but also stable enterprises and dynamic growing
businesses, and informal employment includes not
only self-employment but also wage employment. All
forms of informal employment are affected by most (if
not all) economic policies.
Indeed, although earlier this ‘old view, or the formalization thesis, was widespread and
commonly accepted, today a growing amount of literature refutes this theory. The
reason for its defectiveness is seen in ‘a widespread recognition that the informal
economy is not some weak and disappearing realm but strong, persistent and even
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growing in the contemporary global economy’ (Williams and Round, 2007: 32)
2.1.2. By-product theory (structuralist approach)
The second theory, the by-product/globalisation/marginalisation approach, akin to the
residue theory, represents the informal economy negatively, but in contrast to the latter,
views this sphere as an integral part of the formal economy. The informal economy is
here seen as emerging in late capitalism and as a result of an increasingly deregulated
global economy in which labour standards are ever lower with the aim of cost
reduction. Here, marginalised population’s acceptance of the exploitative work
conditions is just a part of their ‘survival strategy’. These first two theories tend to focus
upon waged informal employment and also necessity-driven informal self-employment
(Williams and Round, 2008). According to Chen et al. (2004), waged informal
employment includes workers without worker benefits or social protection who work for
formal or informal firms, for households or with no fixed employer, including employees
of informal enterprises, other informal wage workers (casual or day labourers, domestic
workers, unregistered or informal workers, some temporary or part-time workers),
industrial outworkers (also called 'homeworkers').
The International Labour Office (2007), adopting a by-product approach,
negatively depicts informal work and promotes formal employment as decent and
progressive. For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, where the formal economy employs
not more than 10 percent of labour, addressing the informal economy and poverty
reduction are intertwined. In Latin America as well, the informal sector is very large
absorbing 75 percent of workforce and contributing around 40 percent of the region’s
GDP. Here the informal economy is viewed as an urban phenomenon, which was a
result of rural-urban migration caused by ‘burdensome regulations and lack of
recognition of the property rights and capital of informal operators’ (ILO, 2007: 5)
Focusing on the development of decent work in this region, the ILO adopted the policy
of ‘progressive formalization of the informal economy’. In Asia, the ILO (2007) argues,
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the main representatives of informal workers are micro-entrepreneurs and
homeworkers at the lower end of global supply chains. They are ‘unrecognized,
unprotected and lack access to basic services and rights’. As the ILO (2007: 18) puts it:
‘The main benefit of formalization should be considered in terms of increased
economic and social security that builds a platform for investment and enables
informal operators to take a longer perspective on their future than day-to-day
survival allows’.
Another example of the by-product theory can be found in Williams and Round (2007).
They studied work practices of households in Ukraine and found that the formalisation
thesis is not applicable there. Instead, informal work in Ukraine can best be described
using a by-product approach due to two main findings. Firstly, over a quarter of
households mainly rely on the informal economy. This shows that the informal sector is
not a disappearing residue from pre-capitalism. Secondly, for those engaged in the
informal work the main motive is to ‘eke out a living’. However the commentators argue
that the by-product thesis is not the most accurate approach to depict Ukrainian reality
(although the closest one). They argue that the informal economy in Ukraine is rather ‘a
core integral component of contemporary work organization’ (Williams and Round,
2007: 38). This is explained with the fact that the majority of those still in the formal
economy heavily rely on the informal economy to secure their livelihood.
One more example of the by-product approach is the work of Smith (2006), who
considers the informal economy as ‘constitutive outside’ of neo-liberalism. The author
also employs the example of post-socialist countries in the transition period. He sees it
as
‘a response to reductions in social benefits and as a way in which poor
households sustain livelihoods in the face of falling incomes. Recourse to
informal work provides an additional income stream to sustain that has been
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reduced because of neoliberal austerity measures’ (Smith, 2006: 11).
This correlates with the 'survival strategy' theory. However the author also mentions the
reciprocal nature of non-market informal labour, when informal activities imply being a
part of community. Here, Smith adheres to the post-structuralism view (discussed
below) of the informal ‘as part of a diverse economy of post-socialism constituted by a
range of forces, not only those corresponding to capitalist induced austerity’ (Smith,
2009: 53). The author suggests that informal practices cannot be seen just ‘as the
“survival strategies” of the poor, but as complex cultural and socio-economic
phenomena’. Some informal economic activities are not just profit earning, they have a
particular social and cultural significance for the participants – it is the way of being a
valuable member of your community, ‘the “glue” that enables “held togetherness” of
societies in traumatic times’ (Smith, 2009: 62). The idea can be illustrated by reciprocal
exchange of goods and labour: self-build housing construction, household food self-
production, etc. in Soviet and early post-Soviet (the tough 90’s) epoch. In addition,
Smith (2009) questions an applicability of the ‘survival strategy’ theory to self
provisioning arguing that food production for household consumption on domestic plots
of land (which is very common part of informal economy in post-socialist countries) is a
prerogative of not the poorest population.
Finally, Varnaliy (2007) portray the informal economy (‘shadow economy’) in
Ukraine as having a ‘negative impact on all social-economic processes’. They mention
that the ‘shadow sector constantly expands connections with the legal one, compete
with the latter and supplants it from the most regulated spheres of economy’. On the
basis of this depiction of the informal economy as a negative phenomenon and as
intertwined with the formal, one can assume that here the informal economy is also
considered as a by-product of the formal.
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2.1.3. Complementary theory
In the third theory, the relationship between the formal and informal economies is
complementary with both growing and declining in tandem, rather than substitutive as
in the by-product approach. Akin to the by-product approach, nevertheless, both
spheres are again seen as intertwined with each other, albeit in a mutually iterative
relationship rather than one arising as a consequence of the other. Moreover, although
inclusion into the formal economy is retained as a ‘path to progress’, the informal
economy is viewed more positively than in the residue and by-product approaches.
Economic development implies not only formal economy development, but also
informal development. Both economies are growing and declining in tandem and those
who are better-off have more opportunities to generate informal income while deprived
households are less involved in the informal economy (Williams and Round, 2008). In
order to obtain a better understanding of this relatively new approach to the informal
economy as a complement to the formal economy, the various studies referring to this
theoretical approach will be here discussed.
Williams and Marcelli (2009) argue that ‘besides profit-motivated market-like
informal work there exists informal work that is conducted under economic relations
more akin to paid mutual aid’ (2009: 228). They list the following positive characteristics
of the informal economy: it enhances social cohesion through mutual aid and
reciprocity; it enables the provision of goods and services to those in need; it helps
cement and develop social networks of material support; and it extends the range of
opportunities available to individuals and families to cope in situations of deprivation.
Williams and Round (2008) support this theory with the example of Ukraine.
They found that higher income households give and receive some 41 percent more
paid favours than the average household while the lowest income households account
for just half of the paid favours of the average household. This displays ‘how this
informal work reinforces the disparities produced in the formal economy’ (2008: 382).
Paid favours here include domestic tasks conducted for kin, friends and neighbours.
This work is done not only for profit motives, but also to help close people and/or
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reinforce social ties. The study of English localities (Williams, 2010a) revealed a similar
situation. Here, own-account work for closer social relations can take various forms
from profit motivated informal self-employment undertaken for more distant
acquaintances to the work performed solely for social motives.
Another piece of evidence supporting this theorization of the informal economy
as a complement to the formal economy is provided by a study of rural Pennsylvania
(Jensen and Slack, 2009). This study refutes common assumptions that formal and
informal economies are substitutes; in other words, that informal work is a survival
strategy and participation in the informal economy is inversely related to family income.
This builds on the fact, that the total number of formally employed members is
positively related to participation in the informal economy. Households with the
members in stable, well-paid jobs are more likely to participate in the informal economy
(e.g. entrepreneurial moonlighting) than those with low-paid household members. This
implies that ‘good’ jobs provide more opportunities for on-the-side earnings and
informal work is a complement to formal work. In addition, Jensen et al. (1995) found
that although the prevalence of the informal activities declines with rising income,
households with the lowest incomes were the least likely to report informal activities.
These findings therefore correspond with the informal-as-complement theory.
One of the attributes of the complement theorisation, namely a close connection
of the informal and formal economies, is shown by Dzivnka (2002) and Adam and
Ginsburgh (1985). Using the money demand method, Dzvinka (2002) displays that
‘there is no a significant adverse effect of the informal economy on the formal
one. These two are rather complements than substitutes. Economic agents have
formed preferences on what share of activities to report or hide. The preferences
look remarkably stable; only major policy shocks are likely to break these
preferences in favour of the official economy’.
Adam and Ginsburgh (1985) evaluated the effects of the informal economy on the
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formal one. They applied their analysis to Belgian economy and found that there was a
positive relationship between the growth of the informal and formal economies.
2.1.4. Alternative theory
The fourth theory which views the informal economy as an alternative to the formal
economy is advocated mostly by neo-liberals (De Soto, 1989; Schneider and Enste,
2000; Maloney, 2003). They consider over-regulation of the economy as very negative
and argue that ‘the real problem is not so much informality as formality’. The solution is
to liberate the labour market from intervention, and informal employment exemplifies
how formal employment could be organized if it were deregulated. In this approach,
which is more commonly applied to a third world context, the normative hierarchy of the
residue and by-product discourses is inverted. The conventional normative portrayal of
economic development as a process of formalization is countered with an alternative
inverted view of development as a process of informalisation. In this approach
opportunity driven informal self-employment is discussed. These are mostly micro-
entrepreneurs that prefer informality due to the cost-, time- and effort-consuming
registration (Williams and Round, 2008).
For example, Cross (2000) argues that informal sector takes over where the
formal sector fails. This is the ‘micro-business’ sector that absorbs part of increased
unemployment, tempering negative social effects of economic downturn. Therefore the
view of the informal sector as ‘a bad copy of the formal’ is seen to be erroneous.
Furthermore, the author criticises the projects for informal micro-business
development. He argues that imposing formal rules to informal businesses undermines
their success factors. ‘From engaging in a flexible and evolving economic activity
focused on family subsistence needs…, they are sucked into a rigid set of rules that
they can barely understand…’ (Cross, 2000: 44). It is further suggested that in order to
encourage entrepreneurship, micro-firms should be allowed to remain unofficial at least
until there is more sense to become formal in order to protect their capital. Thus, this
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perspective can be put into the alternative theory.
Maloney (2003) while criticising dualism compares informal work and self-
employment in micro-enterprises with the official employment and presents alternative
views of informality on the basis of a survey conducted in Latin America. The survey
showed the core of informality in Latin America is self-employment which is preferred
due to dignity/prestige and autonomy/flexibility/comfort rather than due to necessity.
The author supports his theory concluding that ‘it may be the attractiveness of informal
self-employment that causes dualism rather than a segmented market causing
informality’ (Maloney, 2003: 4). Moreover the Latin countries’ informal sector is seen
here as a ‘healthy, voluntary small firm sector’ (2003: 14). This can be viewed as an
alternative theory as well.
Williams et al. (2011) supported the alternative theory of the informal
employment by the example of Ukrainian own-account workers. In order to define
which theory is more applicable to this type of worker, they analysed the motives for
being informal in terms of voluntariness of participation in the informal work. The survey
revealed that informal self-employed can be divided into three groups: those who
voluntarily exit the formal sector (57 percent of all self-employed), those who are
excluded from the formal sector (20 percent) and those who have both exit and
exclusion reasons for being informal (23 percent). Who are then those self-employed
exiting the formal economy and the most likely to fit the alternative theory? They are
mostly the higher-income informal self-employed driven by the extra-earnings
opportunities from their formal job. This includes, for example, plumbers, electricians,
builders and even lawyers whose motive is just to ‘top up’ their formal incomes. The
other major motive for performing informal work is to avoid informal taxation and
administrative corruption that are characteristic to Ukraine. They positively perceive
informality due to the belief that the taxes they pay are being stolen by the officials.
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2.1.5. Post-structuralist theory
Analysing these four theories, Williams and Round (2008: 383-384) conclude that ‘each
theory is talking about very different forms of informal employment (e.g. neo-liberals
largely discuss informal self-employment while by-product theorists discuss informal
waged employment)’. They then assert that ‘although evidence can be found to support
nearly all these theories by looking at specific types of informal employment, no one
theory accurately depicts informal employment as a whole’.
The relationship between formal and informal employment, positive/negative
perception, and what forms of informal economy is discussed in each theoretical
approach is rendered by the authors in the following scheme:
Figure 2.1. The relationships between formal and informal employment (Williams and
Round, 2008: Figure 1)
Indeed, one might see this approach of Williams and Round (2008) and Chen et al.
(2004) as a fifth perspective; what might be termed a post-structuralist perspective. The
term ‘post-structuralist’ is used to recognise the economic plurality and diversity
inherent in the ‘economy’ writ large and these post-structuralist commentators argue
that each form of the informal economy seeks to allow the plurality of economic forms
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in existence to have a voice. The literature on this approach is briefly discussed below.
First of all there is a ‘diverse economies’ perspective that is grounded in the
work of Gibson-Graham (2008). He suggested a diagram (Table 2.2 below) that groups
‘the huge variety of economic transactions, labour practices and economic
organizations’ (Gibson-Graham, 2008: 3). It should be noted that this diagram is an
‘open-ended work in progress’ and could be potentially supplemented with other
columns.
Table 2.2. A diverse economy (Gibson-Graham, 2008: 4)
TRANSACTIONS LABOR ENTERPRISE
MARKET WAGE CAPITALIST
ALTERNATIVE
MARKET
Sale of public goods
Ethical ‘fair-trade’ markets
Local trading systems
Alternative currencies
Underground market
Co-op exchange
Barter
Informal market
ALTERNATIVE
PAID
Self-employed
Cooperative
Indentured
Reciprocal labour
In kind
Work for welfare
ALTERNATIVE
CAPITALIST
State enterprise
Green capitalist
Socially responsible firm
Non-profit
NON-MARKET
Household flows
Gift giving
Indigenous exchange
State allocations
State appropriations
Gleaning
Hunting, fishing, gathering
Theft, poaching
UNPAID
Housework
Family care
Neighbourhood work
Volunteer
Self-provisioning labour
Slave labour
NON-CAPITALIST
Communal
Independent
Feudal
Slave
The work of Pavlovskaya (2004) bases her study of post-Soviet households in Moscow
on the post-structuralist concept of diverse economies as well. She analyses three
theoretical approaches in terms of existence of capitalist/non-capitalist forms of
economy in capitalist society. Firstly, she argues about the existence of multiple
economic forms within capitalism. This approach is post-structuralist. In the frames of
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this theory, the post-Soviet economy may be identified ‘as consisting of multiple
economies instead of its generalized characterization as ‘post-socialist’ or ‘market-
based’’ (Pavlovskaya, 2004: 334). Secondly, she claims the existence of non-capitalist
forms of labour in modern capitalist societies. And finally, she argues mixed capitalist
and non-capitalist economic institutions can exist together, when socialism and
capitalism are not mutually exclusive.
The similar, diverse (multicoloured) economies concept is developed and
proved in Smith and Stenning (2006). They argue that ‘capitalist development in post-
socialist societies should be seen as one part of a diverse economy’ (2006: 1) and that
that the informal economy is articulated with other types of economies in different
geographies – both local and global. Speaking about informal work the authors connect
it with ‘forced flexibilization’ of workforce and emergence of ‘portfolio workers’- caused
by the retrenchment of formal labour markets i.e. they adopt a by-product approach.
Being unemployed or employed part-time the workers had to find new sources of
income (mostly self-employment), often several at a time in order to provide decent
standard of living. They suggest, however, that the informal work conducted for the
family members is not always financially motivated and that affluent households have
more opportunities to receive informal income and therefore are even more engaged in
the informal activities that less well-off households. Poor households usually engage in
‘defensive’ informal practices while the informality of ‘elite’ is ‘entrepreneurial’ in their
practices.
Supporting the views of the post-structuralists, Chen (2007: 5) found that
‘informal enterprises include not only survival activities but also stable enterprises and
dynamic growing businesses’. She also mentions each theory suits different types of
informal work. Based on these assertions she divides informal employment into two big
groups. In the first group is self-employment in informal enterprises. It is when people
work in small unregistered or unincorporated enterprises. They may be employers or
own account operators (both heads of family enterprises and single person operators)
or unpaid family workers. In the second group is wage employment in informal jobs
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without social benefits and protection.
Mandybura (1998) reviewed different shades of the informal economy: from
bloody black (criminal activity) to light-grey (mostly informal activity of households) and
different timeframes: from the 1970s in the Soviet era to the first decade of
Independence. The author explains the light-grey economy as a positive phenomenon,
which helps people to survive and achieve satisfactory levels of income during the
transition period. In particular he mentions that food production for household
consumption on domestic plots of land is of great importance for households’ survival
in developing and transition countries. However, as mentioned above, Smith (2009)
proves that these agricultural activities were a prerogative of not the poorest population
according to the research in Russia and Slovakia in 2002. According to Mandybura one
more positive impact of these light-grey activities on the economy is that they enforced
‘marketisation’ of the transitive economy. The author does not describe the interaction
between the light-grey and white economies (his theoretical implications concern
mostly illegal, ‘black’ economy). He argues that each component of the informal
economy should be considered individually, which also correlates with the modern
‘diverse economies’ approach.
To conclude, among the five perspectives discussed above, the most popular
and up-to-date is the post-structuralist thought, which can also be called a ‘diverse
economies’ approach because it recognises the plurality of economic practices in post-
socialist societies and the fact that capitalism is not yet hegemonic. However, there is
no consensus yet about the theorisation of the informal economy. Commentators
persist who advocate each and every one of these rival theoretical perspectives.
Having discussed the existing theories of the informal economy, we now move
to the next section that aims to test the validity of these theories in terms of empirical
data on different places and societies.
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2.2. Mapping the informal economy in global perspective
The homogeneous nature of the informal economy as a residual, negative and
discriminating phenomenon is no longer so popular among scientists. The extensive
nature of the informal economy and consequently its persistence is already
acknowledged by the majority of commentators (Chen et al., 2004; Williams and
Windebank, 1998; Marcelli et al. (2004); Schneider and Enste 2000; Esim, 2001;
Wallace et al., 2004; Smith and Stenning, 2006). ‘Most observers now accept that
informal employment is a feature of modern capitalist development, not just a residual
feature of traditional economies’ (Chen et al., 2004: 13)
However, there is no consensus yet on the theorization of the informal
economy. Williams and Round (2008) systematise existing theorisations of the informal
economy. As discussed above, they distinguish four different theoretical approaches
that consider the informal economy as: a residue, a by-product of the formal economy,
a complement to the formal economy, and an alternative to the formal economy. Chen
(2007) collates corresponding schools of thought regarding the informal economy:
dualism, structuralism and legalism. Williams (2010) identifies two general opposing
perspectives: modernization thesis and globalisation thesis. All these theorisation
approaches are summarized in Table 2.3.
The objective of this section is to test the validity of these theories in relation to
different groups of countries and to Ukraine separately on the grounds of the empirical
data available and to conclude what approaches are applicable to different groups of
informal workers in different parts of the world.
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Table 2.3. Theorisation of the informal economy
# Chen (2007) Williams and
Round (2008)
Williams
(2010)
Main features
1 Dualism a residue of pre-
capitalist society
modernisation
thesis
- binary hierarchy of formal,
a superordinate, and
informal, subordinate;
- informal work is in a long-
term decline;
- formal and informal are not
linked;
- informal is primitive,
marginal, weak, negative;
- informality is an exclusion.
2 Structuralism a by-product of the
formal economy
globalisation
and marginal
theses
- informal work is in a long-
term growth;
- informality is an exclusion;
- formal and informal are
intertwined;
- informality is negatively
viewed;
- informality is a survival
strategy;
- informality is a result of
deregulation and
globalization.
3
Po
st
-s
tru
ct
ur
al
is
m
a complement to the
formal economy
- informality is positively
viewed;
- informal is in direct relation
with formal;
- informality is a result of
social networking;
- informality is an exit.
4
Le
ga
lis
m
 (n
eo
-
lib
er
al
is
m
)
an alternative to the
formal economy
- formal and informal are
relatively separate;
- informality is positively
viewed;
- informality is an exit;
- deregulation is promoted
and bureaucracy criticized.
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2.2.1. Globalisation and informality
Before discussing different countries and global regions, it is worth mentioning
globalization and its influence on informality all over the world. Williams (2010) employs
the term ‘globalization thesis’ arguing that informal work is universally growing
(Williams 2010, Schneider and Enste, 2000; Tiessen 1997; Rodgers, Williams and
Round, 2008; Esim, 2001; Glovakas, 2005). One of the most exciting ideas of the
globalization thesis refers to the neo-liberal project of deregulation. ‘Economic
globalization refers to a dangerous cocktail of deregulation and increasing global
competition that produces an expansion of informal work’ (Williams, 2010: 13). Here
informal work is seen as a new form of advanced capitalism.
Other advocates of the globalization thesis, Schneider and Enste (2000),
analyse the sizes and tendencies of informal employment all over the world and found
that informal economy rose dramatically over the past two decades, regardless of the
estimation method. The authors identified the following main economic causes of the
increase: the burden of tax and social security contributions, intensity of regulation,
social welfare system, overregulation and labour costs in the official labour market,
which it should be noted are factors associated with the alternative or neo-liberal
theorisation of the informal economy.  However they also argue that
‘economic factors can only partly explain the increase. Micro-sociological and
psychological approaches can provide interesting additional insights in the
decision making process of individuals choosing to work underground. In an
interdisciplinary approach (as undertaken in economic psychology), variables
such as tax morale and acceptance and perceived fairness of the tax system are
considered’ (Schneider and Enste, 2000: 82).
The variables cited lead to the inevitable conclusion that informal work can only be
reduced by de-regulating the economy. This, therefore, must be attributed to the
alternative theory. To the non-economic factors influencing the extent of the informal
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economy in particular regions, historical traditions and social relations in particular
regions also may be added.
The ‘globalisation’ thesis is opposed to the ‘modernization’ thesis which
dominated in earlier literature and viewed informality as slowly disappearing. However
both theses are universal theories, and in order to study informal work more accurately
a more context-bound approach should be employed.
ILO (2002) also sees the informal economy growth within past several decades.
Its view of globalization is mixed. ILO recognizes positive changes caused by
globalization due to transnational corporations that create new official working places
and new markets for the self-employed deploying production in developing countries.
However, globalization tends to be favourable for large formal companies and to
disadvantage micro-entrepreneurs in the Third World. As ILO (2002: 34) puts it
‘there can be no greater contrast in terms of market access, power and
competitiveness, than that between the woman who produces clothes at home
for local markets and the brand-name retail firm that markets fashion clothes in
the United States or Europe. The impact of global competition also encourages
formal firms to shift formal wage workers to informal employment arrangements’.
The idea of large firms employing informal workers due to increased international
competition in the global environment is supported by many observers (ILO Pakistan
Office, 2009; Maloney, 2004; Meledendez et al., 2010)
Interestingly, globalization penetrates even the least developed countries,
‘…vendors are becoming linked to multinational corporation chains, with companies
such as Unilever selling their soap through them and with Coca-Cola renting out kiosks’
(Carr and Chen, 2001). Evidently, such trading activities may be completely or partially
informal. ILO gives the following comments regarding the growth of informality caused
by globalization:
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‘where the informal economy is linked to globalization, it is often because a
developing country has been excluded from integration into the global economy.
It is the failure or inability of countries to participate in globalization processes
(whether because of their own domestic policies or because of international
barriers), rather than globalization per se, that contributes to preventing these
countries from benefiting from trade, investments and technology’ (ILO, 2002:
34).
Another consequence of globalization is the apparent concentration of informal work in
global cities performed by immigrants/ethnic minorities. Domestic informal work in
London may be taken as an example. Cox and Watt (2002) argue that globalization
resulted in both middle class spending power increase due to development of global
cities as financial centres and growth of immigrants from developing countries that
cannot work officially because of immigration status or language difficulties and
therefore are ready to work as domestic workers for less. These two factors caused an
increase of unofficial paid domestic work as more and more professionals can now
afford and obtain domestic help. The analogical case can be found in Waldinger and
Lapp (1993) article where the increase in informal employment in the garment industry
in New York is discussed. However, the commentators admit that not only marginalized
populations are involved in informal work, but also self-employed professionals and
landlords.
Though most authors advocate the general growth of the informal economy,
which correspond with the globalisation thesis, Williams (2010) notes that posing this
as a universal generalisation is misleading for two reasons. Firstly, the informal
economy is not always and everywhere growing. Secondly, informality is not
everywhere an outcome of neo-liberal economic globalisation, ‘…a fuller understanding
will derive only from a socially, culturally, and geographically embedded consideration
of this sphere’ (Williams, 2010: 13).
This sub-section provided a review of literature addressing the issue of the
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informal economy in the context of globalisation in general. The next sub-sections
provide a more detailed examination of the existing literature on empirical aspects of
the informal economy in particular regions and countries.
2.2.2. Third World countries
The informal economy is often called a traditional economy (Zapotoczky, 1995; Chen et
al., 2004; Flodman Becker, 2004) when speaking about Third World countries. Indeed,
the informal sector plays a fundamental role in their economic structure. This sector is
growing very fast here, and the globalization thesis is accepted by the majority of the
observers (Zapotoczky, 1995; Flodman Becker, 2004; Chen et al., 2004; Muza, 2009).
The issue of informality is also closely connected with Third World countries’ poverty
problem. For every nation, engagement in informal activities is a ‘survival strategy’ in
the very literal sense of the word. However, even in these countries, by-product theory
is not the sole applicable theory. Zapotoczky (1995: 245) speaks in support of
alternative theory and the importance of cultural compatibility. He argues that the
informal economy is useful and necessary (especially for developing countries) due to
economic and cultural reasons and supports this point of view with the examples of
Indonesia and Peru, where ‘the informal sector seems to harmonize well with the
different local cultures, while the almost totally bureaucratized formal sector contradicts
the local cultural peculiarities and in the long run brings along partly exorbitant
contradictions’. The author accentuates the necessity of the particular cultural
compatibility of economic institutions. Besides, he argues that in developing countries
the majority of employment opportunities (and consequently poverty reduction) may be
created only in the informal sector. However, he does not comment on the methods of
formalisation of informal activities while this is also very important for the development
and poverty control. In support of the above, De Soto (1989) should be mentioned and
his neo-liberal (alternative) theory that the underground economy is part of the solution,
not the problem. If this entrepreneurial spirit were legalized and nurtured rather than
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fettered and suppressed a burst of competitive energy would be released.
Speaking about the proportion, nature and reasons of informality in developing
countries one may argue that they bear a great resemblance to each other. According
to Chen et al. (2004: 14):
‘the largest occupational categories within the informal economy, in most
developing countries, include casual day labourers in agriculture and
construction, small farmers, forest gatherers, street vendors, domestic workers,
workers in EPZ factories or small unregistered workshops, and industrial
outworkers who work from their homes (also called homeworkers)’.
There exist a number of publications focusing on the informal economy in particular
Third World countries. For example, in Botswana, the informal sector increased by 72
percent during the past decade.  Informal businesses are mostly found in cities/towns
and urban villages than in rural areas. Majority of informal businesses are operated by
females (67.6 percent). Education has a marked effect on operators of informal
businesses: those with no or less education more likely to run an informal sector
business. The results further indicated that the majority of informal sector business
operators are engaged in Wholesale & Retail Trade at 40.5 percent, followed by
Construction at 20.3 percent (Republic of Botswana Central Statistics Office, 2009).
However, the results of a June 2002 to August 2003 survey according to Kapunda and
Mmolawa (undated) showed the inverse statistic concerning the education level of
informal workers. They argue that the informal sector is represented both with
educated (60 percent) and uneducated (40 percent) persons.
According to a nation-wide household income and expenditure Survey (HIES)
carried out from June 2002 to August 2003, the first reason given by 40 percent of the
respondents was that they joined the informal sector because they were unemployed
and had to take self-employment/ informal business as the last resort, 25 percent
expressed that they needed a better income than what they used to have as well as to
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supplement their monthly salaries (confirmation of the by-product theory). 35 percent
had a keen interest in self employment and wanted to be their own bosses (alternative
theory). Before that they were mostly formally employed or students.
The informal economy in Zimbabwe is analysed by Muza (2009) in the context
of poverty reduction. In Zimbabwe, the nature of informal work is similar to other Sub-
Saharan countries. However, the situation is aggravated by droughts and 5-year
economic crisis resulting in 94 percent of unemployment rate. Therefore rural dwellers
indulged in agriculture have to seek for informal employment not just in urban areas but
also overseas: South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia. The most qualified
and experienced consider work opportunities in Australia, United Kingdom, New
Zealand and United States of America. The survival strategies to offset agricultural
income shortfalls include illicit diamond mining in the absolutely indecent working
conditions. At the same time informal sector remains unattractive due to high
vulnerability and risk.
Flodman Becker (2004) also commented that the first ILO employment mission
in 1972 to Africa, Kenya, observed that the informal sector, described as activities that
are unrecognised, unrecorded, unprotected or unregulated by public authorities, was
not confined to marginal activities but also included profitable enterprises. This allows
us to conclude that not only by-product theory is applicable to developing countries in
Africa, but also alternative theory.
In Latin America the character of the informal economy is somewhat different.
Maloney (2004), supporting his views with De Soto’s neo-liberal theory of informal
economy, concluded from the surveys in Latin America that informality there is not a
‘disadvantaged residual’ but unregulated micro-entrepreneurial sector. He rejects the
dualistic view (residue theory) that the firms facing international competition try ‘to
reduce legislated or union induced rigidities and high labour costs, particularly through
subcontracting production out to unprotected workers’ (2004: 1). He found that ‘of
those workers who started in the formal salaried sector but move into informal self-
employed sector 15 months later, two-thirds report moving voluntarily, citing a desire
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for greater independence or higher pay as the principal motives’ (2004: 2). It supports
the results of interviews in 1970s with Monterrey workers that discovered their
endeavour to be one's own boss. Furthermore, movements into self-employment from
official waged employment often represented an improvement in job status. The same
was revealed in Argentina: ‘80 percent of the self-employed had no desire to change
jobs and under 18 percent saw self-employment as a temporary activity before they
found a ‘real’ job’. In Gran Buenos Aires only 26 percent of self-employed were
dissatisfied with current position. In Paraguay, this percentage constituted 28 and even
the share of informal workers, who seem to be the most disadvantageous – only 32
percent. According to Maloney (2004: 4),
‘if firms must pay ‘efficiency’ or above market clearing wages to dissuade their
workers from opening their own firms, this creates a segmented market. It may
be the attractiveness of informal self-employment that causes dualism rather than
a segmented market causing informality…Though informal salaried workers
always earn consistently less, this may be due to the fact that they are often
related to the owners of the enterprises where they work and thus may receive
unobserved payments in kind (food, lodging). Further, to the degree that the
sector appears to play a job training role for young workers, some fraction of the
salary may be deducted to cover implicit training costs’.
Maloney (2004: 6) also challenges the view of the informal economy as an absorbent
for officially unemployed workforce. The surveys in Mexico and Argentina showed that
‘75 percent of the unemployed in Mexico and 64 percent in Argentina were
informal previously. And although their unemployment spells are 30 percent lower
than those of formal sector workers, it is not the case that they instantly find new
informal jobs. So the sector is not simply or even primarily absorbing the
unemployed from the formal sector’.
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Another important fact mentioned by Maloney is that in Argentina and Mexico there is
interdependence between education level and formality. As the education level
increases, the probability of movement from the formal to informal sector decreases.
‘More educated workers will have higher productivity in firms than in self-employment’.
People with mature children are more likely to move to risky informal self-employment,
as their children ‘provide a hedge against the risk’. Those who are going to be self-
employed also hedge themselves against risks offered by informality staying in formal
job until the enterprise is safely established.
Women, being discriminated in sub-Saharan Africa and Pakistan in the
household informal work, in Latin America participate in the formal sector in the highest
proportion. This mostly refers to single women without children. Those who have
children and are burdened with household duties prefer the informal sector due to its
flexibility. For younger people, who recently obtained school education, the informal
sector serves as job-training site even for more apprentices than the formal education
system.
Speaking about developing countries in general, Ruffer and Knight (2007)
divide informal activities into ‘voluntary’ (a result of exit) and ‘involuntary’ (a result of
exclusion) chosen. Voluntary informality is a response by small enterprises to over-
regulation by government bureaucracies, and the result of a decision that the cost of
being informal is lower than that of being formal. For example, Latin America, Maloney
(2004) investigated the case of Latin America, namely, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay countries in details and concluded, that two-thirds of informal workers are
highly qualified, mature people, well-connected and experienced. They exit the formal
economy explaining it with higher-income possibilities. These facts give evidence
concerning the alternative theory of the informal economy.
Meanwhile, informality as a result of exclusion is an only way out when the rate
of unemployment is very high and is characterized by lower wages, indecent work
conditions and high vulnerability. It prevails in China and South Africa. In China, rural
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dwellers cannot obtain formal jobs in the city because of the residence registration,
which restricts rights of migrants from rural areas and protect urban dwellers against
the competition. Therefore, rural-born people may obtain only informal, discriminatory
jobs. In South Africa, the labour force grew by 4.6 million over the eight years, wage
employment by 1.3 million, self-employment by 0.7 million, and unemployment by 2.6
million. The figures imply that the economy is unable to provide enough working places
for the growing workforce. Those who could not obtain wage jobs entered self-
employment or open unemployment. As a result, the wages of the self-employed are
falling much more rapidly than formal wages (Ruffer and Knight, 2007). Here, by-
product theory may be applied.
The nature and extent of informal work in South Asia is unsurprisingly different.
During the regional consultation of ILO in Pakistan on home based workers in South-
East Asia, it was reported that 80 percent of the total working population is engaged in
informal work, of which 50 percent are women (ILO Pakistan Office, 2009). Among the
working women in the informal sector, 80 percent are home-based workers, which is a
huge part of the whole Pakistan economy. Though the consultation was aimed at
home-based women rights support, relevant facts on the informal economy were also
reported. Home-based women workers in Pakistan are mostly illiterate and belong to a
poor income background. Most of women are piece-rate workers involved in
embroidery, carpet weaving, wood work, handicrafts, gem cutting and embroidering for
multinational companies. Here, the globalization thesis may be employed (informal
work in developing countries as a part of transnational companies’ supply chain) and
the reasons and nature of informality fit the by-product theory.
2.2.3. Developed countries
In developed nations, informal economic activity is also diverse. According to Williams
and Windebank (1998), the complementary theorisation is the most relevant for
understanding the informal economy in developed countries. People are engaged in
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the informal economy in order to develop and maintain social networks. The more
affluent is the household, the better opportunities it has to conduct self-provisioning,
unpaid community exchange and paid informal work (Williams and Windebank, 1998;
Slack and Jensen, 2010). The situation with the unemployed is different even in
developed countries: for them, informality is necessity driven, a strategy to get by. The
examples are benefit fraudsters who obtain unemployment benefits being informally
employed and migrants without work permit. At the same time for those in employment,
informal work is mainly beneficial, which is proved by direct surveys conducted in
developed nations. Therefore, the marginality thesis has been largely refuted so far
(Williams 2010).
Pfau-Effinger (2009: 83) found that ‘in generous welfare states, the chance that
a part of work is organized in terms of undeclared work is rather lower than in less
generous welfare states’. The commentator asserts that this contradicts the alternative
theory which states that the main reason for undeclared work ‘is the result of over-
regulation and heavy state intervention in the economy through tax and social security
system contribution systems’. Herewith, Pfau-Effinger advocates the diversity of
informal work and inconsistency of a unique theory explaining such work. She states
that ‘there are different types of undeclared work that vary with respect to the way in
which they are embedded in societal contexts and in terms of the factors that inﬂuence
the way in which they develop’ (2009: 83). Therefore, the author developed a typology
of undeclared work to systematize possible combinations of motives and strategies of
both suppliers and consumers, which will be discussed later in this chapter.
United States
Analysing the ‘globalisation thesis’ particularly widespread in the United States
Williams (2006: 35) found that informal work is ‘especially prevalent in global cities and
among immigrant/ethnic minority populations’. This type of informal workers (‘day
labourers’) was examined by Melendez et al. (2010) is obviously related to the by-
product theory. These workers are primarily immigrants from Mexico, Central America
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and South America and mainly work in construction and manufacturing. Some 95
percent of them are male and only 26 percent have documents or work permit. Such
informal work allows enterprises to reduce labour costs employing flexible and cheap
labour. For the day workers, it is involuntary informality, for many the only chance to
get by (Meledendez et al., 2010).
However, the research in California in 2004-2006 commented by Marcelli
(2010) showed that the popular account of informality as a survival strategy of
uneducated, low-skilled workers who live in urbanized areas, is doubtful. Firstly, it is
because the proportion of informal jobs tends to be higher in non-metropolitan and
small-metropolitan areas. Secondly, though informal work is mostly performed by
workers with only high school education, some highly informal jobs include a sizable
proportion of college graduates. The results of survey reconfirm that a singular
universal theorization is not possible even in developed countries.
The research conducted in rural Pennsylvania by Slack and Jensen (2010)
revealed that one of the peculiarities of this rural economy is the shortage of all the
necessary services at hand. Another is the availability of land and other natural
resources. So, for example, cutting and selling firewood is very popular in rural
Pennsylvania. The interviews conducted in this region showed that two main reasons
of being informal are ‘to help out neighbours and relatives’, which is characteristic for
better-off households and ‘to make ends meet’, which was cited mostly by lower-
income interviewees. The above means that, again, a universal theorisation is
impossible. Here, the by-product and complementary theorisations are both relevant,
albeit for different population groups.
Canada
Fortin and Lacroix (2010) discussed two large surveys in the Quebec Province in
Canada that were conducted in 1985 and 1994. The surveys discovered approximately
the same as in Pennsylvania. The most interesting findings are:
- on the supply side of the market nearly 4 percent of the adult population is
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involved in informal work. On the demand side, the proportion constitutes 17.5
percent (this discrepancy set the readers thinking about the reliability of the
survey data);
- mostly young, relatively educated men are engaged in part-time work in urban
areas; welfare recipients, unemployed, underemployed are also largely
represented in informal economy;
- the higher the participant’s formal income is, the smaller is his/her informal
income and the bigger are his/her informal expenditures. This indicates that
informal markets perform complex redistributive function;
- and finally, what is also rather disturbing, when asked about perceived
prevalence of informal work, most participants reported that it is widespread.
This is in conflict not only with the survey results concerning the extent of
informal work but with the same respondents’ answers that very few people in
their neighbourhood work informally.
To conclude about the USA and Canada, two concepts of informal work prevail: by-
product theory (relating to low-income households or illegal immigrants undertake
informal jobs to get by) and complementary theory (referring to social network creation
and maintenance by well-off households).
Germany
In Germany, the size of the informal economy is higher than in other developed EU-
countries. Pfau-Effinger and Magdalenich (2010) distinguish two main types of informal
work in Germany: ‘poverty escape’ and ‘moonlighting’. The first type is as usual
represented by low-skilled workers in construction, transportation and restaurant
industries. A substantial part of such work is located in private households, where the
typical employer is an employed upper-middle-class couple and the typical domestic
worker is a formally unemployed working class housewife or female migrant.
Interestingly, female migrants act not only as breadwinners for their families, but
contribute to trans-nationalization of lifestyles, communication and consumption. The
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second type is a strategy to earn additional income to that earned through formal
employment. Moonlighting is mainly associates with native population in the fields of
construction, repair and renovation. The main aim is to increase disposable household
income to purchase desired goods and services. While ‘poverty escape’ group
obviously corresponds with the by-product thesis, the explanation of ‘moonlighting’ may
be rather problematic. The observers challenge neoclassical theory arguing that ‘strong
state regulations and relatively high social security taxes have had a rather ambiguous
effect on informal employment in Germany’. Though these factors may influence
moonlighting activities, the effect may be mitigated or enhanced by cultural factors:
immanent to Germans low trust in public institutions and relatively high cultural
acceptance of informality.
Pfau-Effinger (2009) advocating the heterogeneity of undeclared work suggests
three types of such work on the basis of empirical studies:
1. The ‘poverty escape’ type of undeclared work is deﬁned as ‘undeclared work
that is supplied by workers with the immediate aim of avoiding extreme poverty
and as such provides their main source of income’ (Pfau-Effinger, 2009: 84). As
an example, female immigrants without work permit that are informally
employed by 3.4 million of households in Germany which is 11 percent of
German households’ total number.
2. The ‘moonlighting’ type is represented by the self-employment or small
businesses of qualified employees with the aim of getting extra-income without
paying taxes to afford themselves luxury items. This type is mostly prevalent in
prospering economies with full employment. The main prerequisites of
moonlighting are high taxes, large quantity of affluent middle-class consumers
and the last, but most important – a cultural acceptance of this type of
undeclared work.
3. The ‘solidarity orientated’ type includes exchange of services among friends,
neighbours, relatives rather for developing social networks and mutual support
than for monetary gain. This type of undeclared work has much in common to
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unpaid mutual help.
Therefore, Pfau-Effinger (2009) raises two important questions. The first question is
why in such close social networks services are paid at all. Williams and Windebank
(2005) explain this by firstly, the unwillingness of people to feel that they owed others a
favour and secondly, a distrust or doubts that the favour will be returned. The second is
why this paid mutual help cannot be registered. According to Pfau-Effinger (2009), this
is because there is a public perception of this type of activity as private, into which the
state should not intervene. Table 2.4 below summarises the main features of each type
of informal work: the nature and the motives of suppliers and consumers.
Table 2.4. The main types of informal work (Pfau-Effinger, 2009: Table 1)
Description of field of
employment Supply side motive Demand side motive
Type 1: Poverty
escape type
— based on dependent
employment (or
precarious forms of
self-employment) as
main income basis
of the workers
— used by firms and
private households
— Strategy of workers
to escape poverty
who are restricted
from entering
regular employment
that is based on
income above the
poverty line
In firms:
— cost-saving strategy
of firms seeking
undeclared work for
tasks that require
relatively low skills
In private households:
— strategy of affluent
households to get
affordable support
for the dual-earner
arrangement
Type 2:
Moonlighting
— Self-employment as
side job in addition
to standard employment
— mainly private
households as
contractors, in some
parts also small
businesses
— Fulfilment of
‘luxury-item’ wishes
without paying taxes
and social security
contributions
— Cost-saving strategy
of private
households and
firms as reaction to
craftsmen or
professionals seeking
side job
Type 3:
Solidarity based
form
— Mutual support in
social networks,
based on money or
payment in kind
— support given to
others in social
networks, more than
the monetary gain
— low degree of
acceptance of the
obligation to pay taxes
for support in social
networks
— get help from others
within social network
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United Kingdom
According to Williams (2010a), the survey of household work practices in affluent and
deprived rural and urban areas showed that different meanings of informal work occur
in different geographical contexts. In order to explore geographical variations of the
nature and extent of informal work, data was collected through 861 face-to-face
interviews between 1998 and 2003 in 11 English localities. The survey corroborates the
conclusions of previous studies that informal work is not concentrated in deprived
populations, which challenges the marginalisation thesis. It has been found that those
who live in affluent areas consume and supply informal work to a greater extent than
those living in deprived areas. Moreover, higher-income population receive a
disproportionate share of the income from such work.
As for motives, in affluent areas, informal work consumption is mostly motivated
by financial gain and is mostly acting as a substitute for formal employment. Such work
is conducted by friends and neighbours for gifts to develop closer social bonds and by
pre-adult children to redistribute cash and teach them the value of money. In deprived
areas the majority of informal work is undertaken by friends, neighbours and kin with
the object of building social capital and redistribution (i.e. helping others out as by
giving them money). Similar to customers, suppliers of informal work in affluent urban
areas are motivated by financial gain, while in lower-income areas informal workers
undertake such work for the purpose of developing social networks and/or
redistribution.
To sum up, even in the developed countries the diversity of informal economies
may be found including disadvantageous informal employment of marginal populations.
However, complementary and alternative theories prevail here and social and cultural
factors play an even more important role when people choose informality.
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2.2.4. Ukraine and other post-socialist countries
Post-socialist economies (other than Ukraine)
The informal economies of post-socialist countries are sometimes purported to be
similar compared with other countries. According to Chavdarova (2003), during the
1990s, the informal economy in these countries grew faster than anywhere in the
world. Indeed, according to Schneider (2003) the informal labour force percentage of
working-age population was significantly higher in transition countries compared to
OECD countries. In 2000-2001, the size of the informal economy in percentage to GDP
amounted to 44.8 percent in average in the former Soviet Union countries and 29.2
percent in the Central and Eastern European transition countries, while in the OECD
countries only 16.7 percent. Chavdarova explains such results for the transition
countries as being due to the fact that during the process of transformation, the old
system institutions were destructed quicker than the new market economy institutions
were established. This led to filling up the formal institutional vacuum with informal
institutions. Thus, the informal economy became a central element of economic and
social systems of post-socialist countries. Chavdarova (2003) argues that Bulgaria is
not an exception: the informal economy in early nineties reached 34.4 percent. It fell
down to 21.9 percent since 1997-1998 after economic stabilisation and trade
liberalisation. It was found that ‘the increase in the informal economy and that of GDP
are negatively correlated’ (Chavdarova, 2003: 218)
The most common way to take part in the informal economy is to work on a fake
labour contract (some 22 percent of total number of contracts in 1996). Such informal
employment can mostly be found in construction and trade, in private firms in regional
centres. In 1996, 6.8 percent of employees reported that they worked without any
contract. These totally informal jobs are most typical for agriculture and trade in villages
and small towns (Chavdarova, 2003).
Chavdarova (2003) recognises the plurality of informal work forms, which
corresponds with a post-structuralist perspective of the informal economy. For
instance, she distinguishes between employment on a non-labour or fake labour
51
contract, employment and self-employment without any contract, domestic production
for own consumption and social exchange of products and labour. Moreover, she
underlines that the informal economy contributes to social inequality. For example,
workers with only one informal job are as a rule underpaid and socially unprotected,
whereas self-employed moonlighters, for whom informal earnings on the side are not a
survival strategy, are usually well-paid and socially protected being formally employed
at their main workplace.
The situation with the informal economy in Romania is not unlike other post-
socialist countries. Albu and Nicolae (2003) analysed the survey of 1996 and found that
the share of informal earnings constitute 20.4 – 26.2 percent in the structure of total
households’ income. Both high and low income households participate in the informal
economy; however their motives are different. The poor are excluded from the formal
economy (‘subsistence’ motive), while the rich are exiting the formal economy
(‘enterprise’ motive). The other reasons for participation in the informal economy
mentioned in by Albu and Nicolae (2003: 210) were ‘persistent crisis in the formal
sector, legislative incoherence, feeble penalty system, corruption, over-
bureaucratization, etc.’ Thus, the authors employ by-product and alternative
approaches to the informal economy.
According to Mroz (2005) in 2004 nearly 21 percent of economically active
population were involved in the informal activities. The highest proportions of the
informal work are found among the unemployed participants and workers in private
businesses (27 and 18 percent respectively). Rokicka and Ruzik (2010) reported that
the informal economy in Poland was in decline between 1998 and 2004. In 2004, some
9.6 percent of workers were involved in the informal activities, which differ to the
numbers provided by Mroz (2005). Rokicka and Ruzik (2010: 12) found that the main
reasons for working informally were: ‘the need to have any kind of income, the lack of
jobs opportunities in the formal sector, and the aspiration to have higher income than in
formal jobs’. The informal work is the most widespread in the construction and repairs,
trade, private tutorial, and child care sectors. Some 60 percent of informal workers
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reported that the informal work was their main source of income.
Esim (2001) describes in detail the informal work of women in Central and
Eastern Europe. In his paper, informality is depicted as a strategy to escape poverty
during the transition to market capitalism and global economic integration. Analysing
informal trends in Central and Eastern Europe, Esim is inclined to the by-product theory
of the informal economy. He argues that the intense informalisation since the transition
was the result of impoverishment of households and their survival strategy.
However, the informal workers have never been confined to marginalized, low
skilled and uneducated population. Doctors, teachers and lawyers are unemployed or
have substandard below the cost-of-living wages. As a result, many have to take
secondary employment in addition to their current jobs cleaning houses, teaching at
home, engaging in cross border trade, or temporary migration. ‘This is resulting in a
sense of indignation and frustration among many professionals who have to engage in
informal employment to support their families’ (Esim, 2001: 4).
Among the key areas of the informal economy in which Central and East
Europeans (mostly women) were engaged, Esim (2001) mentions cross-border trading
or suitcase trade, ’shuttle trade’.
‘Suitcase trade is used to describe the informal cross-border trade carried out by
mainly women ‘tourists’ visiting Turkey, Greece and Italy mainly from Eastern and
Central European countries like Lithuania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Romania in the
1990s. These cross-border traders buy large amounts of consumer goods, mainly
food products, textile and apparel, and household goods. According to the official
balance of payment figures reported by the Turkish Ministry of Finance, revenues
from suitcase trade were US$8.84 billion in 1996’ (Esim, 2001: 7)
Other observers also identify the diversity of economies in which people are engaged
in order to get by. Wallace et al. (2004) used the outcomes of New Democracies
Barometer survey as a database of their research of the informal economy in East-
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Central Europe. The authors categorize the economies (based on monetization/non
monetization and integration/autonomy with the main formal economy) in the following
way:
- the formal economy (work or benefits from the public formal economy);
- the household economy (production for household consumption);
- the social economy (dependence upon favours and help from friends and
relatives);
- and the cash or black economy (additional monetized activities).
Wallace et al. (2004) argue that all three forms of the informal economy were
necessary for the survival of the majority of households (almost 90 percent of all
households were involved in at least one of the informal economy forms). Furthermore,
most of the post-Soviet households developed a ‘portfolio of economies’, combining
different formal or informal economic activities in order to survive. The corresponding
view of a ‘portfolio of economies’ or ‘multiple economies of households’ may be found
in Smith and Stenning (2004) and Pavlovskaya (2005). Wallace et al. (2004) developed
a table in order to structure these findings.
Table 2.5. Relationships between different economies (Wallace at al., 2004: Table 1)
FORMAL SECTOR INFORMAL SECTOR
I State economy II Formal marketeconomy
III Informal market
economy
IV Household
economy and non-
monetized
Primary sector
(agriculture)
Collective/state
farms
Independent
farmers
Sale of surplus
agricultural
products at
roadside and
markets
Food, pigs etc. for
household
consumption (15%
of NDB families)
Secondary sector
(industry)
Many main
industries
Some privatised
industries
Sweat shops,
industrial home
working
Production of
goods e.g. clothes,
housing by the
household
Tertiary sector
(services)
Education, health Financial services,
banking,
restaurants,
plumbers, doctors,
teachers,
prostitutes in
official private
sector
Plumbers,
carpenters,
prostitutes not
paying tax,
moonlighting
doctors and
teachers, many
migrant workers
Housework, care
of elderly,
childcare (if
monetized can be
done by migrant
workers)
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Quartiary sector
(Information/
Culture)
State media,
opera, cinema
Cable TV, satellite,
private radio
stations
Black market CDs
and computer
software, videos
Internet
communications,
shareware etc.,
virtual migrant
communities
The table represents a classification of economic activities according to industrial
sectors and types of ‘economies’ (by economic logic) to which they belong. Firstly, the
state economy and formal market economy are understandable and are not further
discussed here. Secondly, the informal market economy, or cash economy is
represented by the informal sale of agricultural products, illegal forms of industrial
employment (perhaps evading labour market regulations as found, for example, in the
sweatshop industries) and services such as the work of plumbers, carpenters as well
as doctors and teachers ‘on the side’. In the last sector, there is the bootlegging of
various kinds of cultural products as well as the black market in computer software.
Finally, the household and social economies include all kinds of economic activities,
which are not for profit but are exchanged on an informal basis. The household sector,
Wallace et al. (2004) argue, is increasing in post-industrial societies rather than
declining as more and more domestic services are commercialised and technologies
are miniaturized in such a way that they can be incorporated as part of the household
economy (e.g. the computer, consumer electronics etc). Production of clothes (as self
provisioning in the household economy and as self-employment in the informal market)
was very popular in the Soviet period because of scarcity of the fashionable clothes
available to ordinary people. A lot of Soviet women sewed or knitted clothes
themselves or had a personal seamstress. Evidently, people did not declare these
activities. In transitional period, the market of clothes dramatically improved with years,
however the reason for household clothes production became poverty (especially in
90s). Later by 2000’s more cheap and fashionable clothes brands entered the market
and economic position of many households improved which caused a decrease in
seamstresses’ services demand; however handmade clothes remain popular as
quality, exclusive and/or comparatively cheap.
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Pavlovskaya (2005) explored survival strategies of post-socialist cities during
the period of transition to a market economy. She explored Moscow households and
their multiple economic activities. The households’ informal practices are seen here as
a constituent part of ‘a conceptual model of multiple economies’ (Pavlovskaya, 2004:
335), which is illustrated in Figure 2.2 below.
Figure 2.2. Multiple economies in the post-Soviet society (Pavlovskaya 2004: 335)
This model of multiple economic spaces of post-socialist households is constructed on
the basis of four dichotomies: formal and informal economies; monetised and non-
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monetised economies; state and private sectors; and public and private spheres.
Pavlovskaya (2004) emphasizes an important role of the informal economy both in the
Soviet and transition periods. She found that before the transition nearly 12 percent of
workers earned informal income and this income constituted up to 40 percent of total
households’ income. During the transition period the informal economy amounted to 46
percent of GDP and 69 percent of households were engaged in various economic
activities. This can be complemented with the finding that during the transition the
number of households, where formal activities are the primary source of income has
decreased, while the importance of second and informal activities has sharply
increased. She argues that although the economy in the area surveyed has
significantly grown, new goods and services were unaffordable to ordinary households
and this lead to a greater reliance on informal resources and consumption. This
included both monetised and non-monetized informal activities (private informal sector
in Figure 2.2 above). Private monetised informal sphere includes rents, profits,
investments, help with money and purchasing goods and services. Private non-
monetised informal sphere consists of networks of family and friends, favours, help in
kind, help with labour and domestic labour.
Similarly to Pavlovskaya, Smith and Stenning (2006) argue that post-socialist
economies are diverse and the informal economy plays an important role in economic
life of households.
‘‘Black’ and ‘grey’ economies were significant parts of the economy of shortage of
Soviet systems. Popular images still prevail of the illegal street selling of jeans in
the Soviet Union, or the black market exchange of foreign currency. Since the
collapse of the Soviet systems the role of ‘black’ and ‘grey’ economies has
continued, intensified and even developed into new forms’ (Smith and Stenning,
2006: 11).
One of the most important characteristics of the informal economy in post-socialist
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countries is ‘envelope wages’, which formally registered employees receive in addition
to their formal salaries. These informal, ‘envelope wages’ are hidden from tax
authorities by employers with the aim to reduce costs of paying taxes and social
contributions (Kedir et al, 2011). Until now, very few publications exist exploring this
issue, however ‘envelope wages’ are very widespread in East-Central European
countries. For example, the study of ‘envelope wages’ in Moscow by Williams and
Round (2007) showed that almost two thirds of wages are paid ‘in the envelope’. Some
76 percent of full-time workers and 61 percent of part-time workers received part of
their salaries informally.  The proportion of their total wages received ‘in the envelope’
ranges from 20 to 80 percent. In Lithuania, according to Woolfson (2007) 17.2 percent
of respondents reported that they currently received ‘envelope wages’, another 8.0
percent received ‘envelope wages’ in the past. It is argued, that the employees’
attitudes towards this type of earnings are ambivalent. While some people are
dissatisfied with ‘envelope wages’ and losing some part of their social benefits, others
view it as an opportunity to reduce their income tax payments gaining in a short-term
perspective. In Estonia the proportion of employees displeased with their ‘envelope
wages’ equals 45 percent; 55 percent reported that they would be unemployed if they
refuse to receive their wages ‘in the envelope’. This is explained with the fact that the
employee’s gain from hiding his/her salary from tax authorities is very small: from 6 to
12 percent of the average income of fully official workers (Staehr and Meriküll, 2010).
Williams (2009b) analysed the results of the survey of the 27 EU member states
in 2007 carried out in 2007. The survey showed that ‘envelope wages’ are more
prevalent in East-Central Europe compared to Continental and Nordic countries. In
East-Central Europe, on average, 12 percent of waged employees surveyed received
‘envelope wages’. The highest rates of employees with ‘envelope wages’ were found in
Romania (23 percent), Latvia (17 percent) and Bulgaria (14 percent) and the lowest - in
Czech Republic (3 percent), Slovenia (5 percent) and Slovakia (7 percent). In countries
where ‘envelope wages’ are more prevalent, it is paid more for regular working hours
and constitutes nearly a half of employees’ gross income. In countries with less
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widespread ‘envelope wages’, it is paid more for overtime/extra work and averages to
around a quarter of employees’ gross income.
The informal economy in Ukraine
Ukraine is one of the world’s leaders in terms of informality and corruption. According
to recent data from the Monitor Group, in different sectors with different economic
structures, 30 percent to as much as 80 percent of the overall economy is in the
informal economy. Ukraine shares with Russia and Zimbabwe the 146th place among
180 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index published by Transparency
International (2009). Schneider (2002) calculated the share of the informal economy in
Ukraine using the currency demand, the physical input and DYMIMIC approach at the
level of 52.2 percent for the year 1999/2000, being the third largest after Azerbaijan
and Georgia among 23 transition countries.
Analyzing the results of the first activity-based survey in Ukraine in 2005-2006
Williams and Round (2008) distinguish three broad categories of informal work:
informal waged employment, informal self-employment and paid favours for kin, friends
and neighbours. Informal waged employment is not the dominant type of informality in
Ukraine, though it also can be found here. The most prominent type of informal
employee is somebody who receives two wages from their formal employer. The first is
the official wage that the employer declares to the government and the second is the
informal wage or ‘envelope wage’ paid in cash. 30 percent of employees receive
‘envelope wages’ and normally have the lowest income among the surveyed.
‘Envelope wages’ are also widespread in other post-socialist nations which have been
discussed in the previous sub-section on post-socialist economies (other than Ukraine).
.
‘The prominence of such a practice is important. It displays how formal and
informal employment are inextricably intertwined as well as how informal
employment has become part and parcel of contemporary capitalism with
employers reducing costs by paying their formal workers informally, and blurs
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the very distinction between formal and informal employment’ (Williams and
Round, 2008: 378).
About 38 percent of all informal waged employees engage in informal employment for
businesses in which they do not hold a formal job. These informal employees are also
concentrated in the lowest-paid of all informal employment: construction and consumer
service sectors in jobs such as labourers on building sites, taxi drivers, market stall
workers and waiters and cooks. Informal employment is mainly a result of exclusion.
Waged informal employment here fits the by-product thesis that accurately depicts the
nature of waged informal employment. Especially as informal wages and employment
are the result of the exclusion of the surveyed. Informal self employment is represented
by two main groups: the lowest income (poorly paid work, such as selling flowers
outside street markets, cigarettes outside stations or providing routine domestic
services) and the highest income (informal work arises out of opportunities from their
formal employment or self-employment). The first group is excluded from formal
economy and chooses informality as their survival strategy. The second group motive
is to avoid tax bribery and endless bureaucratic procedures.
‘In sum, although lower-income informal own-account workers reinforce the
byproduct thesis of marginalized groups engaged out of necessity in this work,
higher-income own account workers reflect the ‘alternative’ thesis as a chosen
alternative to a failing, bribe-ridden and corrupt formal economy’ (Williams and
Round, 2008: 381).
The complementary theory is also applicable to Ukraine: some 55 percent of all
informal employment was conducted for kin, neighbours and acquaintances chiefly for
reasons other than making/saving money. This type of informal employment includes
domestic services such as home maintenance and improvement work, routine
domestic tasks (e.g. cleaning, cooking, gardening) and the provision of caring services.
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On the one side the reciprocity that is a basis for such favours helps to create and
cement social networks and on the other side it reinforces economic disparities as
more affluent households have more opportunities for these reciprocal exchanges than
deprived ones. Finally, universal theorization is not possible – evidence can be found to
support each theory. Williams et al. (2011: 21) supplementing the findings of the 2005-
2006 survey in Ukraine suggest that:
‘What is perhaps now required are richer more qualitative accounts of people’s
explanations for participation in order to tease out some of the more nuanced
context-bound understandings of what leads different population groups to
engage in informal employment. Not least, the theoretical and methodological
issue that ‘exit’ and ‘exclusion’ are not neat dichotomous terms needs to be
unravelled along with how the meanings of ‘exit’ and ‘choice’ vary across
population groups. For example, the opportunity structures within which an
individual is operating his/her ‘choice’ to exit the formal economy will vary
considerably across groups and this will be important to explore’.
Indeed, there are no studies in relation to Ukraine that qualitatively explore the motives
and circumstances for being excluded from or exiting the informal economy.
Rodgers et al. (2008) connect the informal economy with the huge economic
recession after the collapse of the Soviet Union and with the Soviet system ‘traditions’.
They argue that such informality, both employers’ and employees’, in post-Soviet
Ukraine was defensive by nature - without it survival would not be possible. And in
general this survival thesis (by-product/structuralist/marginal theory) is supported by
the observers regarding some types of informal activities in transition countries of CEE
including Ukraine, though at the same time this thesis is included by them into the
diversified conceptualization (Williams and Round 2008; Esim, 2001; Wallace et al.,
2004; Smith, 2006). The nature of the informal economy in post-Soviet countries is
particular for several reasons. Firstly, the official state ideology of the Soviet Union
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came to be used to legitimise stealing from it. Secondly, social connections were very
important in order to access deficit necessary goods while money had little meaning
(Glovakas, 2005; Smith and Stenning, 2004)
‘Rather the system relied on networks of favours whereby if you needed a good
that could be procured informally then you would owe a favour to the person
that could obtain it for you. Therefore, the success of the household was
dependent on being able to operate in both the formal and informal economy’
(Rodgers et al., 2008: 669).
This reciprocal favours phenomenon in the post-Soviet countries is caused by both
economic necessity and socio-cultural peculiarities. Informal exchanges of services are
an integral part of the post-Soviet communities, they have a particular social and
cultural significance for the participants – it is the way of being a valuable member of
your community. As a result consideration of informality not only as a by-product, but
also as a complement to formality is applicable here. Thirdly, within the systems of
‘economic involution’ after the USSR collapse ‘it was very difficult for the state to
develop legislation to provide effective support for workers, and small and medium
enterprises’ (Rodgers et al., 2008: 670). Besides, ‘those who controlled the country’s
major firms became the new political elite. Therefore, legislation was extremely pro big
business and very little employee protection was developed’. Because of such ‘chaotic
capitalism’ (Lane, 2008: 179) in spite of Ukraine’s economy certain recovery since the
1990s, the scale of informal economy remains among the highest in the world.
The overregulation and ineffective, inconsistent legislation are also mentioned
by Thiessen (1997), who commented on the surveys of Ukrainian private and state-
owned firms and household’s participation in the unofficial economy conducted by the
World Bank in 1993-1995. The findings of this survey were the following. 70 percent of
those who were employed in the state-owned firms were also involved in unofficial
employment; such employment generated more than 50 percent of their income. The
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reasons for informal activity were: regulation of trade, foreign exchange dealings and
domestic trade, high inflation, a heavy tax burden and frequent changes in tax
regulations.
Interestingly the next reasons were not confirmed by the survey: the
complicated procedures for registering firms, labour law requirements, motivation and
qualification problems on the part of employees, and infrastructural inadequacies. And
of course wide spread bribes to public authorities were discovered by the survey.
‘Small and medium-sized firms mentioning such payments put their value at between
10 percent and 25 percent of turnover’ (Thiessen, 1997). Thiessen (1997: 24) also
argues that
‘…the growth of the unofficial economy was particularly strong in the early years
of transition. While the loosening of foreign trade regulation in 1994 and 1995
served to dampen unofficial economic activity, this was offset by other factors
(such as the tax burden, inflation, administrative barriers), so that the
underground economy continued to account for a substantial proportion of GDP’.
Hence, the results of this survey maintain the alternative theory of the informal
economy concerning small and medium enterprises. To sum up, Ukrainian informal
sector is extremely diversified: it includes marginalized population striving to get by
(informal economy as a by-product of formal), entrepreneurs suffering from corruption,
inadequate regulations, tax burden (informality as alternative to formal); favours,
informal networking, importance of social connections since the Soviet period (informal
economy as complementary to formal).
The study by the World Bank (2005) based on statistical analysis of the
Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey data assesses the labour market
performance in Ukraine, identifies key constraints to job creation, and suggests policies
that will foster job creation and productivity. It revealed that the growth of the informal
economy in Ukraine during the years 1998-2004 has both positive and negative
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features. On the one hand it helps the jobless to escape poverty creating informal work
places. On the other hand the informal sector provides little employment security and
social benefits. It narrows the tax base which causes higher tax rates and distorted
competition. Furthermore, informal firms usually remain small which negatively
influences economic growth and development in general.
Another interesting finding by the World Bank is that salaries in the informal
sector are 10-15 percent higher compared to formal salaries. This suggests that
‘workers are not only pushed into the informal sector by lack of job opportunities but
also pulled into it by better earning prospects’ (World Bank 2005: 2). However informal
work is usually of low productivity. Unskilled blue-collar workers constitute one-third of
informal sector employment and only one-fifth of the formal one. Besides, they are
concentrated in trade, agriculture, construction – industries with relatively low
productivity.
The World Bank researchers also argue that payroll taxes are the major factor
of the growth of the informal economy. Therefore they suggest decreasing the tax rate
which will provide incentive for the informal firms to formalize and therewith increase
the tax base. The other suggested policy options include decreasing the number of
regulations (permits, licences, customs procedures) and improving access to finance
(e.g. promoting competition in banking sphere and developing microfinance schemes).
These measures are expected to encourage informal firms to come out of the shadow
and reduce the size of the informal economy.
In the article of Wallace and Latcheva (2006) the informal economy in Central
and Eastern European post-socialist countries is discussed. The research is based on
the New Democracies Barometer (NDB) data that was carried out in 1991, 1992, 1994,
1996, and 1998 in 12 transition countries including Ukraine. These countries are
divided into three groups. In the first group are those countries where the informal work
is used for improvement of household incomes (e.g. Serbia and Croatia). The second
group includes the countries where the household or social economies prevail (e.g.
Ukraine and Romania). Third group are the countries with the formal economy
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predominating over the informal one (e.g. Czech Republic and Hungary). It was found
that household and social economies in Ukraine are ‘a social safety net for the poor,
the elderly and those in rural areas’ (Wallace and Latcheva, 2006: 81) in the conditions
of weak social provision and collapse of labour market. This signifies that
commentators consider Ukrainian informal economy from the structuralist point of view
(by-product theory). Another interesting finding of the article is that trust in political and
public institutions depends on respondents’ perception of corruption. This can confirm
the assertion that the level of trust in government in Ukraine is very low and can be the
major reason for the firms and individuals for staying informal.
2.2.5. Summary
The informal economy all over the world is diverse: partially legal low-skilled
immigrants working in global cities, highly-skilled professionals moonlighting in affluent
areas, reciprocal favours exchange between households, teachers and doctors striving
to survive in post-Soviet countries, unemployed in the periods of economic crises,
street traders in Sub-Saharan Africa selling Coca-Cola. All these and many more
activities can be approached using the existing theories: the informal economy as a
residue, by-product, complement or alternative to formal. In each country and global
region, evidence for each theory may be found. The exception here might be a residue
theory which lacks supporting evidence. However, informality as a residue of pre-
capitalist society might be applicable to subsistence households in rural Ukraine
seeking to live off their smallholding/dacha. Nowadays the members of such
households are mostly older people because the young have gone to the city to work in
the formal or the informal economy. The case might be related to the by-product theory
as it is also a survival strategy of rural population, however this type of the informal
economy is in the long-term decline, not linked with formal economy and not connected
with deregulation or globalisation, therefore should be referred as a residual of pre-
capitalist society.
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While in the most developed nations informality as a complement is strongly
pronounced and alternative and by-product approaches are less popular, for Third
World countries by-product approach is more characteristic, and for transition
economies all the theories are important. However, this generalization is rather rough.
Informality is greatly influenced by socio-cultural factors (Schneider and Enste, 2000;
Pfau-Effinger and Magdalenich, 2010) such as low trust in public institutions in
Germany or blat traditions in post-socialist countries. When analysing the nature and
choosing theoretical approach to each case of informality, these factors should be born
in mind. The thesis therefore seeks to find which theory is most strongly pronounced in
transition economies and notably in Ukraine.
To sum up, the nature of multiple informal economies is similar in all post-
socialist countries including Ukraine. Therefore, here the diverse theorisation of
informality, as was discussed for Ukraine, is applicable. However the discussion of the
informal economy in Ukraine is not comprehensive without taking into consideration a
specific type of informal networking – blat – getting things done through personal
connections. Until now, this has not been discussed with reference to Ukraine in any of
the studies conducted on the informal economy. This issue is addressed in the next
section.
2.3. Blat
Informal networks/blat/connections/pulling strings is an integral part of the informal
economy of post-socialist countries. It is worth discussing here the etymology, origins,
prerequisites for and meaning of blat, common blat-usage in the Soviet period, and
finally, further transformations of this phenomenon. As a result different theoretical
approaches to blat will be reviewed. Although the number of studies of blat is very
limited, they answer the most important general questions and allow conclusions to be
drawn on different theorisations of blat.
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2.3.1. Origins of blat
Michailova and Worm (2003: 515) argue that the origins of blat are to be found in both
‘pre-revolutionary Russian traditions of patronage and self-interested giving’ and the
methods of ‘everyday ‘fixing” encountered in that society. Ledeneva (1998:11) states
that ‘blat is an old word which developed a new meaning at the very beginning of the
Soviet era’. It was found that there are different versions of its origin: the Polish blat
meaning ‘someone who provides an umbrella or cover’, which in turn is taken from
Jewish blat which means ‘close, familiar’; the prerevolutionary meaning of blat which
was referred to criminal activity meaning ‘thieves’; and the most improbable folk version
from the surname of Brezhnev’s minister of trade Blatov (Ledeneva, 1998; Michailova
and Worm, 2003). However, its genuine origin and exact age cannot be established for
sure.
2.3.2. What were the prerequisites for blat?
Ledeneva (1998: 118) argues that blat emerged in the state centralised regimes that
‘produce not only conditions of shortage but also, for the majority of people, limitations
on the level of individual needs’. She defines four different types of needs blat was
used for:
1. regular needs such as foodstuffs, clothes, household goods, and housework
and hobby materials;
2. periodical needs (holidays, health resort stays, and travel tickets);
3. life cycle needs (birth clinics, kindergartens, schools, escape from compulsory
military service, high schools, jobs, flats and hospitals);
4. the needs of others (the needs of one’s family, kin, friends).
The last one is the most interesting because asking for help on behalf of someone
rather than asking for oneself was very common in the Soviet culture.
To explain the origins of the blat-phenomenon, Arnstberg and Boren (2003: 33)
state that ‘using one’s social capital for blat-exchanges was a relevant way to adapt to
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peculiarities of the Soviet system’. Indeed, having friends in strategic places was very
important, as it was not money that posed the main problem, but the shortage of goods
and services, access to which could be opened using personal connections: a
‘prerequisite that underpinned the system of blat was the fact that almost every
employee had some type of ‘asset-access’, which could be used in blat-relations’
(Arnstberg and Boren, 2003: 23). To sum up, the phenomenon of blat was a result of
shortages, uncertainty, system constraints and open access to public funds. To
respond to the system limitations, ‘blat networks channelled an alternative currency —
an informal exchange of favours — that introduced elements of the market into the
planned economy and loosened up the rigid constraints of the political regime’
(Ledeneva, 2009: 257). Thus, blat in its traditional meaning is positively viewed by
scholars as it helped people to cope with the inefficiencies of the system. A similar view
can be seen in the neo-liberal studies of the informal economy, where informality is
viewed as an answer of the entrepreneurs to overregulation and therefore considered a
positive phenomenon.
2.3.3. What are the main characteristics of Soviet-era blat?
Researchers of blat found that a comprehensive comparison of blat with the similar
phenomena of the Soviet and post-Soviet countries (bribery, fiddling, corruption,
informal work, mutual help) (Ledeneva, 1998) as well as paralleling Soviet blat and
Chinese guanxi (Mikhailova and Worm, 2003; Ledeneva, 2008) help to understand this
complex concept more in-depth.
In the first place, the most basic characteristics of blat should be mentioned.
They are informality, non-materiality, reciprocity, personal basis of relationships and
cultural grounding (Ledeneva, 1998; Ledeneva 2008; Arnstberg and Boren, 2003).
Among the features identified by Mikhailova and Worm (2003) the most
dramatic are ‘social resourcing’, ‘continuity of relationships’ and ‘coexistence of trust
and cooperation on the one hand and power and domination on the other’. Speaking
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about social resourcing, the authors mean that even when blat seems to be of a dyadic
nature: ‘…exchange is often embedded in or influenced by actors outside the dyad.
Thus, obligatory relations may extend to people whom one does not know directly or
will never meet’ (2003: 511). They also argue that informal connections with relevant
authorities or individuals are of greater importance for Russians than the quality of
goods or services and expertise offered by their business. Continuity of blat
relationships stems from the inclination of Russians ‘to develop close long-term
personal relationships’ when they enter into a business collaboration in order ‘to
establish trust, confide and to share information’. Moreover, ‘the person doing the
favour does not expect an immediate return: reciprocation usually takes place later or
much later’ (2003: 512). Discussing the coexistence of trust and cooperation on the
one hand and power and domination on the other, Mikhailova and Worm (2003) argue
that friendship was a necessary prerequisite for initiation of business relationships in
collectivistic society. There was a confident belief that it is more probable to have blat
without friendship than friendship without blat. As for power and domination, ‘the more
rank and power one has, the more blat one normally possesses’ (2003: 513).
Furthermore, Russian society views blat, influence, pulling strings, and the ability to
take care of friends as important status symbols.
Ledeneva (1998) as well as previous commentators emphasize the emotional
involvement of participants in blat relations. Indeed, Arnstberg and Boren (2003: 24-25)
state that ‘helping a friend was more than just obtaining additional income’. In addition
to this, blat had its peculiar ethics. Ledeneva (2008: 129) lists six ethical rules of blat
relations:
1. The obligation to help—help your friends unselfishly and they will come to your
aid;
2. Do not expect gratitude but be grateful;
3. Look to the future—long-term reciprocity;
4. Keep within limits—ask within limits;
5. Know the contexts in which the informal friendship code has priority over formal
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legal codes;
6. Socially ostracize those who follow the letter of law.
To sum up, blat relations are argued to be in no way profit motivated. Instead they were
based solely on social motives such as building reciprocity and trust. This view has
much in common with the view of the informal economy as a complement to formal,
when the participants of paid informal exchange are found to have non-monetary
motives.
2.3.4. The distinctiveness of blat relations in Ukraine
When discussing blat, authors do not identify any peculiarities of this phenomenon in
different post-Soviet countries. They often refer to Russia or the former Soviet Union in
general (Ledeneva 2008, Mikhailova and Worm, 2003; Ledeneva 2009). Moreover,
Wanner (1998) exploring post-Soviet Ukraine does not separate blat in Ukraine and in
Russia. The author emphasizes the importance of trust and the role of ‘svoi ludi/svoi
chelovek)’ (translated as ‘one’s own people/one’s own person’) in blat networks. ‘‘Svoi
chelovek’ means someone who can help you navigate through the maze of life in the
Soviet system’ (Wanner, 1998: 56). Here the author even notes that
‘…although one could say this in Ukrainian (svoya liudyna), Ukrainian speakers
quite simply use the equivalent Russian expression when speaking Ukrainian to
underline the close connection between the concept and the Soviet system’
(1998: 56).
This assumes that blat in Ukraine does not have any characteristics that distinguish it
from the conventional concept of blat.
However, societal arrangements similar to blat exist throughout the world. The
importance of the use of personal networks for getting things done and the existence of
idioms to define it is found by scholars in China (guanxi), Arab World (wasta) and Brazil
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(jeitinho) (Ledenva,2008; Mikhailova and Worm, 2003; Smith et al., 2011; Ardichvili et
al., 2010; Hutchings and Weir, 2006). Guanxi is an attribute of Chinese culture that is
‘composed of interpersonal linkages with the implication of a continued exchange of
favours’ (Mikhailova and Worm, 2003:510). Wasta belongs to Arab World and means ‘a
process whereby one may achieve goals through links with key persons’ (Smith et al.,
2011: 3). According to Hutchings and Weir (2006: 143) ‘wasta involves social networks
of interpersonal connections rooted in family and kinship ties and implicating the
exercise of power, influence, and information sharing through social and politico-
business networks’. Jeitinho is ‘a hermeneutic key for the Brazilian culture’ and
represents ‘a special way of managing obstacles in order to find a way out of
bureaucracy’ which is ‘a result of the attempt to satisfy the dictates of bureaucratic
rules while still finding ways to accomplish business goals’ (Ardichvili et al., 2010: 3).
In this section, the focus is on a comparison of blat and guanxi as the latter has
the most similarities with the former (Ardichvili et al., 2010). Indeed, both blat and
guanxi emerged in the socialist systems (though substantially different) under the
pressure of shortages and overregulation (Ledeneva, 2008) while wasta and jeitinho
are of another origin. Before comparing blat and guanxi, they may be contrasted to the
networking in the West. Michailova and Warm (2003) outlined six key differences
between blat/guanxi and networking in the West (Table 2.6).
Table 2.6. Key differences between blat/guanxi and personal networking in the West
(Michailova and Warm, 2003: 510)
Blat/guanxi Personal networking in the West
Based largely on collectivism/relationships Based primarily on individualism
Vitally important; often a matter of survival Important
Highly frequent exchanges Exchanges are discrete in time
Exchanges take place at the workplace Exchanges take place outside the workplace
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Extended relationships/mediated exchanges Dyad-based relationships/direct exchanges
Exchanges are usually personal Exchanges are usually non-personal
Another explanation of the distinctiveness of blat is provided by Ledeneva (2008: 123).
She refers to the four different types of needs, discussed in Section 2.3.2:
‘In market democracies only certain life cycle needs such as jobs and honours
are likely to require “pulling strings,” but in state centralized economies guanxi
and blat were required to satisfy all four types of needs. Their pervasive use as
a “safety-net” or “survival kit” made involvement in informal practices
compulsory rather than voluntary’.
This shows that although informal networking is widespread all over the world including
developed countries, blat possesses a special status. This is due to its vital importance
not only for people, but even for the functioning of the regime itself. Indeed, as Rehn
and Taalas (2007: 243) put it:
‘Were it only a system used in the private life of citizens it could be grasped as a
method of survival in a repressive structure, but as it was entangled in most of
economic life it instead seems to have been a structure on a par with the
command economy, a flexible scaffold for a rigid edifice’.
These characteristics of blat make it very similar to Chinese guanxhi. There are also
other similarities of blat and guanxi identified by Michailova and Worm (2003): social
resourcing, continuity of relationships, and coexistence of trust and cooperation on the
one hand, and power and domination on the other. Social resourcing means that blat
and guanxi networks imply participation of more than two actors in the exchanges.
Continuity of relationships is needed to establish effective exchange mechanisms that
are based on tacitly understood norms and rules. The establishment and dissemination
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of these norms and rules takes a long time. Another aspect of continuity of blat/guanxi
relationships is that the favours must not be returned immediately. A reciprocal favour
may take place much later. Therefore the investment of time and effort into the building
of personal relationships can be paid off only if this relationship is long-term.
Coexistence of trust and cooperation and power and domination implies that emotional
trust is prevalent in both countries. This can be contrasted with cognitive trust when the
reason to trust is a proof of reliability, knowledge about the person’s competence and
integrity. Where emotional trust prevails, friendship is valued much more than the
contract and it may be a prerequisite for developing business relations. At the same
time, every network is built into hierarchical social structures where different actors
have different power and influence. In Russia, pulling strings and taking care of friends
are important status symbols. In Chinese ‘patron-client’ relationships the subordinate is
always advantaged having greater rights than the superior (Michailova and Worm,
2003).
Discussing the similarities between the personal networking in the two
countries, Ledeneva (2008) stated that both blat and guanxi had contradictory effects
on political, economic and social spheres. On the one hand, they supported state
centralised systems by compensating for their defects. On the other hand, they
undermined the systems by ignoring formal rules. According to Ledeneva (2008: 126)
‘…similarities between guanxi and blat testify that people tend to develop
similar practices … in order to survive in state centralized economies
characterized by shortages, a state distribution system, and ideological
predicaments’.
Although the similarities between blat and guanxi are striking, there are a number of
variations between these two concepts (Table 2.7).
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Table 2.7. Differences between blat and guanxi (Michailova and Worm, 2003: Table 2)
Guanxi Blat
Neutral origin of the term Negative origin of the term
Helping friends through connections is a moral
and social obligation Helping friends through connections is a pleasure
Losing face/guanxi is perceived as having drastic
negative personal consequences
Losing blat is perceived as a matter of life and
death
Dominating holistic approach Prevailing analytical approach
The word blat originates from criminal jargon while guanxi ‘is derived from the kinship
ethics and popular Confucianism, and propagates respect and harmony, imposes a
duty of moral and proper reciprocity, and makes a gift an object that serves a ritualized
relationship’ (Ledeneva, 2008: 127). Russians see helping friends as a pleasure, while
for Chinese it is an obligation. Moreover guanxi practices are codified and predictable
and blat practices are rather opportunistic and ambiguous. The consequences of
loosing guanxi are much more serious than failure to maintain blat relations as the
Chinese have always been very sensitive to loosing face and prestige. The holistic
approach leads to broader networking while analytical approach generates dyadic
relationships (Michailova and Worm, 2003).
2.3.5. What happened to blat after the collapse of the Soviet system?
According to Ledeneva (1998) and Arnstberg and Boren (2003), the shift from the
planned to the free market economy, privatisation of state property, marginalisation of
do-it-yourself activities, ever-growing value of money, collapse of social security system
guarantees – all these post-Soviet changes contributed to the restructuring of the blat
economy and transformation of blat phenomena itself:
‘While during the Soviet period access to scarcely supplied goods was crucial,
with the development of a market economy one can buy formerly deficit goods
without routine queuing and without the use of personal networks’ (Arnstberg and
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Boren, 2003: 39).
There are several points of view regarding what blat transformed into. These views do
not contradict with each other, but rather complement each other. Arnstberg and Boren
(2003) argue that though the ethics and principles of informal ‘arranging matters’
remained the same, it is as corruption rather than blat. In the free market environment
‘the goods obtained were no longer for personal consumption, but rather for
business needs. Therefore, the benefits gained through access to a bank loan or
to the privatisation of a state enterprise could be measured and reimbursed in the
form of money. A counter-service might not be adequate any more. If seen in this
way, it could no longer be friendly help. As both of the involved parties were
accumulating significant amounts of wealth, and could do it because they often
occupied crucial places in the state system, their activities were perceived as
corruption’ (Arnstberg and Boren, 2003: 41).
Indeed, according to Ledeneva (2008) the main purpose of using connections is now
satisfaction of business needs through dealing with authorities who are in charge of
tax, customs, banking and regional administration. Mikhailova and Worm (2003: 517)
also consider that blat has become ‘explicitly related to economic interests and the
conduct of business, whereas in the socialist period it was mainly associated with
political considerations and private consumption’. The authors also argue that
‘blat is losing its warm, human face and becoming increasingly ‘materialized’. The
transformation of its nature from being based on moral and ethical considerations
to having an explicit financial expression is a phenomenon in itself’.
The same idea of blat ‘monetisation’ is introduced by Ledeneva (2008). She states that
‘money has become the focus of ‘shortage’ and the driving force by which blat
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connections become reoriented. Such ‘reorientation’ has undermined the non-monetary
nature of the blat exchange of favours’ (Ledeneva, 2008: 132). Indeed, Smith and
Stenning (2006) argue that a result of transformation processes, Russian society
became monetised:
‘Whereas in the previous system workplace relations and activities were more
likely to be used to develop social capital networks for favours and access,
market transactions have become key as opportunities for cash earnings are now
seen as of primary importance’ (Smith and Stenning, 2006: 6).
Though the term blat is still understood, it becomes increasingly outdated today and
acquires an increasingly negative meaning especially among young educated people
(Arnstberg and Boren, 2003; Ledeneva, 1998) and the terms connections,
acquaintances, pulling strings, networks are more widely used today.
To conclude, modern blat has lost its traditional meaning: blat relations are now
more profit than socially motivated and often turns into illegal corruption practices,
while in the past social motives prevailed. Furthermore, today’s blat is argued to be
used for business purposes when arranging matters with authorities, while earlier the
main purpose of using connections was personal consumption.
The literature reviewed in this section does not, however, raise theoretical
issues in relation to blat. In the next section an attempt is made to find the ways of
theorising blat by linking them to theories of the informal economy.
2.4. Potential ways of theorising blat
This section attempts to set out how the theories applied to the informal economy could
be applied to informal networking (blat). The existing literature on blat will be fed into
the theories of the informal economy: residue, by-product, alternative and
complementary. It will be also discussed whether modern blat can be approached from
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the fifth, post-structuralist perspective.
2.4.1. Residue theory
According to the literature reviewed in the previous section, in recent years blat
became transformed and monetised (Ledeneva, 1998; Arnstberg and Boren, 2003;
Mikhailova and Worm, 2003). This is no more a friendly help or reciprocal favours in
the conditions of shortages connected with private consumption, but rather ‘arranging
matters’ for business purposes, where favours are now rewarded with money. This
means that the old-fashioned blat is viewed as a residue of a pre-capitalist society
being substituted with the modern connections. Theorisation of the connections (blat in
its modern meaning) as a residue would be erroneous because the profit-motivated
use of connections is found to be neither primitive, weak and marginal, nor in the long-
term decline. Blat did not disappear. Instead, it became ‘transformed’, ‘reoriented’,
‘monetised’ and stayed widespread. Ledeneva (2009) found, that in December 2007 in
response to the question about their opinion concerning the prevalence of blat, 66
percent of participants answered that it is widespread or rather widespread. Only 13
percent said that blat is not very widespread and only 7 percent reported that it is
practically absent. Therefore, contemporary blat is by no means a marginal activity
existing in few minor areas. It is rather an important part of the post-Soviet households’
economy. This allows the conclusion that residue theory can be rejected due to the
findings of previous research.
2.4.2. By-product theory
Rehn and Taalas (2004: 241) argue that blat can be grasped as a survival strategy in
repressive system, rather than opportunistic economic activity: “instead of securing
hefty profits or a company to call one’s own secures a decent living – an
entrepreneurship whose opposite is not a day-job but death or even famine”. However
they admit that survival, law breaking, and entrepreneurship became intertwined and it
becomes increasingly hard to draw clear boundaries between them. Ledeneva (2008:
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123) argues that blat was used as a ‘safety net’ and ‘survival kit’ and participation in it
was rather compulsory than voluntary. Blat allowed satisfying very basic needs of
people:
‘The needs satisfied with help of guanxi and blat practices typically did not
exceed the level of modest personal consumption, at least by Western
standards’.
However, the by-product theory implies that the informal economy is a survival strategy
of marginal populations excluded from formal economy. Obviously, blat is voluntarily
used across a vast swathe of the population and marginalised populations are
excluded from blat relations. Moreover, Arnstberg and Boren (2003) argue that in the
post-Soviet times blat participants dealt with significant wealth and often held influential
posts. Indeed, Michailova and Worm (2003) state that the higher the social status of
the person was, the more opportunities he/she had to participate in blat. This,
apparently, by no means relates to low-income marginalised populations excluded from
formal economy. Therefore the by-product approach cannot be applied here. Are there
therefore complement or alternative theories that can explain the modern blat
phenomena?
2.4.3. Alternative theory or complementary theory?
While blat in its traditional meaning was based solely on social motives, which
corresponds with the view of the informal economy as a complement to the formal, new
monetary relations are still the result of personal networking but are profit rather than
socially motivated both for the supplier and consumer (Mikhailova and Worm, 2003;
Ledeneva, 2008; Arnstberg and Boren, 2003). Connections are no longer used to
obtain goods for private consumption, but rather to satisfy business needs, for
example, to obtain a bank loan or a licence. Often the favours are rewarded with
money instead of reciprocal favours. Therefore when one of the participants of blat
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relations occupies a significant public position, his/her abuse of authority is often
considered as corruption (Arnstberg and Boren, 2003). Finally, as already mentioned in
the previous section, blat is losing its human face and becomes increasingly
materialised (Mikhailova and Worm, 2003). Thus, the modern blat financial orientation
does not fit complementary theory of the informal economy as it implies the inclusion of
social motives into economic relations. Besides, the need in blat relations stems from a
bureaucratic, non-transparent and overregulated system (Arnstberg and Boren, 2003).
This allows us to relate this view of the informal networking to the alternative
perspective.
However, in their study of ethical business practices Ardichvili et al. (2010)
argue that managers are inclined ‘to consider the exchange of favours with their
informal network of business connections (blat) as part of standard and ethical
business practices’. This contradicts with the statement above that business related
favours are mostly profit motivated and rewarded with cash. Even though business
oriented, reciprocal favours done for closer social relations are still in place in the post-
Soviet countries. Therefore, the complementary theory of blat should not be refuted at
this stage.
Another argument to support complementary theory is that households with
higher social status and income have better access to blat. Indeed, Mikhailova and
Worm (2003: 513) state that ‘the more rank and power one has the more blat one
normally possesses’. This means that those who succeeded more in the formal realm
have more opportunities in the informal one. Similar finding was reported by Batjargal
(2007) who studied the influence of personal networks on financial performance. He
concluded that network ties help to mobilize financial resources, such as negotiated
loans, which positively impacts firm’s revenues. This is in line with the complementary
approach.
In addition, while the complementary theory implies that formal and informal
economies are relatively intertwined, the alternative approach sees them as relatively
separate. These are official businesses and state officials who participate in the
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informal networking (Mikhailova and Worm, 2003; Ledeneva, 2008; Arnstberg and
Boren, 2003) and apparently informal and formal economies are closely connected
here. A good example is provided by Yakubovich (2005), where the role of connections
for getting a job is explored. It was found that ‘the information and influence that are
transferred through social relationships do matter in the labour market’. This also
supports the appropriateness of the complementary approach to blat theorisation.
To sum up, it is still problematic to determine which theorisation could be the
most applicable to the modern blat relations described in the existing literature.
Therefore, the post-structuralist perspective might be of use for theorising blat.
2.4.4. Post-structuralist theory
While the literature discussed above reveals that modern blat is mostly (if not solely)
represented by corruption, Ledeneva (2009: 265) argues that the nature and functions
of blat are diverse.
‘The ambiguity of informal practices is an important theoretical assumption that
allows us to differentiate between the functions of networks and to analyze their
multivector functionality: from sociability, safety nets, survival kits, and forms of
social capital to means of access, diversion of resources, bridging formal
organizations, and subverting formal procedures, thus blocking the effectiveness
of governance‘.
This means that blat can also be variously theorised depending on its functionality. For
instance, blat used for sociability and safety nets is a positive phenomenon and can be
theorised using a complementary approach. In contrast, blat used for subverting formal
procedures and diversion of resources can be negatively viewed and even associated
with illegal practices and first of all, corruption. Indeed, contemporary blat does not only
exist in the form of paid favours connected with arranging business matters. The
services where blat is most commonly used include medicine, education, employment,
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and the traffic police (Ledeneva, 2009).
To conclude, the existing research on blat tends to explain the origins,
prerequisites, characteristics and history of blat. However, no spatial variations are
taken into consideration and the connection of blat and informal practices is not
explored in-depth. Moreover, it would be reasonable to supplement existing studies
with the statistical data since no quantitative methods were used in previous studies.
Finally, no literature examines possible ways to theorise blat. This thesis therefore is
aimed at bridging these gaps in the knowledge and determining which theorisation of
the informal economy could explain modern blat the most comprehensively. Indeed,
this is one of the major contributions to knowledge of this thesis.
The literature on the informal economy, blat and possible theorisations of these
phenomena discussed above revealed that there are quite a number of different
informal practices. The next section of the literature review chapter will look at various
approaches to the classification of these informal practices.
2.5. Approaches to informal work classification
The literature reviewed describes a vast variety of different types of the informal
activities that require sorting and classifying. Speaking about the classification of
activities, it is impossible to overlook Taylor’s (2004) and Williams’ (2009)
developments of Glucksmann’s (1995) theory of the Total Social Organization of
Labour (TSOL) that describes ‘the manner by which all the labour in a particular society
is divided up between and allocated to different structures, institutions and activities’
(Glucksmann, 2000: 67). On the basis of the TSOL, Taylor (2004: 31) suggested a
conceptual model for the ‘relational and interconnected nature of different forms of
work in different spheres’. Explaining Table 2.8, the author states that ‘private and
public and formal and informal aspects of work relations can be situated along a
continuum, rather than in mutually exclusive spheres, and divided by a vertical axis
signifying paid and unpaid work’ (Taylor, 2004: 39). From six types represented in the
table, only two are discussed in this thesis namely informal economic activity and
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household family work. They both are considered as paid informal work, the former
belonging to public sphere and the latter to private one.
Table 2.8. A framework showing the organization of labour (Taylor, 2004: 39)
PAID
Formal paid
employment in public,
private and voluntary
sector
e.g. paid accountant or care
assistant
PUBLIC
Informal economic
activity
e.g. paid babysitting for friends
or neighbours
PUBLIC
Household/ family work
e.g. paid babysitting within the
family
PRIVATE
FORMAL
e.g. unpaid accountant or care
assistant
Formal unpaid work in
public, private and
voluntary sector
INFORMAL
e.g. unpaid care for sick or
elderly neighbour
Informal unpaid work
INFORMAL
e.g. unpaid care for sick or
elderly relative
Private domestic labour
UNPAID
Building upon the framework above, Williams (2009c) elaborated the typology of forms
of community engagement in the TSOL (Table 2.8 below). The author explains that
‘…this portrays a continuum of forms of economic activity along a formal-to-
informal spectrum on the x-axis divided by whether it is paid or unpaid on a
vertical y-axis. The result is a series of eight zones with fuzzy boundaries that
when moving from left to right, shift from more formal to more informal economic
activities. The hatched boundaries dividing each zone signify that these are not
discrete activities but that they blur into one another. The shaded zones in this
conceptual framework represent the different zones of community engagement,
and provide a ﬁner-grained understanding of the array of types of community
engagement in societies’ (Williams, 2009c: 215-216).
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As seen from Table 2.9, three of eight zones refer to paid informal work: informal
employment (type 2), paid community exchanges (type 3) and paid household/family
work (type 4). Type 2 is a legitimate undeclared employment, either wholly undeclared
or underdeclared (e.g. undeclared paid overtimes or informal self-employment). Type 3
introduced by Williams (2009c) involves reciprocal exchanges with favours between
friends, neighbours and acquaintances that are not-for-profit however paid. Type 4
includes paid household work by household members.
Table 2.9. Typology of forms of community engagement in the TSOL (Williams, 2009c:
216)
FO
R
M
A
L
PAID
IN
FO
R
M
A
L
1. Formal paid
employment in public,
private and voluntary
sector
e.g. paid accountant
or care assistant
2. Informal employment
e.g. wholly undeclared
waged employment;
under-declared formal
employment; informal
self-employment
3. Paid community
exchanges
e.g. paid favours for
friends and
neighbours
4. Paid
household/
family work
e.g. paid
exchanges
within the family
e.g. unpaid work in
formal community-
based group; unpaid
internship
5. Formal unpaid work
in
public, private and
voluntary sector
e.g. unpaid children’s
soccer coach without
formal police check
6. Informal unpaid work
in public, private and
voluntary sector
e.g. unpaid kinship
exchange,
neighbourly favour
7. One-to-one unpaid
community
exchanges
e.g. self-
provisioning of
care within
household
8. Unpaid
domestic work
UNPAID
Another important jobs classification, the International Classification of Status in
Employment (ICSE) by ILO (1993), divides all employment statuses into six groups by
the criteria of economic risk and/or the type of authority and at the same time it
distinguishes between two main groups of employment: paid employment and self-
employment.
Paid employment includes:
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- employees (1) – those who are in employment ‘which give them a basic
remuneration which is not directly dependent upon the revenue of the unit for
which they work’
Self-employment includes:
- employers (2) – ‘those workers who, working on their own account or with one
or a few partners, …have engaged one or more persons to work for them in
their business as employee(s)’
- own-account workers (3) – ‘those workers who, working on their own account or
with one or more partners, …and have not engaged on a continuous basis any
employees’
- members of producers’ cooperatives (4) – those workers who are ‘in a
cooperative producing goods and services, in which each member takes part on
an equal footing with other members in determining the organization of
production, sales and/or other work of the establishment, the investments and
the distribution of the proceeds of the establishment amongst their members’
- contributing family workers (5) - in a market-oriented establishment operated by
a related person living in the same household, who cannot be regarded as a
partner,
The last type is workers not classifiable by status (6).
This classification by ILO does not capture all possible types of labour and does not
distinguish between public and private, formal and informal, monetized and non-
monetized work. Therefore the approach based on the model of ‘total social
organisation of labour’ adopted by Williams (2009c) will be used further in this thesis for
the purposes of data analysis.
In this section possible approaches to informal work classification have been
discussed. The next and the last section concludes on the Chapter 2, summing up the
gaps in the knowledge identified as a result of the literature review.
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2.6. Gaps in the knowledge
The literature review has shown that there is insufficient empirical evidence to presently
allow comprehensive theoretical conclusions in respect to the informal economy in
Ukraine. The only appropriate survey was conducted during the years 2005–2006
(Williams and Round, 2008; Williams et al., 2011; Williams et al., 2011a) but even this
survey does not allow to obtain the deeper and richer understanding of nature of the
informal economy and notably the motives and circumstances of being engaged in the
informal economy (Williams et al., 2011). In addition, the literature review reveals that
in relation to Ukraine few commentators have sought to evaluate the validity of the
contrasting theorisations of the informal economy (Thiessen, 1997; Williams, 2007;
Williams and Round, 2008; Williams et al., 2011; Williams et al., 2011a) and none of
the commentators have considered the issue of contemporary blat in Ukraine.
Furthermore, it is difficult to consistently trace the evolution of thought on the
informal economy in Ukraine. Even reviewing official governmental documents, such as
the President Order on Ukrainian economy deshadowisation measures (2002), only
general causes of shadowisation of the economy such as tax burden, corruption and
tax legislation instability can be found. No other theoretical issues have been touched
upon in the literature by Ukrainian authors.
To sum up, the gaps in the literature on the informal economy in Ukraine are the
following:
- insufficient empirical evidence for theoretical conclusions about the informal
economy and blat in Ukraine;
- lack of any in-depth qualitative research and profound understanding of the
nature and causes of the informal economy and blat, and therefore
- a lack of the theorisation of the informal economy and blat in Ukraine
My thesis therefore seeks to fill these gaps in the knowledge. It investigates the
informal economy more directly and also blat, and as such provides a nuanced
understanding of the nature of the informal economy in Ukraine. It also investigates
Mykolayiv, an area of Ukraine that so far has not been investigated.
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Chapter 2 was focused on literature review and identification of the knowledge
gaps. Now we move to the Chapter 3 where methodological issues of the research
aimed to cover these gaps are discussed.
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3. METHODOLOGY
The aim of this chapter is to explain and justify the methodology used to evaluate the
informal economy in Ukraine. For this purpose, the philosophical assumptions of the
mixed method approach which will here be adopted are discussed first. Secondly, both
direct and indirect methods of exploring the informal economy that have been used in
previous studies are reviewed. Thirdly, the semi-structured face-to-face interviews used
as a research technique are justified. Fourthly, the questionnaire used for the
interviews and sampling procedure are described and explained. Fifth and finally, the
economic, social, political and cultural characteristics of Mykolayiv, the Ukrainian city
which was the site of the fieldwork, will be outlined.
3.1. Philosophical assumptions
As Bryman (2008, 13) puts it, ‘an epistemological issue concerns the question of what
is (or should be) regarded as acceptable knowledge in a discipline’. The central
question in this respect is whether social science should adhere to the same paradigms
as the natural sciences. In this context, there exist two contrasting general
epistemological positions: positivism and interpretivism. While positivism advocates the
use of natural science methods in the social sciences (though the concept is not limited
to this principle), interpretivism suggests that people and institutions are too complex to
be theorised by definite laws as is done in the natural sciences.
In social science, both qualitative and quantitative methods of research are
recognised and researchers adhere to various epistemological positions. Each position
has its strengths and weaknesses, for example qualitative research methods employed
by social constructionists (e.g. critical ethnography) are criticised by positivists for lack
of scientific rigour and subjectivity of data and the findings it produces (Hammersley
and Atkinson, 1995). At the same time, Johnson and Clark (2006) question the
possibility to neutrally collect empirical data from an independent reality. Gill and
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Johnson (2002) argue that positivistic research methodologies suffer from deficiencies
in ecological validity. Furthermore, qualitative researchers united by their advocating of
subjectivity have their own philosophical disputes with each other. As a result, there are
three schools of thought using qualitative methodologies – neo-empiricism, critical
theory, postmodernism – based upon different combinations of epistemological and
ontological assumptions (Johnson and Clark, 2006). These approaches are ‘unified by
their opposition to positivism and their commitment to study the world from the point of
view of the interacting individual’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). The main arguments
against the application of a positivist paradigm to management research is that ‘social
phenomena are quite distinct in character from physical phenomena’ and ‘the social
world cannot be understood in terms of simple causal relationships or by the
subsumption of social events under universal laws’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995).
This is explained by the dependence of human actions on intentions, motives, beliefs
and values.
According to Thietart at al. (1999) the co-existence of positivist, interpretivist
and constructivist paradigms may be seen either as a sign of the immaturity of social
science or as an opportunity for the researchers. They argue that although certain
authors consider that a researcher must choose one paradigm and stick to it, others
view the dialog between paradigms as possible and even desirable. For instance, Jill
and Johnson (2002) consider that ‘methodological triangulation’ may overcome a bias
intrinsic to a single-paradigm approach. Whereas Bryman (2008) argues, that from an
epistemological point of view mixed methods of research are not possible as
quantitative and qualitative research is based on incompatible epistemological
principles.
Social research cannot be separated from questions of social ontology. Bryman
(2008: 4) define ontological issues as ‘ones to do with whether the social world is
regarded as something external to social actors or as something that people are in the
process of fashioning’. Positivist and interpretivist paradigms have contrasting
ontological positions. The positivist ontological position asserts that ‘there is only one
88
truth, an objective reality that exists independent from human perception’ (Sale and
Brazil, 2006: 57). As Hassard (1991: 277) puts it:
‘…society has a real, concrete existence and a systematic character and is
directed toward the production of order and regulation. The social science
enterprise is believed to be objective and value free. The paradigm advocates a
research process in which the scientist is distanced from the subject matter by
the rigour of the scientific method’.
From an interpretivist perspective, in contrast, social reality
‘…does not possess an external concrete form. Instead it is the product of
intersubjective experience. For the interpretive analyst, the social world is best
understood from the viewpoint of the participant-in-action. The interpretive
researcher seeks to deconstruct the phenomenological processes through which
shared realities are created, sustained and changed’ (Hassard, 1991: 277).
The concept of blat and the informal economy can be viewed from the point of view of
either positivism or interpretivism, yet interconnection between social actors and social
reality should be considered. This interconnection means that people create the scope
of morality, culture and customs, and these influence their behaviour. This also
explains the evolution of the phenomena. People engage in the informal economy and
blat relations because they have to, but also because they feel they wish to do so.
Thus, either approach would be relevant for this thesis. Therefore, the mixed method
approach will be the most relevant here, which is considered below.
In this doctoral research a mixed method approach is adopted. The use of
quantitative and qualitative research in tandem helps to cope with issues each method
confronts with. For positivist approach this is the lack of flexibility and insight into
subject with regard to its complexity. Besides, according to Bryman (2008) the
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connection between research and everyday life could be lost as a result of reliance on
instruments and procedures. The main criticism of the qualitative approach refers to the
issue of reliability and generalisability. Besides it is difficult to replicate and lacks
transparency (Bryman, 2008).
Another argument for the use of the mixed methods approach is that pluralism
of methods provides access to different facets of the same social phenomenon due to
different strategies used in the research (Olsen, 2004). Indeed, the positivist method
(survey) allows one to explore the extent and nature of the informal economy while the
interpretivist approach (case studies based on the in-depth open-ended questions in
the interview) helps to understand the motives of people’s actions, their perspectives
and opinions.
Taking into consideration the discussion above, the methodology of this thesis
is based on critical realism. It can be viewed as a middle way between interpretivism
and positivism. According to Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009: 16):
‘Critical realists consider positivism and social constructionism as too superficial
and non-theoretical in their way of doing research; analysis of underlying
mechanisms and structures behind phenomena is what it takes to create theories
that are not just concentrates of data’.
Critical realism ontology presupposes that the world is not what we think about it, and
as follows, our knowledge is fallible (Sayer, 2004). According to Alvesson and
Sköldberg (2009), critical realists focus on profound mechanisms generating empirical
phenomena, rather than on predictable patterns. And those mechanisms operate
independently of their discovery.
Epistemologically, the main stand of critical realism is that our knowledge is
provisional as we do not have observer-independent access to the world. And
methodologically, critical realism is focused on explanation and understanding rather
than prediction and description (Mingers, 2004). It suggests that both qualitative and
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quantitative methods are important. Indeed, according to Ackroyd (2004:137) critical
realism
‘allows research to be selective in their choice of investigatory tools. Insightful
empirical research is a creative activity in which valuable insights cannot be
produced by the routine use of particular research technique’.
Furthermore, the aim of critical realists is to produce a theory which accurately explains
complex causal mechanisms. To achieve this aim multiple data is indispensible.
Having discussed the philosophical assumptions of the approach adopted in this
thesis, the focus now turns to a review of the previous methods used to research the
informal economy.
3.2. Previous methods used to research the informal economy
The methods used to research the informal economy can be divided into two main
groups, namely direct and indirect methods. Direct methods involve contact with or
observation of individuals, households or firms and include surveys and auditing of tax
returns. Indirect methods measure the traces the informal economy leaves in the
official statistics and includes research based on the differences between income and
expenditure at household level, discrepancies in the national accounts, differences
between officially measured participation rates and actual participation rates, monetary
methods, and modelling (Pedersen, 2003).
3.2.1. Direct measurement methods
Direct measurement methods are micro-economic methods that are based on contact
with or observation of persons and/or firms and mainly include surveys. Previously the
lack of empirical directly collected data was met by indirect methods in order to
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highlight the problem of the informal economy. Today, direct surveys are more popular
among scholars as these methods provide more accurate and in-depth information and
they can be tailored to meet the needs of the particular research problem being
investigated (Pfau-Effinger, 2009; Schneider, 2002; Williams, 2007; Williams and Ram,
2009). As TNS Infratest, Rockwool Foundation and Regioplan (2006: 17) stated it:
‘Direct surveys have their strong points in providing detailed information on the
nature of undeclared work: the structure, prices, circumstances under which
undeclared work takes place, norms and motives. Respondents who are involved
in undeclared work – be it as supplier, be it as buyer – can be asked a broad
variety of questions describing their sociodemographic background as well as the
nature of the undeclared work and the motives for offering or buying goods or
services in the undeclared sector’.
The detailed information direct surveys provide is important for deeper understanding
of the informal economy and designing the policies aimed at tackling it.
However, there are a number of criticisms cited by various scholars with regard
to direct methods. One of the major disadvantages of these methods is that people will
be unwilling to reveal the magnitude and character of informal work and will not
respond honestly (Bаculo, 2006; Jones et al., 2004; Ram et al., 2002; Williams, 2004).
Furthermore, participants may not know whether the money they paid for a good or
service has been officially declared (Williams, 2007; Williams and Ram, 2009). While
the unawareness of purchasers about the formality/informality of their suppliers might
be really the case, the reluctance of respondents to talk about their unofficial activities
has been refuted by a number of studies (Frey and Snyder, 2000; MacDonald, 1994;
Snyder, 2003; Williams and Windebank, 2001; Williams, 2007). ‘Just because it is an
activity hidden from or unregistered for tax and/or social security purposes, does not
mean that respondents are unwilling to discuss it with researchers’ (Williams, 2007:
351). However, there remain two major characteristics of direct methods that lead to
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some criticisms of this approach: a heavy emphasis on the household (mainly domestic
services provision) rather than the business as the unit of analysis and the focus upon
small-scale research of particular localities or sectors (Williams, 2007; Jensen and
Slack, 2009). Moreover, the direct methods provide only snapshot estimates of the
informal economy making it difficult to trace its development and growth over the time
(Schneider, 2002; Alderslade et al., 2006).
3.2.2. Indirect measurement methods
Indirect methods are advocated by those who are sceptical about the credibility of data
obtained using direct methods. Such commentators argue that the informal economy
can be revealed at the macroeconomic level and/or seek to measure the magnitude of
undeclared work, but not its characteristics and motives.
According to GHK and Fondazione G. Brodolini (2009), the key indirect
methods to measure the informal economy are considered to be discrepancy methods,
labour input methods, degree of participation method, Tanzi method, global indicators
methods (electricity consumption), latent variable methods. These methods are divided
into two types: indirect (general) and econometric. Econometric methods in turn include
monetary, global indicator and latent variable methods that are discussed below.
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Table 3.1. Classification of methods of measuring the informal economy (GHK and
Fondazione G. Brodolini, 2009: Table 3.1)
Type of method Sub-type of method Individual methods
Indirect (general)
methods
1.Discrepancy method
Labour market methods
2.Labour input
3.Degree of participation
Econometric methods
Monetary methods 4.Tanzi method
Global indicator methods 5.Electricity consumption
Latent variable methods 6.MIMIC/DYMIMIC
The first is the discrepancy method, which is based on the assumption that income can
be hidden more easily than consumption. The difference between declared income and
expenditures is expected to show the amount of undeclared income. The sources of
data are usually household surveys, national accounts and taxation authorities (GHK
and Fondazione G. Brodolini, 2009). Although this method has been employed in
studies conducted in Germany (Petersen, 1982 and Langfelt, 1989), the UK (O’Higgins,
1981) and the USA (Paglin, 1994), the results it provides might be of questionable
reliability (Thomas, 1999; Schneider, 2002; Williams and Ram, 2009). The problems of
the method are connected with the accuracy of income and expenditure data it uses.
The discrepancy between income and expenditure accounts may include not only
informal activities, but other factors as well (e.g. errors and omissions). Moreover,
according to Williams and Ram (2009), the studies using this method do not provide
the breakdown of income by source (whether it is from criminal or just undeclared
activities) and period (whether it was derived in the corresponding period or was
accumulated earlier).
The second and the third methods are ‘labour market’ methods. The labour
input method relies on the assumption that informal employees are less motivated to
conceal the nature of their work than their employers. The substance of this method is
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a comparison of data from the labour supply and demand sides. The difference in
figures will reveal the extent of informal activities. The sources of such information are
household and labour force surveys, ministries connected with finance, labour and
social issues, and the social security system. As the method is based on the
information from labour force surveys, the results may be distorted if the respondents
are unwilling to reveal the truth.
The assumption of the ‘degree of participation’ method is that if the number of
official work places is limited, labour will switch from formal to informal work. Thus,
positive variations in labour force participation in the official economy are seen as
negative variations in undeclared labour, and vice versa. This means that formal and
informal economies are negatively correlated: when there is an increase in the formal
employment, informal employment is decreased. The sources of information for
calculation are household surveys and national accounts. The method has been used
to measure the informal economy in Italy (Contini; 1981) and the United States (O’Neill,
1983). The drawback of this method is that the changes in the rate of participation can
have other causes and formal workers may perform informal activities as well.
Methods 4, 5 and 6 are econometric. The Tanzi (‘currency demand’) method is
a monetary econometric method and its key assumption is the solely cash basis of off-
the-books transactions. The amount of undeclared money is estimated by measuring
the sensitivity of the demand for money to tax pressure/ income level/ prices and
interest rates or by measuring the ratio of total demand for money and total deposits.
GDP and monetary variables are obtained from the national and regional accounts,
central banks, and statistical authorities. The currency demand approach has been
applied to many OECD countries (Schneider, 1997; Johnson, et al., 1998). However it
has been criticised for many reasons (Thomas, 1999; Schneider, 2002; Williams and
Ram, 2009). Firstly, off-the-books transactions are not always paid in cash. They can
involve cheque payments and barter. Secondly, while most studies consider only one
factor (the tax burden) of the increase in the informal economy, other factors, such as
tax morality and the impact of regulations also affect the size of the informal economy.
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Thirdly, it is hard to determine how much of the currency is held domestically and
abroad.
According to the fifth method of measuring the size of the informal economy,
namely the electricity consumption (the physical input) method, the size of informal
economy is the difference between the growth rate of electricity consumption (a proxy
for the growth rate of total economic activity) and the growth rate of measured GDP.
This yields an approximation of the growth rate of unrecorded income (Kaufmann and
Kaliberda, 1996; Lacko, 1999). Although the methodology is clear and easy to
implement, and the required data are usually easily accessible and reliable, it has
significant weaknesses. The problem with this method is that some informal activities
do not require significant amounts of electricity. In addition, the efficiency of production
and electricity use grow over time which affects electricity consumption for both formal
and informal activities. Finally, the elasticity of electricity/GDP across countries and
over time is not taken into account (Schneider, 2002).
Finally, the sixth method, MIMIC (multiple indicators and multiple causes) or
DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple indicators and multiple causes), is again econometric in
approach. This assumes that undeclared work is an unobserved variable that
influences observed indicators and is determined by observed variables. It includes,
first, a search for determinants (e.g., real and perceived tax burden, the burden of
regulation, tax immorality, etc.) and indicators (male participation rate, hours worked
and growth of real GNP). Then, it calculates undeclared work with the aid of
econometric tools. The DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple-indicators multiple-causes) model
consists in general of two parts, the measurement model links the unobserved
variables to observed indicators. Schneider (2002: 42-43) lists the causes and
indicators of the informal economy used in the model. The causes are:
(i) The burden of direct and indirect taxation, both actual and perceived: a rising burden
of taxation provides a strong incentive to work in the informal economy.
(ii) The burden of regulation as proxy for all other state activities: it is assumed that
increases in the burden of regulation give a strong incentive to enter the informal
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economy.
(iii) The tax morale (citizens’ attitudes toward the state), which describes the readiness
of individuals (at least partly) to leave their official occupations and enter the informal
economy: it is assumed that a declining tax morality tends to increase the size of the
informal economy.
The indicators are:
(i) Development of monetary indicators: if activities in the informal economy rise,
additional monetary transactions are required.
(ii) Development of the labour market: increasing participation of workers in the hidden
sector results in a decrease in participation in the official economy. Similarly, increased
activities in the hidden sector may be expected to be reflected in shorter working hours
in the official economy.
(iii) Development of the production market: an increase in the informal economy means
that inputs (especially labour) move out of the official economy (at least partly); this
displacement might have a depressing effect on the official growth rate of the economy.
Even though the method copes with the limitations of the previously discussed
approaches and was employed in a number of studies (Giles and Tedds, 2002;
Schneider 2001; Schneider and Enste, 2002; Tedds, 2005) it still should be used with
caution. This is because there is no evidence that these causes and indicators
necessarily lead to the existence and growth of the informal economy (Williams and
Ram, 2009).
An in-depth review of the above methods completed by GHK and Fondazione
G. Brodolini (2009: 26) identifies that indirect methods differ with respect to: data
requirements; the possibility of breaking down aggregate national data by employment
status of individuals, occupation, sex, etc.; and the potential for the method to provide
data on undeclared work across sectors and/or countries and over time. The main
advantages and disadvantages of each method found by GHK and Fondazione G.
Brodolini (2009) are summarised in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2. Overview of the key methods for measuring the informal economy (GHK and
Fondazione G. Brodolini, 2009: Table 3.2)
Method Main strengths Main weaknesses
1. –Discrepancy -Good data availability
-Harmonised data used
-Different sources used together, hence, the estimates
problematic
-Certain important sectors excluded
2. – Labour input -Well established
-Refined breakdown
available
-Harmonised data used
-Reliance on LFS results questionable (lack of
representativeness in LFS(Labour force survey);
dishonest responses to LFS)
-Some countries lack data
-Could be difficult to implement
3. – Degree of
participation
Harmonised data used -Example found only in RO
-Assumptions questionable
4. – Tanzi method -Easy to implement
-Harmonised data used
-Good data availability
-Focus on all non-observed economy (of which undeclared
work is only one part)
-Assumptions questionable
5. – Global indicator –
electricity consumption
-Harmonised data used
-Good data availability
-Requires a problematic initial estimate
-No breakdown is available
-Assumptions questionable
6. – Latent variable
MYMIC/DYMIMIC
-Easy to implement
-Harmonised data used
-Good data availability
-Focus on all non-observed economy (of which undeclared
work is only one part)
-Requires a problematic initial estimate
The main problems with all these approaches is that they provide a vague estimation of
the volume of informal economy and do not reveal important information on its
structure, character, nature of development and motives of the participants. Moreover,
the information these methods provide is not practicable for genuine policy conclusions
(Pfau-Effinger, 2009; Renooy et al., 2004; Thomas, 1999; Williams, 2004). As Thomas
(1999: 387) puts it:
‘The search for the magic number corresponding to the size of the black
economy as a percentage of GNP without providing economic theories to explain
the determinants and structure of the black economy has led economists into a
blind alley in which the question of size has become an end in itself and more
important issues are not addressed’.
To conclude, the direct method is the most appropriate approach for the collection of
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data that answers the aims and objectives of this thesis, which is interested in the
nature of undeclared work and the motives underpinning it. Indirect methods only
provide the policy makers with the vague idea about the size of informal economy.
However, in order to effectively combat with the informal economy, its nature and
motives of participants should be thoroughly understood. Therefore indirect
measurement methods cannot fulfil the objectives of the research and direct methods
should be used instead.
In this section, the advantages and disadvantages of direct and indirect
methods of measurement of the informal economy were discussed. In the next chapter,
the method selected for this research will be explained in greater detail.
3.3. Method selected: explanation and justification
On the basis of the review above, semi-structured face-to-face interviews have been
chosen as the data collection method to be used in this PhD thesis. They measure the
character of informal work, which is important for answering the aims and objectives
set out. This includes both closed- and open- ended questions and will be analysed
both qualitatively and quantitatively. This will allow the lack of data available to be
resolved and will explore in-depth the motives for and perceptions of staying informal.
Even though the research in South-Eastern Europe revealed that people talk happily
and openly about their informal activities (Williams, 2009a) this might be not the case in
Ukraine. Different socio-political situations in different countries should be kept in mind.
In Ukraine and especially in the Ukrainian provinces, people are not confident in the
future and are frightened of the lawlessness of local and state authorities. Therefore,
and regarding the questions about informal income in Ukraine particularly, the
respondents may be threatened mainly by the potential consequences of their
answers, even when they know that the questionnaires are absolutely anonymous.
The unit of analysis in this project is the household. This is because taking the
business as a unit of analysis will result in the omission of totally informal businesses
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and also people who operate enterprises from home, which might well be the vast
majority of enterprises in Ukraine. Both the supply and demand sides of informal work
are examined which will allow comparisons to be made between them. Firstly, the
questions about the demand side are asked first due to their less sensitive nature
because consuming informal services is viewed as more socially acceptable and is
also less illegal (Williams and Ram, 2009). Afterwards, the supply side questions are
posed. Such a gradual approach is applied throughout the whole questionnaire:
starting with the less sensitive questions on the general socio-demographic
background of the household members and the repairs done in the household and
ending with second employment and using connections for personal purposes (blat).
Such a gradual approach to posing personal questions detected a higher amount of
informal activity than the direct one in a study comparing different techniques in the
Netherlands (Kazemier and van Eck, 1992, cited in Williams and Ram, 2009).
The survey is carried out on a local population sample. The locality used for the
data collection is Mykolayiv, a city in the South of Ukraine which is characterized
below. The city was chosen as an average one (for example, Kyiv, the capital, might
not be representative as a whole of Ukraine because the gap between Kyiv and the
rest of Ukraine in terms of income and development levels is very large) and also the
home town of the researcher.
After explanation and justification of the method selected for this thesis, we now
move to the ethical issues of the research.
3.4. Ethical issues
When using direct methods for evaluating informal work, the relative sensitivity of the
topic should be taken into consideration. Johnsen and Jehn (2010: 313) define
sensitive issues as ‘those topics about which people are generally unwilling to disclose
information because the issues are intimate, private, threatening, and/or incriminating’.
Therefore informal work could be characterized as ‘sensitive topic’ – it is often
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associated with hiding income from tax authorities and viewed as incriminating.
However, the previous research on this topic suggests that the topic should be
positioned at the margins of ‘sensitive issue’ for several reasons.
Firstly, most of the population view informal transactions positively due to the
fact they do not see it as an offence but rather as a generally accepted practice.
Secondly, informal work is often done for kin, friends and neighbours with the motives
of strengthening social bonds and is not prosecuted by tax authorities. Finally, none of
previously conducted studies resulted in requests by the authorities to disclose the
names of respondents who reported informal work. To sum up, there is no potential
threat for the research participants. This research project respects the rights and
privacies of the participants and also contributes to the public good by exploring the
nature and reasons of informal work in order to assist in public policy improvement
towards tackling the worst aspects of the informal economy.
In this project due attention is paid to Research Ethics Policy Note no. 4 of
Ethics Policy of the University of Sheffield ‘Principles Of Anonymity, Confidentiality And
Data Protection’. This highlights how the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) includes
under its definition of ‘sensitive personal data’ the ‘commission or alleged commission
by him, or her of any offence’. To meet the requirements of the DPA this research
project will meet the first condition of Schedule 2 of the DPA by ensuring that the ‘data
subject has given his/her consent to the processing’ and will meet the first condition of
Schedule 3 by ensuring that ‘the data subject has given his explicit consent to the
processing of personal data’. Informed consent will therefore be used. A consent form
and information sheet is included in the Appendix D.
To obtain informed consent potential participants were given information in
writing, sufficient time to consider whether or not they wish to participate and then their
oral consent will be sought. The fact that they engage in the interview also displays that
they have given their implicit consent. Continuous reiterations were made throughout
the interview of their ability not to have to answer any questions and of their ability to
be able to withdraw at any time, especially before sensitive questions such as on their
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supply of informal work.
To ensure confidentiality of personal data the following measures were put in
place. Firstly, no response on the data-base includes personal details or the address or
contact details of any respondent. All data is anonymous, as is analysis and reporting.
All interviewees were given pseudonyms. After collating the data onto the SPSS data-
base and qualitative analysis, all interview questionnaires were shredded.
3.5. Questionnaire and sampling procedure
The questionnaire consists of seven sections: general information; coping practices
used by households (demand side); work undertaken for others (supply side); acquiring
goods; using connections (demand side), using connections (supply side) and
secondary employment.
General information (section 1) includes questions on the length of time the
respondents have lived in this city and in this particular house/flat. Afterwards the
information about each household’s membership follows in terms of their gender, age,
employment status and employment history. This section also included a question on
monthly income, for which the ranges were provided, as well as a question to identify
the first and second most important means of livelihood. The possible livelihood
sources were suggested (please, refer to Table 2 of Appendix A).
Section 2, Coping practices used by households (demand side) investigated 27
different domestic tasks (see Table 3.3).
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Table 3.3. The list of domestic tasks investigated
REPAIRS (last 5 years)
1. Painting
2. Wallpapering
3. Tiling
4. Replace a broken window
5. Maintaining  and/or installing domestic electric appliances
6. Windows / doors installation
7. Plumbing
8. Heaters / boilers installation
9. Electrical mounting
ROUTINE HOUSEWORK (LAST MONTH)
10. Cleaning
11. Shopping
12. Washing / ironing
13. Cooking
14. Dish washing
15. Dacha work
MAKING AND REPAIRING GOODS (LAST YEAR)
16. Clothes making/ repair / fit
17. Shoes repair
18. House hold textile making/ repair
19. Furniture making / repair
20. Household appliances repair
21. Car repair
22. Computer repair
CARING ACTIVITIES (LAST 3 MONTHS)
23. Hairdressing
24. Manicure
25. Massage
26. Baby-sitting
27. Tutoring
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It included questions about work done for the respondent and his/her household
members: if the job was performed, who did it (how they are related to the respondent),
if they were paid, if yes, how they were paid (cash/in kind/quid pro quo), if they were
paid in cash, officially or unofficially (fully through a bank/till/ etc. or cash with receipt /
cash without any documentation / partly cash partly through a bank/till/ etc.) and why
they did the job rather than someone else.
Afterwards, in the section 3, Work undertaken for others (supply side), the same
questions were asked about the same 27 types of domestic tasks that were completed
by the respondent or his/her household members.
Section 4, Acquiring goods, was designed in order find out where and for how
much people purchase day-to-day goods, what kinds of goods are purchased from the
official retailers and which from the individuals/ black market etc. The list of goods is
provided in Table 5a of Appendix A.
The next sections then deal with possibly more sensitive issues: using
connections / blat (on both recipient and provider sides) and participation in secondary
and / or informal employment.
The using connections (demand side) section starts with the question on the
respondent’s attitude towards blat (refer to Section 6.1.1). Afterwards the list of
possible spheres of using blat is provided (please, refer to Table 6 of Appendix A) and
the respondent is asked whether anyone helped him/her to solve the problems in these
spheres; why the respondent asked for such help; if s/he rewarded this help and how;
and what are the relations between the participators of blat relations. These are
followed by the open-ended questions and the respondent was expected to give
comprehensive answer: whether it is possible to achieve the same result without using
connections; and if not, why.
The same questions were asked about providing help using own knowledge,
position, privileges in the section Using connections (supply side). The same spheres
of blat are suggested. This section differs from the previous one by the open-ended
questions. Here, the respondents were asked to assess the importance of connections
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versus money in the past and today giving examples if possible.
The last section, on secondary employment, also includes open- and closed-
ended questions. The closed-ended questions were aimed at gathering information on
whether the respondent is involved in secondary employment; whether s/he is working
officially/ unofficially; where his/her second job takes place; how important this job is for
the family budget. The open-ended questions explore the problems that arise in
connection with the unofficial activity; the benefits that the members of household
receive from the state; and the motives for being formal or informal.
To select households for interview, a random spatial sampling methodology was
employed (Rodgerson, 2006). 200 households were interviewed using a structured
questionnaire schedule as described above. Following this, 30 of them were
interviewed in-depth using a more unstructured approach. For comparison, for the
research of Williams and Round (2008) in Ukraine 600 interviews were conducted in
four different areas, the biggest of which was Uzhgorod with the population of 116,000
and 150 interviews conducted.
The number of households in Mykolayiv can be estimated as 190 000, given
that population in Mykolayiv is approximately 500 000 and average number of people
per household in Ukraine is around 2.6 (Population census, 2001). 20 households are
surveyed in 10 districts using the random spatial sample in each district. The
characteristics of Mykolayiv including its history, socio-economic and demographic
situation are discussed in the next section of this thesis.
3.6. Characteristics of the fieldwork location: Mykolayiv
Mykolayiv is a regional centre in the South of Ukraine, its population is 498,700 people,
its area is 253 sq km and density of population 1,980 people/sq km according to
National Statistical Committee. In the Soviet period, Mykolayiv was a prosperous
shipbuilding centre of the Soviet Union with three shipbuilding yards. Since the collapse
of the Soviet Union, production volumes have decreased dramatically as well as the
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population employed at these plants. The overview of Mykolayiv history, its current
demographic and social-economic situation is provided in below.
3.6.1. History of Mykolayiv
According to Tronko (1981) Mykolayiv was founded during the Russian-Turkish War
(1787-1791), when young Black Sea fleet was in an urgent need of naval vessels. The
dockyard was founded by the Russian Governor General of Novorossiya, Prince
Grigorii Potemkin at the mouth of the river Ingul. Around this dockyard the town began
to grow. Potemkin named the town Nikolayev to commemorate the victory of Russian
troops over the Turks in Ochakiv in 1788 close to the day of Saint Nikolay in the
Russian Orthodox Church calendar.
The life of the city has always been closely connected to ship building and
fleets. The Black Sea Fleet headquarters were stationed here for almost one hundred
years. During the Crimean war (1853 – 1856) the city was a major logistics base of the
Black Sea Fleet. The majority of enterprises founded in the city belonged to military-
industrial complex and therefore was closed to foreign visitors for many decades. Even
the first educational institution in the city – the Black Sea Navigation College founded in
1798 – was connected with the fleet.
This influenced the history, character and even the appearance of Mykolayiv.
The town was built according to a specially developed plan of Russian architect Ivan
Starov: broad straight streets and squares of the correct forms. This urban planning
preserved its original appearance to this day and is a unique monument of the epoch of
classicism.
In 1862, a commercial port was opened in the city. This helped Mykolayiv to
become an important economic and trade centre. At the end of the 19th century,
Mykolayiv was ranked third after St. Petersburg and Odesa in terms of trade with
foreign countries. The city became an important industrial centre in the South of
Ukraine – in 1890 there were 131 enterprises. At the end of the 19th century, foreign
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companies start investing into the city’s industries. In 1895-1897, the yards of Belgian
and Russian corporations were built and in 1907 merged into the one yard ‘Naval’.
Today, it is the biggest shipyard in Mykolayiv – the Black Sea Shipbuilding Yard. By the
end of the 19th century, Mykolayiv was one of the biggest cities of the Russian Empire
in terms of its population.
At the beginning of the 20th century, the economic and political situation
changed. Mykolayiv was closely associated with the revolutionary movement as its
population mainly consisted of workers. During the revolution in Ukraine in 1917—
1921, Mykolayiv was named ‘Red Petersburg of Ukraine’ due to the activity of the
Bolsheviks (Institute of Society Transformation, 2002).
In 1911, the plant of Russian joint-stock company ‘Russud’ was built. In 1928, it
was named in honour of murdered revolutionaries ‘61 Communards Yard’ (Mykolayiv
City Council, 2003).
During the Holodomor (famishment) in Mykolayiv, the big industrial centre,
certain measures against the famine were taken, while the peasants were actually
abandoned in the field to their fate and suffered. During World War II, Mykolayiv was
occupied by Nazis for almost three years. In 1944 the city was liberated, notably due to
the 68 sailors-paratroopers that were awarded the titles ‘Hero of the Soviet Union’, the
majority of them - posthumously.
After the War, Mykolayiv was one of the biggest shipbuilding centres in the
USSR. The ships were produced by three shipbuilding yards: Black Sea Shipbuilding
Yard, 61 Communards Yard and the shipyard ‘Ocean’. During a short historical period,
a small shipbuilding wharf turned into the large industrial, political and cultural centre of
Southern Ukraine.
On the 1st December 1991, Mykolayiv city and region citizens confirmed the
Declaration of Independence of Ukraine at the National referendum with 89.45 percent
of votes in favour of independence. In the 1990s, the economy of Mykolayiv and the
whole state has suffered a number of significant, often negative, consequences of
market liberalization and economic reforms.
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After the collapse of the USSR, the shipbuilding industry in Ukraine inherited a
powerful industrial potential: eight well-equipped, profitable shipyards, which made up
about 30 percent of the shipbuilding capacity of the former Soviet Union. The first three
of the eight most powerful in terms of production capacity shipbuilding yards are
located in Mykolayiv. In 1992, the share of these three shipyards accounted for 68
percent of shipbuilding in Ukraine.
In the Soviet times, the shipyards were profitable and prosperous. They
regularly paid taxes and salaries, had a developed social sphere, expanded production
facilities and built housing. However, 65 percent of its production were warships and
were made to the order of the government who financed their production.
After 1992, the construction was almost stopped as their Ukrainian ship-owners
did not have enough funds to purchase new ships. Destruction of inter-sectoral links,
inconsistent tax policy, numerous bureaucratic obstacles to the implementation of
investment projects and unpreparedness of the enterprises for such a negative external
environment changes resulted in overwhelming recession in this industrial sector. Thus
the output at the Black Sea Shipyard in 1997 was just 29 percent of the level of 1992,
at ‘61 Communards’ shipyard – 27 percent and at the shipyard ‘Okean’ – 13 percent
(Chornyi, 2009). Indeed, the output and the number of people employed in the
Ukrainian shipbuilding sector decreased dramatically during the independence period
according to the data of the Association of Shipbuilders of Ukraine (Table 3.4).
Table 3.4. The number of employees at the shipbuilding enterprises of Ukraine
(Lysyckyi, 2010)
The number of employees at the shipbuilding enterprises of Ukraine
(average for a year)
Years Number of people In percentage of 1990
1990 150 000 100%
1991-94 no data no data
1995 119 276 80%
1996 98 624 66%
1997 65 494 44%
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1998 77 593 52%
1999 70 046 47%
2000 58 713 39%
2001 54 276 36%
2002 54 247 36%
2003 50 574 34%
2004 47 562 32%
2005 44 013 29%
2006 40 232 27%
2007 34 882 23%
2008 33 529 22%
9 months 2009 30 855 21%
Today, all three shipyards in Mykolayiv are in a critical situation. Other Mykolayiv plants
that supplied machinery, equipment and spare parts to the shipyards are struggling as
well.
3.6.2. Recent social and economic statistics
The most important industries of Mykolayiv are machinery, construction and
shipbuilding. The enterprises of Mykolayiv region produce 40 percent of output of the
Ukrainian shipbuilding industry, 90 percent of state output of gas turbines and 80
percent of aluminium oxide – a raw material for aluminium production.
The structure of GDP in Mykolayiv is the following: manufacturing industry
accounts for 82.1 percent, electricity, water and gas production and distribution - 17.8
percent, mining industry – 0.1 percent of total GPD. The largest portion of production in
manufacturing industry belongs to metallurgical production (31.3 percent), machinery
construction (27.9 percent) and production of food and beverages (17.2 percent).
According to the statistical data, during the years 2006 – 2010 the number of
entrepreneurs increased from 36,000 to 69,000. As of 01.12.2011, 1,000 legal entities
and 51,000 individuals are registered in the State Register.
One of the negative socio-economic indicators is the arrears of wages at
Mykolayiv enterprises that amount to 35.1 million hryvnias (US$4.4 million). Moreover,
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the arrears of wages as of the 1st of November 2010 increased in comparison to the
beginning of the year by 47.9 percent or by 11.4 million hryvnias (US$ 1.4 million).
Analysis of the labour market in Mykolayiv during 2007-2010 shows some
improvements in the economy and thus in employment. In 2010, the approximate
number of employees in the city of Mykolayiv was 213,300 people with a tendency to
increase, 2,939 were registered unemployed. There se are official numbers that display
inconsistency between the registered unemployed rate and nearly half of 500,000 total
population of employment participation rate. There is an obvious discrepancy between
registered unemployment and actual unemployment, which is shown in Table 3.5
below in detail. It should be noted, that according to the 2010 statistics, out of almost
598,900 population, only 62 percent is of active working age, while 25 percent are older
than active working age and 13 percent – are younger. Therefore the amount of
working age population is 309,318 people.
Table 3.5. The discrepancy between registered unemployment and actual
unemployment
Total population 498,900
Active working age population, percent 62%
Active working age population 309,318
Officially employed population 213,300
Unemployed as a difference between active working age population
and officially employed 96,018
Registered unemployed 2,939
Difference between registered unemployed and actually unemployed 93,079
This difference between registered unemployed and actually unemployed of 93,079
people constitutes 30 percent of total working age population and presumably may
include housewives (or anybody involved in self-provisioning), people with disabilities
and informal workers. There is no statistical data yet that sheds light on the share of
informal workers in the 93,079 not in official employment.
Table 3.6 below shows that in 2009 unemployment level in Mykolayiv region
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was 9.0 percent decreasing to 8.2 percent in 2010. The numbers are almost equal to
the average Ukrainian.
Table 3.6. The level of unemployment of population in the age of 15-70 years. In
percentage to the economically active population (State Statistics Service of Ukraine,
2010)
Region 2009 2010
Rivne 12.5 11.3
Sumy 10.9 10.5
Ternopil 11.0 10.2
Chernihiv 10.7 10.1
Cherkasy 10.6 10.0
Vinnytsia 10.5 9.9
Zhytomyr 10.5 9.7
Poltava 10.1 9.5
Kirovohrad 9.9 9.1
Transcarpathian 9.9 8.9
Kherson 9.4 8.8
Donetsk 9.3 8.7
Khmelnytsky 9.3 8.5
Chernivtsi 8.9 8.4
Volyn 9.0 8.4
Mykolayiv 9.0 8.2
Ivano-Frankivsk 8.8 8.1
Average for Ukraine 8.6 8.0
Lviv 8.3 7.8
m. Kyiv 7.8 7.3
Zaporizhzhia 7.7 7.2
Luhansk 7.4 7.1
Dnipropetrovsk 7.6 7.0
Kharkiv 7.6 7.0
Crimea 6.7 6.1
Odesa 6.6 5.8
m. Sevastopol 6.5 5.7
Kyiv 6.2 5.5
The average salary in Mykolayiv Region in 2010 was 2,122 hryvnias per month
(approximately 267 USD), which is slightly lower than the average for Ukraine (Table
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3.7)
Table 3.7. Average salary in Ukraine, by regions (State Statistics Service of Ukraine,
2010)
Regions Avarage salary in 2010,hryvnias
m. Kyiv 3,431
Donetsk 2,549
Dnipropetrovsk 2,369
Kyiv 2,295
Luhansk 2,271
Average for Ukraine 2,239
Zaporizhzhia 2,187
m. Sevastopol 2,167
Mykolayiv 2,122
Poltava 2,102
Kharkiv 2,060
Odesa 2,046
Crimea 1,991
Rivne 1,960
Lviv 1,941
Ivano-Frankivsk 1,927
Sumy 1,866
Transcarpathian 1,846
Cherkasy 1,835
Kirovohrad 1,815
Khmelnytsky 1,786
Zhytomyr 1,785
Vinnytsia 1,782
Chernivtsi 1,772
Kherson 1,733
Chernihiv 1,711
Volyn 1,692
Ternopil 1,659
Retail turnover (i.e. retail sales) of enterprises in Mykolayiv region in 2010 was 5,575.8
million hryvnias (US$ 697 million), its growth rate was 104 percent and it constituted 2
percent of Ukraine’s total retail turnover (Table 3.8).
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Table 3.8. Retail turnover of enterprises in 2010 (State Statistics Service of Ukraine,
2010)
Region Retail turnover,mln hryvnias
Retail turnover,
% to Ukraine's
total
Retail turnover growth rate, %
2010 to 2009 2009 to2008
Ukraine, total 274,599.6 100.0% 108% 79%
m. Kyiv 50,090.7 18.2% 106% 78%
Donetsk 25,092.3 9.1% 112% 73%
Dnipropetrovsk 24,531.2 8.9% 109% 75%
Kharkiv 18,406.2 6.7% 105% 78%
Odesa 17,573.6 6.4% 109% 88%
Lviv 14,904.9 5.4% 103% 86%
Kyiv 11,874.8 4.3% 107% 90%
Zaporizhzhia 10,628.6 3.9% 111% 77%
Crimea 10,117.6 3.7% 107% 78%
Luhansk 8,988.3 3.3% 113% 76%
Poltava 7,105.8 2.6% 106% 76%
Transcarpathian 5,849.5 2.1% 106% 80%
Mykolayiv 5,575.8 2.0% 104% 80%
Vinnytsia 5,563.5 2.0% 107% 76%
Cherkasy 5,356.1 2.0% 109% 83%
Kherson 5,243.9 1.9% 103% 83%
Khmelnytsky 5,111.2 1.9% 103% 76%
Ivano-Frankivsk 4,953.3 1.8% 104% 82%
Zhytomyr 4,939.2 1.8% 106% 82%
Volyn 4,594.1 1.7% 105% 79%
Rivne 4,415.9 1.6% 104% 83%
Chernihiv 4,394.2 1.6% 105% 81%
Kirovohrad 4,394.0 1.6% 109% 78%
Chernivtsi 4,102.0 1.5% 103% 88%
Sumy 3,917.7 1.4% 104% 78%
Ternopil 3,783.5 1.4% 102% 82%
m. Sevastopol 3,091.7 1.1% 116% 85%
3.6.3. Demographic situation
The Census of Population 2001 provides information about the regions in general. The
total population in the Mykolayiv region was 1,265,000 people. The Urban population
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amounted to 838,800 people (66.3 percent) and rural – 425,900 people (33.7 percent).
The population growth rate in Mykolayiv region in comparison to 1989 was 95 percent
(Table 3.9).
Table 3.9. The results of National Census 2001 (Population census, 2001)
Regions
National Census 2011
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Donetsk 4,841 4,363.6 477.5 90 10 10.0 5,332 91
Dnipropetrovsk 3,568 2,960.3 607.3 83 17 7.4 3,881 92
Kharkiv 2,914 2,288.7 625.5 79 21 6.0 3,195 91
Lviv 2,627 1,558.7 1,067.8 59 41 5.4 2,748 96
Kyiv city 2,611 2,611.3 - 100 - 5.4 2,603 100
Luhansk 2,546 2,190.8 355.4 86 14 5.3 2,863 89
Odesa 2,469 1,624.6 844.4 66 34 5.1 2,643 93
Crimea 2,034 1,274.3 759.4 63 37 4.2 2,064 99
Zaporizhzhia 1,929 1,458.2 471.0 76 24 4.0 2,082 93
Kyiv 1,828 1,053.5 774.4 58 42 3.8 1,940 94
Vinnytsia 1,772 818.9 953.5 46 54 3.7 1,933 92
Poltava 1,630 956.8 673.3 59 41 3.4 1,753 93
Khmelnytsky 1,431 729.6 701.2 51 49 3.0 1,527 94
Ivano-Frankivsk 1,410 593.0 816.8 42 58 2.9 1,424 99
Cherkasy 1,403 753.6 649.3 54 46 2.9 1,532 92
Zhytomyr 1,390 775.4 614.1 56 44 2.9 1,545 90
Sumy 1,300 842.9 456.8 65 35 2.7 1,433 91
Mykolayiv 1,265 838.8 425.9 66 34 2.6 1,331 95
Transcarpathian 1,258 466.0 792.3 37 63 2.6 1,252 100
Chernihiv 1,245 727.2 518.1 58 42 2.6 1,416 88
Kherson 1,175 706.2 468.9 60 40 2.4 1,240 95
Rivne 1,173 549.7 623.6 47 53 2.4 1,170 100
Ternopil 1,142 485.6 656.8 43 57 2.4 1,169 98
Kirovohrad 1,133 682.0 451.1 60 40 2.3 1,239 91
Volyn 1,061 533.2 527.5 50 50 2.2 1,061 100
Chernivtsi 923 373.5 549.3 40 60 1.9 938 98
m. Sevastopol 380 358.1 21.4 94 6 0.8 395 96
Total 48,457 32,574.5 15,883 X X 100.0 51,707 26
The population of Mykolayiv city has been in gradual decline during the last few years
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(Figure 3.1). In the year 2010 it amounted to 498,900 people. The age structure of
population reordered by the National Census is characterised by the decrease of the
children share and increase of the retirement age people share. This considerably
worsens the demographical situation in the region and causes population ageing. Such
a demographic situation is similar throughout Ukraine.
Figure 3.1. Population of Mykolayiv during the years 1998 – 2010 (Head Administration
of Statistics in the Mykolayiv region, 2010)
According to the National Census 2001, in Mykolayiv region lived the representatives of
over 100 nationalities. In the national structure of the region the vast majority are
Ukrainian, whose number amounted to 1,034,400 people or 81.9 percent of the total
population (Table 3.10).
Table 3.10. National structure of Mykolayiv region population (Population census,
2001)
Nationality Amount,people
Amount,
%
Ukrainians 653,015 78.2%
Russians 150,438 18.0%
Belarusians 5,807 0.7%
Bulgarians 4,921 0.6%
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Moldovans 3,921 0.5%
Jews 3,197 0.4%
Armenians 2,911 0.3%
Others 10,802 1.3%
Total population 835,012 100.0%
The language structure of the population is the following: 69.2 percent of residents
consider Ukrainian their native language and 29.3 percent views Russian as native.
However according to the research of the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of
Sciences of Ukraine in 2007, in the South and South-East of Ukraine only 5.3 percent
of population speak exclusively Ukrainian and 7.3 percent mostly Ukrainian, whereas
35.7 percent speak exclusively Russian and 23.1 percent mostly Russian. The
language situation in this region may be compared to other regions of Ukraine (Table
3.11).
Table 3.11. The language of communication in the family, by regions, in percent (May,
2007) (Vyshniak, 2009)
What language is spoken in Ukrainian
homes? In percent.
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Exclusively Ukrainian 28.8 80.8 36.0 5.3 1.1
Mostly Ukrainian but sometimes Russian 8.7 7.7 14.9 7.3 2.1
Mixed language 19.7 6.6 27.2 28.4 8.6
Mostly Russian but sometimes Ukrainian 14.3 1.4 12.5 23.1 17.2
Exclusively Russian 28.0 1.7 9.5 35.7 70.2
Other language 0.6 1.7 0.0 0.2 0.8
The results of the Census reveal the improvement in education levels of population, the
increase of number of people with higher and secondary education. This indicator is
higher than those obtained in 1989 Census by 17.6 percent.
According to the Population Census 2011 the structure of Mykolayiv region
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urban population by the sector of economy, employment status and activity group is
similar to Ukraine as a whole. By employment status it mostly consists of waged
employees (89.4 percent) and self-employed (5.6 percent) (Table 3.12).
The sectors of economy absorbing the largest amounts of human resources in
the urban area of Mykolayiv region are manufacturing (22.7 percent), trade (15.9
percent), state governance and transport (both 8.4 percent) (Table 3.13). As for activity
groups, the largest ones are  specialists (19 percent), service and trade workers (15
percent), operators and assemblers of equipment and machinery (15 percent) and
skilled tool workers (14 percent) (Table 3.14).
Table 3.12. Structure of urban population of Mykolayiv region and Ukraine by
employment status (Population census, 2011)
Employment status
Employed
population
of
Mykolayiv
region
Employed
population
of Ukraine
Employed
population
of
Mykolayiv
region, %
Employed
population
of Ukraine,
%
Waged employees, people 277,606 10,783,815 91.5 89.4
Members of cooperatives/collective enterprises 4,107 233,453 2.0 1.3
Employers 4,467 165,289 1.4 1.4
Self-employed 17,398 425,704 3.6 5.6
Unpaid family homeworkers 543 10,663 0.1 0.2
Not classified 6,373 165,079 1.4 2.1
Total 310,494 11,784,003 100.0 100.0
Table 3.13. Structure of urban population of Mykolayiv region and Ukraine by sector of
economy (Population census, 2011)
Sectors
Urban
population
employed in
Mykolayiv
region,
people
Urban
population
employed in
Ukraine,
people
Urban
population
employed in
Mykolayiv
region, %
Urban
population
employed in
Ukraine, %
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 20,196 471,930 6.5 4.0
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Fisheries 508 16,708 0.2 0.1
Mining 470 526,303 0.2 4.5
Manufacturing 70,624 2,628,188 22.7 22.3
Electricity, gas and water production 14,549 471,863 4.7 4.0
Construction 17,897 623,166 5.8 5.3
Wholesale and retail trade, motor vehicles trade,
repair services 49,264 1,664,369 15.9 14.1
Hotels and restaurants 6,627 244,801 2.1 2.1
Transport 26,175 949,068 8.4 8.1
Financial activities 3,325 142,389 1.1 1.2
Real estate transactions and rent 16,752 535,273 5.4 4.5
State governance 26,042 861,116 8.4 7.3
Education 24,456 1,031,385 7.9 8.8
Health care and social assistance 23,146 1,014,510 7.5 8.6
Collective, public and personal services 9,575 416,580 3.1 3.5
Household services 760 43,015 0.2 0.4
Total employed population 310,494 11,784,003 100.0 100.0
Table 3.14. Structure of urban population of Mykolayiv region and Ukraine by group of
activity (Population census, 2011)
Activity groups Mykolayiv,people
Ukraine,
people
Mykolayiv,
%
Ukraine,
%
Legislators, senior civil servants, managers 36,426 1,415,435 12 12
Professionals 32,848 1,649,870 11 14
Specialists 58,791 1,934,763 19 16
Technical employees 11,242 483,469 4 4
Service and trade workers 46,559 1,516,455 15 13
Skilled workers in agriculture and forestry,
fish farming and fisheries 2,910 71,322 1 1
Skilled tool workers 42,655 1,674,892 14 14
Operators and assemblers of equipment and
machinery 46,818 1,808,461 15 15
The simplest professions 32,218 1,188,895 10 10
Total employed population, thousand 310,494 11,784,003 100 100
To conclude, the statistics shows that socio-economic indicators of Mykolayiv region
are average if compared to Ukraine as a whole. The largest portion of its population is
employed in manufacturing and trade. In the Soviet times, Mykolayiv was a prosperous
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shipbuilding city. However, after the restructuring caused by the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Mykolayiv started to decline. One of the major obstacles on the way to recovery
is corruption, which is discussed in the next sub-section.
3.6.4. Corruption
Corruption is closely related to the informal economy and informal networks, and the
borders between these notions are often blurred. Therefore, it is important to shed light
on the corruption statistics in Mykolayiv and Ukraine in general.
According to Neutze and Karatnycky (2007), Ukraine has been constantly
challenged by corruption since its independence in 1991. It penetrates a significant part
of its business, politics and society. Success in the struggle against corruption is one of
the most important factors to the political and economic health of the country. Indeed,
as Kovryzhenko (2011:11) states,
‘Corruption remains one of the top problems threatening the democratic
development of Ukraine. It can be characterised as a systemic phenomenon,
which exists in all sections and all levels of the public administration.
Furthermore, there is a high tolerance for corrupt practices throughout the
society. Ukraine for years has been ranked low in Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index, as well as in other indices and reports produced by
international organisations’.
This can be illustrated by Table 3.15 below. CPI is the Corruption Perception Index
issued by Transparency International which ranks countries according to the perception
of corruption in the public sector as determined by expert assessments and opinion
surveys. The Global Integrity Index uses some 300 indicators to assess the existence
and effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms that promote public integrity. They
typically pair an indication of the ‘in law' existence of a particular institutions with an ‘in
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practice’ assessment of its functioning. Ukraine traditionally is in the bottom end of the
rating. Freedom House’s Nations in Transit indicates that since 2005 until 2010 Ukraine
has not made any progress in tackling corruption. The World Bank (WB) ‘Worldwide
Governance Indicators’ combine the views of a large number of enterprise, citizen and
expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. Ukraine’s scores for
these six indicators have been low from the year 2005 to 2009.
Table 3.15. Assessment of Corruption in Ukraine: Some Quantitative Data
(Kovryzhenko, 2011)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
CPI, rank among the countries considered/ Score
on the scale of 10 (where 0 means perceived to
be highly corrupt, 10-perceived to be highly clean)
107th
of 158/
2.6
99th of
163/
2.8
118th
of 179/
2.7
134th
of 180/
2.5
146th
of 180/
2.2
134th
of 178/
2.4
Global Integrity Index
- - 68 of
100
(weak)
- 58 of
100
(very
weak)
-
Freedom House, Nations in Transit, ‘Corruption’
Indicator, 1 – the highest level of democratic
progress, 7 – the lowest
5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75
WB ‘Voice and Accountability’ Indicator,
percentile rank 0-100
34.6 46.2 46.2 47.1 47.4 -
WB ‘Political Stability’ Indicator, percentile rank 0-
100
38.0 47.6 51.4 47.4 34.4 -
WB ‘Government Effectiveness’ Indicator,
percentile rank 0-100
36.9 33.5 30.0 29.0 23.8 -
WB ‘Regulatory Quality’ Indicator, percentile rank
0-100
39.5 35.6 38.3 35.7 3 1.4 -
WB ‘Rule of Law’ Indicator, percentile rank 0-100 29.5 23.8 26.7 29.2 26.4 -
WB ‘Control of Corruption’ Indicator, percentile
rank 0-100
32.0 31.6 27.1 26.6 19.5 -
The survey by the European Research Association and Kyiv International Institute of
Sociology (2011) provides comprehensive statistics on corruption in Ukraine including
the comparison of the years 2007, 2009 and 2011. According to the survey in 2009 and
2011 Mykolayiv region corruption perception index was lower than average in Ukraine.
However, the index increased significantly in 2011 in comparison to 2009 (Figure 3.2).
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is calculated based on respondents’ answers
to the question of how widespread they believe corruption to be within Ukraine’s
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governing bodies and among public officials. The more respondents believe that
corruption is widespread across the 20 different functions and sectors, the higher the
CPI value (which ranges from 100 – the highest perceived corruption to 0 – the least
perceived corruption).
Figure 3.2. Corruption perception index, by regions (European Research Association
and Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2011)
In addition, the survey distinguishes between voluntary and extorted bribes. The
findings on the prevalence of both types of corruption in different services and
institutions for the year 2007 are shown in Figure 3.3 below
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Figure 3.3. Bribes extorted and given voluntary (European Research Association and
Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2011)
The survey showed that the extortion of bribes by officials (25 percent) is twice as
prevalent as voluntary bribe-giving (11 percent). The institutions where the biggest
share of participants were extorted money are universities (47.3 percent of
respondents reported the extortion), healthcare (43.8 percent), police (42.8 percent)
and business regulation and inspection (41.1 percent).
Figures 3.4a and 3.4b below compare extortion and voluntary bribe giving for
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the years 2007, 2009 and 2011. Here, the sectors are sorted by changes in extortion
experiences (from the highest decrease to the highest increase). No statistically
significant decrease was recorded in any of the sectors.
Figure 3.4a. Bribes extorted, percent of respondents who had contacted respective
state institutions (European Research Association in cooperation with Kyiv International
Institute of Sociology, 2011)
The share of those who offered voluntary bribes decreased by an average of two
percentage points since 2009 (from 42.6 percent to 40.6 percent). In Figure 3.4b, the
sectors are also sorted by changes in experiences with voluntary bribery (from the
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highest decrease to the highest increase).
Figure 3.4b Bribes given voluntary, percent of respondents who had contacted
respective state institutions (European Research Association in cooperation with Kyiv
International Institute of Sociology (2011)
In general, voluntary bribe-giving happens some three times less often than incidences
of extortion. According to Figures 3.5a and 3.5b below, that illustrate voluntary and
extorted bribes by region for the ears 2007-2011, the extortion in Mykolayiv region is
some four times higher than voluntary bribes giving.
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Figure 3.5a. Corruption Experience Index – Extortion, by region (European Research
Association in cooperation with Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2011)
Figure 3.5b. Corruption Experience Index – Voluntary Bribes, by region (European
Research Association in cooperation with Kyiv International Institute of Sociology,
2011)
Notably, the European Research Association and Kyiv International Institute of
Sociology (2011) developed the Index of Use of Personal Connections, Nepotism and
Favouritism when dealing with state officials. In their report, the use of personal
125
connections is considered ‘as a ‘soft’ form of corruption, which is akin to blat. Figures
3.6a and 3.6b below show its breakdown by sector and region for the years 2009 and
2011. It is important to note that according to the survey, voluntary bribes are often
supplemented by the use of personal connections. According to the Research
Association and Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (2011: 31):
‘The findings of 2009 and surveys in 2011 indicate that this type of corrupt
behaviour occurs less frequently than extortion, however more often than offering
bribes. In other words, prior to offering a bribe, citizens try to first find a useful
connection in the necessary sphere’.
Figure 3.6a. Corruption Experience Index – Use of Personal Connection, by sector
(European Research Association in cooperation with Kyiv International Institute of
Sociology, 2011)
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Figure 3.6a shows the percentage of participants who answered affirmatively to the
question ‘Have you or members of your family or a state official ever used personal
connection, nepotism or favouritism to obtain services?’. Since the year 2009, the
prevalence of use of personal connections did not change significantly: the overall
share of those who use connections was 21.8 percent in 2009 and 22.9 percent in
2011. The only sector where the decrease is statistically significant (6.6 percent) is
higher education. The European Research Association and Kyiv International Institute
of Sociology (2011) argue that this can be partially explained by the introduction of the
External Independent Testing system. Previously, the entrance examinations were
conducted by the Universities and lecturers were assessing the students. Now the
students are admitted based on the results of independent testing.
Figure 3.6b. Corruption Experience Index – Use of Personal Connection, by region
(European Research Association in cooperation with Kyiv International Institute of
Sociology, 2011)
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As can be seen from Figure 3.6b above, in 2009 Mykolayiv region had one of the
highest indexes of Use of Personal Connection, which decreased significantly in 2011
and settled on the average Ukrainian level.
The survey found that more than 90 percent of participants evaluated corruption
as an extremely significant problem for the country. At the same time, only 41 percent
do not justify corruption as a way to resolve important matters, while 42 percent believe
that corruption can be sometimes justified if it is necessary to resolve a problem and 6
percent consider that giving bribes can always be justified.
Finally, and to support the finding of Research Association and Kyiv
International Institute of Sociology (2011), the recent survey examining the issue of
corruption in Ukraine (Gorshenin Institute, 2011) revealed, unsurprisingly, high levels of
corruption perception by people from all regions of Ukraine. Some 56.3 percent of
participants consider corruption very common in Ukraine, 30.7 percent consider it
common, 7.4 percent not very common, 1.9 percent not common and 3.7 percent did
not answer. To the question ‘Did you, your relatives or acquaintances have to give
money or gifts to people whose decisions determined whether your problems would be
solved?’ 68.5 percent gave affirmative answer, 19.1 percent replied ‘no’ and 12.4
percent did not answer. Furthermore, 72.1 percent of participants do not believe that
the new anti-corruption law will be able to combat corruption in Ukraine. The most
frequently cited reasons for this were ‘Ukrainian laws are violated’ (53.5 percent),
‘Officials will not follow the law’ (32.5 percent) and ‘Having one law only is insufficient’
(25.8 percent).
To sum up, corruption is widespread in all public institutions and regions of
Ukraine. During the last five years there were no significant positive changes in respect
to this problem and according to public opinion, new anti-corruption laws will not help to
tackle corruption. Moreover, the level of toleration of corrupt practices by the public is
very high – almost half of the population believe that corruption can be sometimes
justified for resolving important matters.
Above, the methodological issues of studying the informal economy in
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Mykolayiv have been reviewed. This included the review of the methods previously
used to research the subject, justification of the method chosen for this thesis and a
description of the fieldwork location. Based on the methodology chosen in Chapter 3,
Chapter 4 focuses on the analysis of data collected as a result of the survey and
discussion of the findings.
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4. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS: INFORMAL WORK
This chapter is divided into two main sections: first, the role of informal work in the
economy of households with regard to different sectors and, second, the role of
informal work in the completion of everyday domestic services in particular. Both
sections include descriptive statistics, empirical analysis and evaluation of the theories
of the informal economy against the findings.
It is important to notice at the outset, that whenever percentage numbers are
considered, they do not represent economic values of the activities but only give insight
about the relative frequencies of events or activities (counts).
4.1. A critical evaluation of the validity of the contrasting theoretical perspectives
towards the informal economy
In this section, the findings of the survey regarding the participation of the households
in the informal work in different sectors of the economy will be reported. The data will
be quantitatively and qualitatively analysed to evaluate critically the validity of the four
perspectives when explaining informal work in Mykolayiv.
4.1.1. Residue theory
To evaluate the viability of the residue theory with regard to Mykolayiv, the extent of the
informal economy in this locality will be measured. Out of 200 survey participants, 22
(11 percent) do not work at all. They are either retired, or students, or housewives, or
unemployed. 98 (49 percent) are fully formal workers, 14 (7 percent) are fully informal
and 66 (33 percent) are partially informal (work both formally and informally). Although
the percentage of the informal work is rather significant, residue theory cannot be
refuted right away. This is because there are still 82 percent of respondents that
participate in the formal economy (49 percent fully formal and 33 percent partially
informal). Therefore further analysis is needed, which will be based on the answers of
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178 employed participants.
Although only 14 out of 178 participants (7.9 percent) reported informality of
their main activity (Figure 4.1), 80 out of 178 (44.9 percent) are somehow involved in
informal work: whether it is their main, or side activity (2nd). It should be mentioned,
that some participants were employed at three jobs simultaneously, however, their
number is insignificant (7 people). Therefore such tertiary activities are not included
into the analysis.
Figure 4.1. Employment status of the participants: primary and secondary activities
The data above can be supported with the answers to the direct question about primary
and secondary sources of household’s income: 11 percent of participants named their
cash-in-hand job as a first important source of income in their family and 30.5 percent -
as the second most important, totalling 41.5 percent of households (Appendix B, Table
1). This corresponds with 44.9 percent of those participating in informality, mentioned
in the previous paragraph. At the same time consumption by households is largely
informal as well. In particular, out of all paid domestic and personal services consumed
by households only 14 percent is attributed to the formal work and 86 percent - to the
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informal economy.
Based on the survey results, the residue theory could be refuted in terms of its
applicability to Mykolayiv. The economy in this city is not formalised and, moreover,
informality is rife in Ukraine and there is no evidence of its disappearing. The informal
economy here therefore cannot be a ‘residue’. However, there are a few limitations of
this argument.
Even if the percentage of informality is very high, can this be a residue of even
higher informality earlier? To answer this question, an easy example of informal
hairdressing services in the past and at present can be considered. The services
sector, and namely hairdressing services, was underdeveloped in Ukraine in Soviet
times due to the state system and in 1990s due to the lack of demand from the
deprived population. Although there is no data on the informal work in this sphere 10 or
20 years ago, today the survey showed that 69 percent of hairdressing services were
performed informally. During the last two decades, the personal services sector has
developed greatly in Ukraine. That is, the amount of services consumed countrywide
has increased significantly while population has only decreased in the meanwhile.
Even if the increase in absolute numbers is observed, there actually may be а
decrease in the percentage of informal activities. There is no evidence as to what was
the extent of informality in Ukraine, but one can think of huge numbers given the fact
that in early 1990s almost all factories and plants (apart from metallurgy, telecoms and
state administrations) were closed and many reopened after years of stoppage
eventually as new businesses. Formality is driven through the development of new
businesses. Thus, the current 40 percent level of informality may be far below what it
was earlier. There was very rapid and dramatic change in the country’s economic
environment comparing to ‘western world’, where transition to capitalistic society was
much longer as people do not change their habits so quickly, so there is a chance that
on this time scale a residue theory might be considered as valid in Ukraine.
Continuing this argument, one can think of, for instance, medical services:
although almost all doctors in Ukraine are officially employed, they all can take cash
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informally for a consultation in public hospitals. It is a generally accepted and well-
known practice in public hospitals where medical treatment is officially (only) free. The
survey showed that more than a half of medical services are rewarded with cash or a
gift (this will be discussed in detail in the next section). Those in private hospitals,
where the service is paid to a cashier, usually do not receive this unofficial money.
More private hospitals have been opening during 2000s, attracting more doctors and
patients from the public sector. This allows one to concede that although income of
doctors in public hospitals is partially informal, informality in this sector is in decline due
to the development of private medical practices and hospitals. However, there is no
evidence that no informal payments are made there.
Growing and selling vegetables and fruit in urban markets by the rural
population fits well in ‘residual theory’ as this activity is traditional and methods are
outdated. However, the rural population is not covered by this survey.
To conclude, as there is no data available about the informality situation before
the turn of the millennium, there is not enough evidence (arguments supported by
facts) to reject the residue theory. However, the basic fact that the informal economy is
not some minor practice but a core part of everyday coping tactics does suggest that
the informal economy is more than some mere residue in this city. Although it is not
known whether it is growing, staying the same or declining, the informal economy is not
some backwater or marginal activity existing in a few minor enclaves of the economy of
this city. It is part of the mainstream economy.
4.1.2. By-product theory
To test the by-product theory with regard to the Mykolayiv population surveyed, the
following questions should be answered:
Who are those people involved in the informal economy? Are they deprived
households striving to get-by and performing multiple jobs as a survival
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strategy?
Firstly, lower-income households are more likely to depend on cash-in-hand work.
There is significant association of the income level and the households’ sources of
income (Chi-square=47.197, p<0.01). Table 4.1 below reveals that, for 90 percent of
the highest income households a regular job is the most important source of income,
and only for 4 percent cash-in-hand earnings are the most important. For the lowest
income household’s earnings from regular job are still more important than cash-in-
hand earning: 12 percent rated cash in hand earnings as most important for the
standard of living of their family and 42 percent – earnings from regular job. However,
these data should be treated with caution as for some participants ‘regular job’ does
not necessarily means formal job. There is also the issue that many formal employees
in Ukraine receive from their formal employer not only a regular declared wage but also
an undeclared additional ‘envelope wage’ (Williams, 2007). Table 4.2 shows that cash-
in-hand earnings and earnings from regular job, as the second most important type of
activity generating households’ income, do not significantly differ for different income-
level households. Therefore it would be erroneous to assert that by-product theory is
applicable to the whole Ukrainian population. The characteristics of separate groups of
informal workers that do confirm this theory will be given further attention in this
section.
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Table 4.1. The most important activities for the standard of living of the household by
households’ income
Which activity is the most important for the standard of living of you and your family?
O
ur
 o
w
n 
se
lf-
pr
ov
is
io
ni
ng
W
ha
t w
e 
ge
t a
s
fa
vo
ur
s/
 th
e 
he
lp
fro
m
 fr
ie
nd
s 
an
d
re
la
tiv
es
C
as
h-
in
-h
an
d
ea
rn
in
gs
E
ar
ni
ng
s 
fro
m
re
gu
la
r j
ob
P
en
si
on
/
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
be
ne
fit
s
To
ta
l
To
ta
l m
on
th
ly
in
co
m
e 
(h
ry
vn
ia
s) <2000 2% 4% 12% 42% 40% 100%
2000-3000 6% 0% 23% 57% 13% 100%
3000-5000 2% 2% 6% 83% 8% 100%
>5000 2% 2% 4% 90% 2% 100%
Table 4.2. The second most important activities for the standard of living of the
household by households’ income
Which activity is the most important for the standard of living of you and your family?
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s) <2000 11% 37% 33% 4% 9% 7%
2000-3000 19% 23% 37% 7% 9% 5%
3000-5000 10% 25% 31% 8% 19% 6%
>5000 0% 2% 35% 5% 23% 35%
The above statement that informality is more characteristic for lower income
populations could be supported by Table 4.3 below. It demonstrates that participants in
higher household income groups are less involved in informal activities. For example,
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only 26.1 percent of households’ members with income more than 5000 hryvnias
regularly work informally while 61.5 percent of workers from the least well-off
households are informal. There is significant association of income and participation in
the informal activities (Chi-square=17.923, p<0.01). This suggests that informality
percentage could depend on the income level. Results of regressing informality
percentage on the income level show that informality level falls 13.5 percent per
income group. The coefficient is highly significant (p<0.01).
Table 4.3. Participation in the informal economy, by the level of income groups
Total monthly income (hryvnias)
<2000 2000-3000 3000-5000 >5000
Does the
respondent
participate in the
informal work?
Yes 62% 61% 34% 26%
No 39% 39% 66% 74%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Participants who informally perform everyday domestic services for others are also
concentrated in the lower income groups (Table 4.4).
Table 4.4. Participation in the informal house and personal services, by the level of
income groups
INCOME GROUP UCE IW FORMAL TOTAL
<2000 87% 13% 0% 100%
2000-3000 86% 14% 0% 100%
3000-5000 98% 1% 1% 100%
>5000 96% 4% 0% 100%
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Is participation in the informal economy a result of exit or exclusion?
To identify whether the respondents have participated in informal work as a result of
exit from formal economy (voluntary) or as a result of exclusion (involuntary), they were
asked an open-ended question: ‘Why do you register/not register your activity?’ The
answers given to the question are multifarious; however the rationales for not
registering the activity might be clustered based on their answers into following groups:
(a) the employer does not want to register me (‘it is unprofitable for the employer’)
(b) I do not want to register (‘the taxes will not be used according to the intended
purpose’, ‘taxes are too high and it is unprofitable to pay them’, ‘it is impossible
to get registered and then run official business without a bribe’)
(c) there is no need to register (‘the activity is occasional’, ‘income from this activity
is insignificant’)
Rationale (a) is indicative of exclusion of the respondent from the official economy and
rationales (b) and (c) give the evidence of exiting the formal domain by the respondent.
For example, a salesperson, a 46-55 years old woman, answered the question about
the reasons for not registering her activity as follows:
‘…This was unprofitable for my employer [to pay full wage officially]. At that time I
could not find any other job and had to agree with his terms’.
This answer relates to the rationale (a) as this was the employer’s preference not to
register the participant and she had no other way out but to be employed unofficially.
Therefore, this answer fits the ‘exclusion’ category accordingly.
A worker in the services sector, a woman aged 26-35 years old, responded:
‘My unofficial activity does not bring significant income and this is not our main
source of income. Being registered is unprofitable for me as the taxes are too
high for the amount of money I get for this job…’
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Obviously in this case, the participant exits the formal economy out of choice fitting into
the group (b) rationale and, accordingly, ‘exit’ category.
A student aged 16-25 years old, said:
‘I am not officially registered because I work occasionally, on some weekends
and holidays, so there is no sense in getting registered’.
Here the participant does not see any need for becoming formal ((c) rationale) and fits
into ‘exit’ category as well.
Some 64 out of 80 participants (80 percent) involved in informal activity
voluntary ‘exit’ the formal economy and only 16 (20 percent) participate in the informal
work as a result of exclusion. For some people whose employment status (‘main
activity’) is ‘retired’, ‘student’, ‘housewife’ and ‘officially unemployed’ informal
employment is considered as a second job. Therefore these cases are included in the
general analysis of the reasons (exit or exclusion) of informality.
Who are those excluded from formal economy?
In order to answer this question significances of association of the reason for being
informal (exit or exclusion) and a) gender, b) income and c) employment status has
been measured below.
a) Table 4.5 below answers the question, whether participation in informal work is
the result of exit or exclusion and for which gender which domain is more
characteristic. Chi-square test shows that there is no association of the cause of
informality and gender (Chi-square=0.67, p>0.05). Moreover, men and women
participate in exit or exclusion in very similar proportions: informal work of 85.2 percent
of men and 77.4 percent of women is a result of ‘exit’ whereas 22.6 percent of men and
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14.8 percent of women are excluded from declared work.
Table 4.5. Exit or exclusion from formal economy by gender
Respondent's gender
Total
Male Female
If the respondent performs his /her
main activity informally, is it exit or
exclusion?
Exit 85% 77% 80%
Exclusion 15% 23% 20%
Total 100% 100% 100%
b) Income and the reason of informality (whether it is an exit or exclusion) also are
not significantly associated (Chi-square=4.275, p>0.05). However, one may expect a
more complex nonlinear relationship, but existing data is only sufficient to conclude
about the mean values (Table 4.6).
Table 4.6. Exit or exclusion from formal economy, by household income group
Total monthly income (hryvnias)
<2000 2000-3000 3000-5000 >5000
Does the
respondent
participate in the
informal work?
Yes 67% 86% 81% 92%
No 33% 14% 19% 8%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
c) Exiting or being excluded from formal economy and informal employment status
(unregistered self-employed or unregistered salaried worker) are significantly
associated (Chi-square=14.077, p<0.01). Nobody out of 38 informal self-employed is
willing to get registered, although they all can do that. All the 38 self-employed
participants do not register because of the following most common reasons: ‘the
activity is occasional’, ‘income from this activity is insignificant’, ‘the taxes will not be
used according to the intended purpose’, ‘taxes are too high and it is unprofitable to
pay them’, ‘it is impossible to get registered and then run official business without a
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bribe’ (Table 4.7).
Table 4.7. Exit or exclusion from formal economy, by the type of employment
Is the informality participant
self-employed or salaried
worker? TotalSelf-
employed Salaried
If the respondent performs his
/her main activity informally,
is it exit or exclusion?
Exit 100% 62% 80%
Exclusion 0% 38% 20%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Some 16 out of 42 waged employees (38.1 percent) are excluded from the formal
economy. These 16 employees excluded from formal economy are represented by
retired, students, unemployed and those who involve in formal main activity but have
an informal side activity. Informal employees excluded from formal economy are those
who have to earn their living because their pension/scholarship/salary from the main
job is not enough to get-by. They cannot be registered mainly because their employers
(small firms) avoid contributing to social security funds at the earliest opportunity in
order to reduce costs. Obviously students, retired and unemployed are those social
groups who have no other choice but agree with their employer. As a retired man
stated:
‘I and my wife used to work at the plant during the Soviet times. Now the plant is
dead. And the pension is scanty and even not enough to pay for utilities. We tried
to obtain subsidies, but were refused because of extra living space. But we have
been living in our flat all our life and do not want to move to a smaller one.
Therefore we try to get informal job from private entrepreneurs – selling water
and ice-cream in summer’.
Other participant, a retired woman that works as a cleaner in the state institution,
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asserted:
‘I work officially there. My salary is 700 hryvnias. Friends helped me to make
some money on the side in the shop. The owner of the shop does not want to
register me officially because it is unprofitable for him: he pays me 400 hryvnias
while monthly contributions to the pension fund only would be 269 hryvnias’.
An unemployed man aged 46-55 year old, who gets by due to casual informal
earnings, said:
‘I worked in the plant for a long time. After the bankruptcy of the plant all my
connections are lost. Now I have to get by somehow, working at different
temporary jobs, because after 50 years of age and without connections nobody
wants to employ you full-time and formally’.
An unemployed woman aged 46-55 years old reported a similar problem:
‘Nobody in our family works officially. My sons cannot find permanent job after
they finished technical school. And it is very difficult to find permanent job for
women after 40 and men after 50 years’.
To conclude on the above, the by-product theory of the informal economy in Mykolayiv
is more prominent amongst low-paid salaried workers, whose employers seek to
decrease costs (probably, also trying to survive) by not registering some of their
employees and saving on contributions to social security funds. These employees
would rather be registered officially, but have no other way out than to agree with
employers’ terms. The theory does not apply to self-employed and waged-employed
voluntary exiting formal economy. These types of workers rather conform to the
alternative theory of the informal work, which is discussed further.
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4.1.3. Alternative theory
The theory of the informal economy as an alternative to the formal economy discusses
mainly opportunity-driven informal self-employment. However, there are cases when
salaried employees choose informality even when they have an opportunity to be
registered employed. Nevertheless, in order to determine whether these unregistered
workers exiting the formal economy fit the alternative theory, deeper analysis should be
done.
Figure 4.1 above shows that one participant may have several informal
activities. Specifically, the participants that are voluntary informal in their main job, exit
informality in their other jobs as well. In this research it will be counted as one case of
‘exit’, not two. Similarly, those who are excluded from formal economy in their main job
are excluded in their other jobs too, thus it will also be counted as one case each time.
According to the survey, 38 of 64 (59.4 percent) voluntary unregistered workers
are salaried workers and 26 (40.6 percent) self employed. As seen from Figure 4.2
below, 9 waged-employed (14.0 percent) and 24 self-employed (37.5 percent) have a
main official job, while informal employment (either waged or self-employment) is their
side-activity. At the same time, 10 out of 64 (15.6 percent) voluntary unregistered
participants are fully informal, out of which 5 workers are informal waged employees
and 5 - informal self-employed. The rest 21 participants (32.8 percent) are students,
retired, unemployed and housewives that receive additional income from the informal
side job. Obviously the motives of each group of the informal workers listed above
could be different, hence these groups should be analysed separately.
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Figure 4.2. Structure of the voluntary informal workers
Fully informal self-employed
In spite of the common view that the informal self-employed who exit formal economy
are the main representatives of the alternative theory, the survey revealed that these
informal self-employed are only partially informal. Most of them work officially as well
as engage in informal self-employment. In contrast, the totally informal self-employed
have no official second job. Such self-employed are opportunity driven - they perform
activities that do not require definite working premises and public advertising and
therefore cannot be detected by tax authorities. Moreover, participants of this type
show distrust of the government and state social benefits system and see no point in
paying taxes. They are afraid of the time-, money- and effort-demanding registration
procedures and subsequent communication with local authorities (fire safety officers,
police, tax inspection, sanitary centre) including paying bribes and establishing
connections with ‘useful people’. As a young woman employed in the services sector
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stated:
‘I do not officially register my activity because my future pension depends little on
it, I do not see any benefits, any use for me in being registered. The taxes people
pay go to the pockets of the government. I cannot see anything is done [by the
government] for improving our welfare’
Another participant, a builder aged 36-45 years old, explained:
‘…I wanted to register a firm, but was not sure whether I will cope with all these
bureaucratic procedures as I have neither useful connections, nor money to pay
bribes...’
A woman, an entrepreneur, reported a similar problem:
‘I could be registered, but my business is not in a plain view and it is difficult to
detect. Even though there is still a risk of being disclosed, it would be cheaper to
pay only for cover-up than to give bribes to tax inspection, fire safety inspectors,
sanitation centre – they all want to squeeze money from you’.
Indeed, except for poor pavements, roads, motorways and public transport, the
catastrophic condition of some state schools and hospitals, low salaries of state funded
employees that are evident to people, the mass media poorly promote anything good
done for Ukraine by the government for taxpayers money, instead eagerly bringing to
light the luxurious belongings of the officials. This shakes people’s faith and negatively
influences tax morality.
Informal self-employed, officially registered at their main job
This group of partially informal self-employed can both enjoy the benefits of being
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formally registered and receiving undeclared income. The advantage of being formally
registered is, firstly, social security: record of service, pension fund contributions, paid
sick leave, regulated employee-employer relations. Although the social security system
is known to be weak and ineffective, it still works and some people still tend to rely on
it. Secondly, formal registration provides an opportunity to officially prove the amount of
income when needed: to take a loan or apply for visa. Informal income from self-
employment allows cutting costs through avoiding taxes. Besides, such activities
usually do not require public advertisement or fixed office and therefore the risk of
detection is insignificant. There are activities that are never being registered by anyone.
These are mostly personal services such as hairdressing, tailoring, manicure, giving
injections. While these activities are performed at client’s or supplier’s home, informal
tutoring can be done even in the teachers’ working places: schools and universities;
this is a common and conventional practice. Interestingly, in most of the cases the
informal income from self-employment is reported to be too small and
occasional/periodical to be registered. For example, a sales manager aged 26-35 years
old explained:
‘I am registered officially in the firm as I need to care about pension, social
security, record of service. My self-employment is not registered as the volumes
of this activity are very small – there is no sense in registering it’
Similarly, a private entrepreneur aged 36-45 years old reported:
‘I registered my private enterprise. I also have secondary activity, but the orders
are periodical. This is why I do not register it’
Another participant, driver aged 26-35 years old replied:
‘I don’t register as my work is generally seasonal: I have a lorry and in summer
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and spring I privately transport grains and vegetables for different clients’
A hairdresser, aged 46-55 years old, which works officially in the salon and moonlights
unofficially, said:
‘I work officially in the hairdressing salon. Out of work I often render mobile
services at my clients’ homes unofficially. I do not have to share my income with
the salon – this is more profitable for me and for the client as I charge a lower
price than if they would do the same in the salon… I even do not think about the
risk of being detected – I work with my old clients and their friends. Besides, all
mobile hairdressers are unregistered’
Could then this type of unregistered self-employed be attributed to the alternative
theory? On the one hand, the answer is ‘yes’, as this is opportunity driven self-
employment. On the other hand, the answer is ‘no’, as formal and informal economies
are not separate in these cases – the same person is involved both in formal and
informal activities, moreover the same activity can be performed by the same person
both formally and informally in different times of the day. Can these activities therefore
support some other theory? The view of this type of the informal economy as a
complement to the formal economy will also be wrong as the above mentioned
activities are exclusively profit-motivated though performed to acquaintances. Some 19
out of 24 (79 percent) unregistered self-employed officially registered at their main job
rated the income from their second job as very important or quite important for the
budget of their family.
Waged-employees officially registered at their main job
Officially employed at their main working place employees can make money ‘on the
side’ unofficially. Similarly to the previous group, their main reasons for not registering
are unwillingness to pay taxes in order to maximise profit, insignificant amount of
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revenues and/or occasional orders and low risk of being detected. As well as the above
discussed unregistered self-employed they are socially secure (as far as it can be
possible in Ukraine) and see no sense in registering their secondary activity. Their
informal employment is voluntary and opportunity-driven and, as well as the above
category of partially informal self-employed, could be referred to alternative theory, but
for the formal and the informal that are intertwined. Thus, IT specialist aged 26-35
years old noted:
‘I am registered at my first job because I want to extend a record of service and
be eligible for pension. I do not want to register my side activity as the taxes are
too high. I would have to pay 600 hryvnias monthly when my income is 3000-
4000 hryvnias’
A doctor aged 26-35 years old reported the similar reasons of being informal at her
second job:
‘My first job is in the state hospital, everybody is officially registered there. As for
my secondary activity – it is preferable for me not to be registered as I do not
have to pay taxes. My second employer is absolutely happy with this – he
employs three people, but pays taxes only for one‘.
Both partially informal self-employed and partially informal salaried employees are
registered officially in their primary workplace and contribute to the social security funds
expecting to obtain pension and other social security benefits in the future. However,
they are not interested in registering their secondary activity and paying more
contributions as this will not positively influence the amount of their expected pension.
Fully informal waged workers
Surprisingly, exiting the formal economy is characteristic not only for opportunity-driven
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entrepreneurs, but for waged employees as well. Similarly to the unregistered self-
employed, among their motives are the tax burden and distrust of the government and
pension system. Therefore, this group of informal workers could support the alternative
theory. For instance, a sales manager aged 16-25 year old stated:
‘There is no sense in official registration – I do not want to pay tax as I do not
expect to receive a decent pension. Besides, I do not want officials to buy those
posh cars for my money’
A beauty salon employee aged 36-45 years old, although being aware of the benefits
of being formal, does not want to register:
‘I work informally even though it creates some difficulties: you cannot have a
sick leave and take a loan from bank. I cannot afford myself formal registration.
It is unprofitable – the taxes are too high’.
Certainly, an opportunity to have paid sick leave and to take a loan from bank ensuing
from formal salary is the incentive for being declared. However, stemming from the
survey, it is overweighed by the tax burden and was mentioned only by few
participants.
Students, retired, unemployed (both waged and self-employed)
Students and retired are those social groups that have least motives to be registered
officially. Taking into consideration sizes of pensions in Ukraine, a side job is very
important for decent standard of living for the retired, no matter whether it is official or
unofficial, self- or waged-employment. Students are usually supported by their parents
and often have part-time job, to earn some extra-cash or to support their families. The
motives of these two social groups are alike and have much in common with the
groups of unregistered workers discussed above. These are endeavours to avoid
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taxes, and are characterised by small volumes and/or periodicity and/or non-regularity
of such activities, and a low risk of being detected. As a retired man aged 46-55 years
old responded:
‘I am a beekeeper. Trade with honey brings me a considerable income. I mostly
sell the honey wholesale and have no necessity to trade in the market in a full
view of tax inspection’
A retired teacher, that still sometimes privately teaches students, asserted:
‘My income from tutoring is insignificant besides it is not common to register
tutoring or baby-sitting. Tax inspection does not control these types of services at
all’
To conclude, both self-employed and waged workers can fit the theory of the informal
economy as an alternative to the formal economy. They work informally out of choice
and some of them are driven by the opportunities from their formal employment.
However, to the ‘pure’ representatives of this theory only completely informal
participants can be related, whose informal job is their main job. In this case formal and
informal economies are not intertwined, that conforms to the alternative theory. Those
who are formal at their primary job may not perfectly fit in this theory. Firstly, with their
formal registration they concur with the state and its regulations. Secondly, their
second employment, even though being a result of exit, might appear to be the survival
strategy, which suits better a by-product theory.
Alternative theory of the informal economy does not conform to informal
workers who are excluded from the formal economy and have no other way out but to
work informally in order to get by. However, not all informal workers that voluntarily exit
formal economy could be the representatives of the alternative theory. Those, who
voluntary exit formal economy, socially rather than financially motivated (if any), should
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be considered under the prism of complementary theory.
4.1.4. Complementary theory
The view of the informal economy as a complement to formal economy describes how
those who benefit most from the formal economy also benefit from the informal
economy. It also shows how the formal and informal economies therefore rise and fall
in tandem, rather than in counter-cyclical ways. This theory can be represented by the
paid work done only for/by relatives, friends and neighbours which is not solely profit
motivated. On the demand side, people can employ their less well-off relatives in order
to help them out. From the supply side, the workers provide paid services for their
friends that otherwise will not be able to get the task completed. For example, one of
the respondents, a retired woman, let a room to her nephew (a newcomer to the city)
for a small fee. As can be seen from the participant’s response cited below, money is
not important to her. She just wants to help her close people, for whom paying rent at a
market price would be unaffordable. This will also be a contribution to the development
of their good relations:
‘My cousins’ granddaughter entered the university here and they asked me to
rent a room for her. I live alone in a two-room flat, therefore I could let her in
without any money. I do not feel myself comfortable taking money from close
people, they always help me without any money…Finally we decided that she will
pay just a nominal charge, 300 hryvnias a month’.
However, this is not common in Ukraine, to pay money to close people when they help
with domestic tasks. If the task is one-off and performed for the closest relatives –
elderly parents or children living separately – it will not be paid at all, neither in the
monetary form, nor as a reciprocal favour (especially if such help is not profit
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motivated). If the favour was done for less close people – friends and distant relatives –
the gift can be given in a ‘chysto simvolicheski’ way, which means the gift is small
(often a box of sweets or alike – a tradition left from the Soviet era) and it represents
just a nominal recompense for the service. This includes another term ‘vystavliatys’ that
means to treat the friend who helped with some alcohol and drink it together. Indeed,
services performed for friends and acquaintances are usually rewarded by reciprocal
favours rather than the money and gifts. The evidence of this can be found in the next
Section 4.2 which discusses informal work done to complete domestic tasks.
Everyday domestic tasks are often performed by/for friends, relatives and
neighbours. Such work is more likely to be socially, rather than financially motivated,
which is one of the main indicators of the validity of complementary theory. In order to
evaluate complementary theory, the research should be focused exactly on the work
done by close people. Therefore conclusions on the applicability of complementary
theory will be done in the next section.
4.2. The role of informal work in the provision of everyday domestic services.
Unlike in the previous section, the focus is not the informal work in all economic
spheres, but specifically on the informal domestic services. In this section, the ways of
coping with everyday tasks are analysed. In particular, the extent and nature of
informal work and the motives of suppliers and consumers are examined. These
findings will allow more rigorous quantitative analysis and specific conclusions on the
validity of complementary theory.
On the basis of the data about who performed the task and how the service was
rewarded, the work done may be divided into four categories: formal employment
(sector 1 in Total Social Organisation of Labour (TSOL), described in Section 2.5), self-
provisioning (sector 8), unpaid community exchange (sector 7), paid community
exchange (sector 3) and informal work (sector 2). Other types of work, as defined in
TSOL, were not found as a result of the survey. If the task was officially paid it belongs
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to the formal employment category, no matter who performed this task. If the task was
performed by household members for themselves and/or other members of the
household and was unpaid, it is labelled as self-provisioning. When the task was
unpaid and done by relatives, friends, neighbours, acquaintances it is treated as unpaid
community exchange. Meanwhile, informal work includes any work rewarded
unofficially in cash or with a gift. It should be stressed that paid community exchange
(paid work performed by relatives, friends or neighbours) belongs to the informal work
category.
Firstly, the work practices used by households to source 27 everyday domestic
services the last time that the task was undertaken will be examined, including the role
of informal work in getting these tasks completed. Secondly, the extent to which
households supply informal work to others will be determined and motives of such
households will be analysed. Thirdly, the theory of the informal economy, that can best
describe informal work done to complete everyday domestic tasks by households, will
be identified.
4.2.1. Consumption of domestic services
Table 2 in Appendix B contains a breakdown of services received by households and
the nature of work that was used to supply these services: self-provisioning (SP),
unpaid community exchange (UCE), informal work (IW), formal work (FORMAL). This
breakdown depicts numbers of activities performed with great emphasis on possible
informal activities. These numbers, however, do not represent economic value created
by the activities.
According to Table 2, self-provisioning is the most widely used household
strategy for completing work: 55 percent of all activities were performed by the
household members themselves. Such self-provisioning is inherent in routine domestic
tasks, such as cleaning (95 percent) and cooking (94 percent).
Informal work was used for 32 percent of all activities the last time that it was
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conducted. It is mostly used for all repair work requiring skills, such as plumbing (55
percent) and tiling (65 percent); personal service activities, for example, hairdressing
(69 percent) and tutoring (89 percent); and repair of goods, for instance, clothes
making/repair/fit (62 percent) and shoes repair (86 percent). However, the results
should be treated with caution when they refer to the services that may not originate in
households but from organised enterprises in which the formality/informality of the work
may not be known to customers. For instance, shoes repair or car repair often require
organised effort with moderate start-up capital to be established and successfully run,
even if this business is formally registered its cashflows may be hidden from tax
authorities. According to Ukrainian legislation, private entrepreneurs (who the above
mentioned businesses might be registered as) can pay a single tax each month
independently of their income (if their annual revenue is less than 500 000 hryvnias
and they employ less than 10 people including themselves) and are not obliged to use
tills to issue receipts for the customer, but must record the costs and revenues. The
customers do not know whether the supplier recorded the transaction or not and often
do not ask for a formal receipt and rely on supplier’s reputation.
The most common reasons for using the supplier were his/her good reputation
or recommendation and/or low price. The majority of the participants do not care
whether the supplier is officially registered unless the service is expensive and requires
qualification, and then official documents are needed for guarantee purposes, for
example, for window installation. The indifference of consumers in relation to formality
of the supplier indicates that informal work is not regarded as disreputable and
dishonest activity. For example, when asked about how he wanted the task to be done
if he had a choice, an entrepreneur answered:
‘I do not know how I want the tasks to be done. It makes no difference for me.
The most important is to find a good quality for a reasonable price. And this is the
most difficult today’.
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Some eight percent of all cases involved unpaid community exchange (UCE). The
biggest part of reported unpaid community exchange accounts for computer repairs,
performed in 15 out of 60 households (27 percent), and manicure, in 28 out of 115
households (24 percent). Paid community exchange is not characteristic to the locality.
As a rule, close relatives and friends are not paid for their one-off help. They may be
rewarded either with a nominal gift (though in this case the work is considered as paid)
or just by saying ‘thank you’ but the most common reason is ‘we always help each
other’ i.e. the favours are done quid pro quo. An exception here are those who do
some work for their relatives or friends on a regular basis, for instance full-time or part-
time baby-sitting, housework, sewing, refurbishment or construction. Indeed, though
some part of informal work was performed by close people for cash or a gift, it
constitutes merely 18 percent from the total services received from close people. In this
case the main reasons for choosing the supplier were quality, reliability and/or low
price. Thus, paid community exchange often implies economic reasons. For instance, a
woman engaged in entrepreneurship commented:
‘I am very busy lately at my work and cannot manage with all the domestic
chores. Therefore my sister comes to my house several times a week to help me
out. I would never let anyone I am not confident in into my house. She does
everything about the house in a way I used to, as we were brought up together. I
am not sure other people are as tidy as she or can cook according to our family
traditions. Besides, she is in straitened circumstances and this is good money for
her’.
Although the main reasons for employing a sister here are still the quality and security
of her services, redistribution motives were mentioned also in the citation above. This
confirms the validity of the complementary theory of the informal economy when talking
about paid work performed by close people. Another participant pays her sister for the
regular services too, because this activity is her sister’s both main regular job and self-
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employment as a secondary activity. The main motive of the consumer in this case is to
save money:
‘My sister is a manicure master. She works in salon and some clients come to her
home. Earlier I visited one salon regularly and the master there was very good.
But prices are growing in that place and now I have to go to my sister’s home to
make manicure. It is not as good as in my old salon but much cheaper’.
Only 5 percent of 2,684 domestic services activities were performed formally; though it
should be stressed again, numbers are not representative of the values created and
frequency of completion of tasks. Even the work that requires special skills and
guaranteed quality, such as windows/doors installation, heaters/boilers installation, car
repair, is mostly performed informally. For instance, in 54 of 95 households (57
percent) windows/doors installations were performed by informal workers, in 21 (22
percent) - by formally employed firms, in 16 (17 percent) - by household members
themselves and in 4 (4 percent) - by means of unpaid community exchange. Car
repairs and furniture making/repair gained the highest percentage of ‘formality’ – 33
percent and 28 percent respectively.
In order to obtain more detailed understanding of the housework done for and
by the households, it is useful to analyse the breakdown of services by the household
income groups (Table 4.8 below). The groups of the work forms are again divided into
self provisioning, when the work is done by the household members; community
exchange, when the work is done by relatives, friends and neighbours outside the
household; informal work, when the favour is paid informally; and formal work, when
the work is done formally by registered enterprise or self-employed. Each group is
divided into sub-group, for example, unpaid community exchange is divided into
services done for a reciprocal favour (‘Unpaid community exchange for a reciprocal
favour’) or without any compensation (‘Unpaid community exchange for nothing’). It
should be noted that in the case of ‘informal work by relatives and friends paid in-kind’,
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the boundaries between unpaid community exchange and informal work is blurred, as
the worker is rewarded but the transaction is not monetised. In order to determine the
relationship between income and participation in different forms of work a Spearman's
Rank Order correlation was run. One-way ANOVA was used to find whether the
difference between groups is statistically significant.
Table 4.8 provides several interesting findings. Firstly, when coping with
everyday tasks higher income households are more inclined to rely on informal work or
formal work and less disposed towards self-provisioning and unpaid community
exchange than lower income households.
Table 4.8. How did the households get the work completed? By income groups.
The work form
Total monthly income (hryvnias)
<2000
2000-
3000
3000-
4000 >5000
Self-provisioning by male household member 11.3% 6.0% 13.0% 10.7%
Self-provisioning by female household member 46.8% 30.4% 24.3% 23.7%
Self-provisioning by both household members 7.4% 20.1% 15.5% 13.7%
Total self-provisioning 65.5% 56.4% 52.7% 48.2%
Unpaid community exchange for a reciprocal
favour
3.4% 7.1% 2.0% 2.5%
Unpaid community exchange for nothing 4.4% 6.3% 3.6% 2.6%
Total unpaid community exchange 7.8% 13.4% 5.6% 5.1%
Informal work  by self-employed 18.0% 20.5% 26.7% 26.3%
Informal work  by businesses 4.2% 6.5% 7.9% 9.4%
Informal work  by relatives and friends 0.7% 0.6% 0.8% 2.1%
Informal work by relatives and friends for a gift 0.2% 0.4% 1.1% 0.1%
Total informal work 23.0% 27.9% 36.4% 38.0%
Formal work 3.6% 2.2% 5.2% 8.7%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
For example, the highest income group uses paid labour in almost a half of cases (38
percent informally and 8.7 percent formally), while the lowest income group pays for
the services only in a quarter of cases (23 percent informally and 3.6 percent formally).
156
However, as determined by one-way ANOVA, the difference in consumption levels
between income groups is statistically significant only in the case of informal work and
formal work consumption (F=14.189, p<0.01 and F=9.157, p<0.01 respectively). The
frequency of self-provisioning and unpaid community exchange does not significantly
differ between income groups (F= 1.979, p>0.05 for self-provisioning and F=2.567, p>
0.05 for unpaid community exchange). Secondly, in all income groups the majority of
the services received in the form of informal work are mostly performed by the self-
employed, and only from 0.2 to 2.1 percent of all cases are performed by close people.
This means that independent of income, people in Mykolayiv are not used to pay their
close people for getting things done. Therefore, redistributive motives of informal
activities mentioned in the literature review are of little applicability to Mykolayiv
population (at least when speaking about domestic tasks). To address this issue in
more detail, the breakdown of the community exchange (when the services are
received from relatives and friends) is provided in Table 4.9.
Table 4.9. What part of all tasks was performed in the form of community exchange?
By income groups.
The work form
Total monthly income (hryvnias)
<2000 2000-3000 3000-4000 >5000
Total community exchange (in % from total
services received)
8.7% 14.3% 7.5% 7.3%
Monetized community exchange (in % from total
community exchange)
10.4% 6.5% 25.0% 30.6%
Monetized community exchange (in % from total
number of services)
0.9% 0.9% 1.9% 2.2%
Table 4.9 reveals that in contrast to the 2005-2006 survey findings (Williams and
Round, 2008) discussed in the literature review, the exchange of favours with relatives
and friends in Ukraine is more characteristic to the lower income groups. Out of all
services received 8.7 and 14.3 percent were done by close people in the lower income
groups and 7.5 and 7.3 percent – in higher income groups. However there is no
statistically significant association between income group and participation in
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community exchange. More impressive difference can be found in the second row of
Table 4.9 that shows which percentage of total community exchange is monetized. The
households with income higher than 3000 hryvnias pay their close people in more than
a half of the cases, while households with monthly income from 2000 to 3000 hryvnias
and less than 2000 hryvnias pay rarely for the services (6.5 and 10.4 percent
respectively) preferring to reward their relatives and friends with reciprocal favours or
‘just thank you’. There is statistically significant positive correlation between income
and frequency of monetised community exchange (rs= 0.14, p<0.05). However, there is
no statistically significant difference between groups as determined by one-way
ANOVA (F = 1.931, p>0.05). The last row of the table shows that monetized community
exchange constitutes a very small part of all services received by the household not
exceeding 2.2 percent even in the highest income households. Therefore, the
redistributive reasons mentioned in the qualitative discussion earlier in this section are
not only secondary as compared to financial motives but are also of insignificant
prevalence in the locality researched. Thus, the complementary theory that views
informal work as more socially rather than financially motivated can be supported only
by a few cases.
4.2.2. Supply of domestic services
Table 3 in Appendix B represents the breakdown of tasks performed by households for
others by the type of work that was used. As well as in Table 2, self-provisioning,
informal work, unpaid community exchange and formal work are distinguished and no
monetary value of work is considered. Two significant findings can be discussed here.
Firstly, in contrast to the outcomes on service consumption, the responses on
services supplied in general indicate the prevalence of unpaid community exchange
which made up 85 percent of all work done. Informal work and formal work accounted
for merely 13 and 1 percent respectively. Only clothes making/repair/fit, household
textile making/repair, furniture making/repair and tutoring involved considerable part of
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informal work – 45, 50, 50 and 65 percent respectively. Such discrepancy of supply
and consumption sides referring to participation in informal work may be explained with
the following:
1) More or less qualified informal work, like painting, is expected to have
different consumption and supply figures. A few qualified painters may
supply all neighbourhood with painting services;
2) People are more likely to report consumption of informal work than to report
being informal workers;
3) Some people can feel uncomfortable about performing second-rate
activities for others especially if they used to more prestigious jobs and,
hence, they may not wish to report them as well.
Secondly, considering unpaid community exchange particularly, supply and demand
side scores differ dramatically. For example, wallpapering was done for
friends/relatives/neighbours for a favour or ‘just thank you’ by 37 participants (or their
household’s members) whereas this task was carried out by others only in 20
households. This may be justified by the following.
1) Reciprocal exchange does not imply exchange with identical services.
Painting may be repaid, for instance, with professional advice, valuable
information, blat or any other favour not included in the survey.
2) Although blat relations with their reciprocity still occur in the locality
observed (as found by survey), the cases of one-sided help have been
reported. Ukrainians have a propensity to receiving more than giving (or
freeload) without taking care of their belonging to the community. This
contrasts with the view that people participate in community exchanges in
order to feel themselves a ‘valuable member of their community’ (Smith,
2009).
3) People easily forget about favours done for them but keep better in mind
what they did for others.
However, the share of paid work performed for close people is similar to the one
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consumed: 14 percent of such work is monetised.
In the overwhelming majority of cases the reason for doing informal work was to
earn money. This relates to the work done for both unknown and close people. As well
as consumers, those who engage in informal work for close people had solely profit
motives. As a self-employed woman, who works informally, stated:
‘I mostly work informally. My main business is sewing. I have a lot of clients - my
friends, relatives and friends of friends. I sew for money as I raise my daughter
alone and have an elderly mother – I need money to feed my family. I also
sometimes do gardening, cleaning and cooking for the aunt of my best friend’.
The participant clearly states that she needs money being the only bread-winner in the
family and performs the services mostly for people she knows. Therefore she cannot
afford herself to work for free which corresponds with the by-product theory. Such
regular work can be contrasted to one-off services such as help with wall-papering,
taking children from kindergarten, household appliances repair. As a retried woman
aged 66-75 years old asserted:
‘Our relatives asked me recently to pick their son from the kindergarten and
watch him for several hours. When I brought him back home, my niece tried to
give me 20 hryvnias as a gratuity. I strongly refused as their family often help us
with refurbishment, dacha and share fresh meet or dairy products with us when
they get it from their relatives in the countryside. We always try to help them in
different matters as well. For example, my son employed their son when he
needed work experience while at the university’
The narrative cited above is the most typical for the locality: relatives and friends are in
constant exchange of favours. This means such relationships exclude economic
motives, but rather are based on unpaid reciprocity and willingness to cement social
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bonds.
In order to obtain better understanding of the nature of domestic services
supplied, the forms of work here will be analysed by breaking them down by
household’s income (see Table 4.10). It should be noted at the outset, that according to
one-way ANOVA, there is no statistical difference between income groups.
Table 4.10. How did the households provide the services? By income groups.
The form of services supply
Total monthly income (hryvnias)
<2000 2000-3000
3000-
5000 >5000
Unpaid community exchange for a reciprocal favour 28% 24% 34% 13%
Unpaid community exchange ‘for nothing’ 41% 62% 57% 81%
Total unpaid community exchange 68% 86% 91% 94%
Informal work as self-employed 11% 12% 1% 3%
Informal work for relatives and friends 3% 2% 1% 1%
Informal work for relatives and friends for a gift 18% 0% 7% 2%
Total informal work 32% 14% 8% 6%
Formal work 0% 0% 1% 0%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
This displays that the biggest portion of the informal paid work belongs to the lowest
income households. The households with an income of less than 2000 hryvnias
performed informal paid work in 32 percent of all tasks done by them, the households
with the income from 2000 to 3000 hryvnias in 14 percent of cases and the households
with the income from 3000 to 5000 hryvnias and higher than 5000 hryvnias only in 8
and 6 percent of cases respectfully. However, statistical test shows that income and
participation in informal work are not significantly associated (rs=-0.138, p>0.05).
The biggest number of tasks is done for close social relations by households
with income less than 2000 hryvnias and is rewarded with a gift (‘informal work for
relatives and friends for a gift’). The next most popular type of informal work supplier is
the own-account worker (‘informal work as self-employed’) from the household with
less than 2000 hryvnias and from 2000 to 3000 hryvnias monthly income (11 and 12
percent respectively). Consistently, moreover, the lower income households are the
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main suppliers of paid services for close people (‘informal work for relatives and
friends’). While the latter type of informal work is not a characteristic of the locality
examined as its average portion in the total amount of cases is only 2 percent, the
formal work is almost non-existent and constitutes on average 0.2 percent.
The most prevalent way of completing domestic tasks for others is unpaid work
without any reward (unpaid community exchange ‘for nothing’). Indeed, the higher
income households reported more participation in unpaid work without any reward (57
– 81 percent) than the lower income households (41 – 62 percent). There is a
significant correlation between income and provision of unpaid work without any reward
(rs=0.982, p<0.01), but the difference between groups is not statistically significant
(F=0.686, p>0.05). The reciprocal exchange with favours constitutes on average 25
percent of total cases and the percentages for each income group do not vary
significantly. There is a statistically significant correlation between income and
participation in the unpaid community exchange (rs=0.184, p<0.05), however no
significant difference between groups was found as a result of one-way ANOVA
(F=2.226, p>0.05). It should be kept in mind that there is a probability of results
distortion: the participants might not remember that the reciprocal favour has been
done or are not sure/do not expect that they receive it later.
The more detailed analysis of community exchange is illustrated by Table 4.11.
Interestingly, almost all domestic tasks performed by the households for others are
done for relatives, friends and neighbours. For the higher income households it
reaches 99 percent of all cases. At the same time this community exchange is mostly
non-monetised. The exception here is the lowest income households that in 24 percent
of cases perform domestic tasks for their kin and friends for money. This supply side
results are in striking discrepancy with the consumption side results. The possible
reasons for such a significant difference are discussed earlier in this section.
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Table 4.11. What part of all tasks was performed in the form of community exchange?
The form of services supply
Total monthly income (hryvnias)
<2000 2000-3000 3000-4000 >5000
Total community exchange (in % from total
services received) 89.5% 87.9% 98.7% 97.1%
Monetized community exchange  (in % from total
community exchange) 23.5% 2.5% 7.4% 3.0%
Monetized community exchange (in % from total
number of services) 21.1% 2.2% 7.3% 2.9%
The above shows that the complementary theory of the paid informal work is of little
applicability here. Firstly, this is because most of the paid informal work for close
people is performed by the lowest-income households for monetary rather than
sociality reasons. Secondly, and more importantly, socially motivated informal work is
usually unpaid in the area examined and therefore is not the subject of the thesis.
However, if considering unpaid informal work, it obviously can strongly support
complementary theory.
To conclude on both supply and consumption, similarly to all other economic
areas, informal work occurs when coping with simple everyday tasks. However while
informal work prevailed from the consumption side, unpaid community exchange was
the most common way of domestic services supply. Only a small part of informal work
was performed by/for close people and is mostly profit motivated. This should not be
viewed as all-absorbing market relations that penetrate all aspects of social life (though
this partially occurs in today society and is discussed in the next section blat). Firstly,
this is because the majority of day-to-day services performed by relatives and friends
are unpaid. Households participate in close social relationships, which imply regularly
recurring reciprocal help. Moreover the closest relatives - parents and children - living
in different households not just help each other for free, but such help is usually taken
in stride: none of the participants mentioned monetary rewards or reciprocal favours in
such cases. Secondly, even if the community exchange is paid, this is mostly due to
nature of the work: it is regular and important source of income of the supplier. Thus
paid community exchange should be viewed as ordinary informal work and treated on
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the basis of the motives of having informal income, as discussed in the previous
section. Therefore, when talking about everyday domestic tasks, paid informal work
represents mostly a by-product or alternative theory of the informal economy.
Complementary theory is mostly applicable for unpaid informal work (which is not the
focus of this chapter) and residue theory can be completely refuted.
This section focused on the supply and consumption of everyday domestic
tasks. Next section will provide the summary of the findings regarding the informal work
in general and domestic services in particular.
4.3. Informal work: summary of the findings
To sum up, the informal economy in Ukraine is diverse by nature and so are the
motives for participation in it. Each of the four theories can be applied to the Ukrainian
society, although they are not equally prevalent. This means, the fifth, post-structuralist
theory which acknowledges the diversity of informal activities, is applicable to Ukraine.
The survey showed that the alternative theory can explain the largest part of the
informal economy in Ukraine, because informal workers here are mostly individuals
who voluntary exit formal economy in order to avoid participation in unfair tax system
and ineffective social security system.
The next largest part of informal work can be viewed as a by-product of the
formal economy. The survey participants who fit this theory are waged workers
excluded from the formal economy by their employers seeking to reduce payroll costs.
As for the residue theory, no evidence has been found in the research area to
support it. However, at the same time, there is not enough evidence from previous
research to prove long-term growth of the informal economy and thus, completely
reject this theory.
Complementary theory in Ukraine is best supported with paid and unpaid
favours done for/by relatives and friends for closer social connections. Both previous
sections on the informal work in general and domestic work in particular showed that
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very little paid informal work is socially motivated. Unpaid favours, rather than socially
motivated paid work, are more characteristic to the Ukrainian society. Some of such
favours may be regarded as blat. Conclusions on contemporary blat are drawn in the
next chapter.
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5. THE ROLE OF BLAT
In the previous chapter the four theories were tested against the survey results
regarding informal work in Mykolayiv. This chapter attempts to look at blat from the
same viewpoint as informal work: each of the four theories will be evaluated towards
the survey findings regarding blat relations. As a result, an alternative approach to
understanding of blat will be suggested in Section 5.2.4.
5.1. Descriptive statistics
This chapter seeks to explore the extent to which favours are done and received
through blat, the spheres where blat is most widely used, how blat is rewarded in
contemporary Ukraine and who are the recipients and providers of blat in different
spheres. This will provide the background for theorisation of blat in the next section.
5.1.1. The prevalence of blat
Blat (using informal connections for the personal benefit) is still quite widespread in this
urban area of Ukraine. Some 168 out of 200 respondents (84 percent) reported the
participation in at least one sphere of using personal connections. This might indicate
that the informal networks cannot be a residue of the Soviet system. However, only 54
respondents (27 percent) take part in blat relations in four or more spheres.
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Table 5.1. Participation of respondents in blat relations by the number of spheres
involved
Number
of
spheres
Favours received Favours done
Count of
responses %
Count of
responses %
0* 32 16% 86 43%
1 38 19% 43 22%
2 45 23% 31 16%
3 31 16% 21 11%
4 23 12% 7 4%
5 14 7% 6 3%
6 2 1% 1 1%
7 3 2% 0 0%
8 2 1% 2 1%
9 3 2% 2 1%
10 4 2% 0 0%
11 1 1% 0 0%
12 0 0% 0 0%
13 2 1% 1 1%
Total 200 100% 200 100%
* the favours were not received / done
5.1.2. The spheres where blat is most widely used
The total number of spheres, in which suppliers report providing favours, is almost
twice as small as the spheres people report that they receive favours across. Taking
into consideration multiple answers, favours received were mentioned 536 times and
favours done 283 times. This can be explained by the fact that the average participant
can provide the favours in the limited amount of areas (mostly, the areas he/she works
in), and consume favours in almost all spheres depending on width of his/her
connections. For example, a professor in the university will do favours only in the
sphere of education and employment; however he/she obviously can obtain blat in
various spheres in return.
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As Table 5.2 shows, favours are most commonly received in the spheres of
medical services (21 percent of all answers), finding a job (13 percent), traffic police
matters (11 percent), education and local authorities’ matters (8 percent both). In
regard of the favours done for others, getting a job was the most popular answer (17
percent of all answers), medical services (15 percent), education (11 percent),
everyday services (9 percent) and traffic police and local authorities matters (8 percent
both). Supply and consumption side answers agree with each other, showing
approximately the same rank order in terms of participation rates.
Table 5.2. Spheres of using blat: supply and demand sides.
Spheres Favoursreceived
Favours
done
Medical services: local surgery, hospital or bed and operation 112 21% 42 15%
Solving problems with the traffic police, registration of a vehicle 59 11% 22 8%
Finding a job 67 13% 47 17%
Education: Places in primary-secondary and higher education 43 8% 31 11%
Legal services and courts 34 6% 15 5%
Army conscription 9 2% 1 0%
Everyday services at better quality or better price 31 6% 25 9%
Repairs of housing, garages, dachas 32 6% 17 6%
Tickets for events, theatre, concerts 23 4% 9 3%
Hobbies and entertainment, resorts, travelling tickets 38 7% 12 4%
Consumer goods 23 4% 20 7%
Foodstuffs 20 4% 15 5%
Communicating with local authorities 45 8% 24 8%
TOTAL 536 100% 283 100%
These data show that while in some spheres blat is still widespread, in other spheres it
really can be viewed as a residue, for example in obtaining consumer goods, tickets for
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events and travel tickets. This corresponds with the findings of the literature review
(Arnstberg and Boren, 2003; Ledeneva, 2006), that in the Soviet times, blat was used
to get the goods in short supply which is not the case today. Thus, blat in this traditional
meaning is a residue today and the new forms of blat are, in contrast, rather
widespread and require a different theoretical approach. Further sections explore these
new forms of blat.
5.1.3. How are favours rewarded today? (Is blat really monetised?)
The questions ‘How do you reward your connections?’ and ‘What do you usually
receive as a reward?’ were aimed at finding out whether blat relations are still a
reciprocal exchange with favours or whether blat has become monetised nowadays.
The participants were suggested five answer options: ‘cash’, ‘gift’, ‘quid pro quo’, ‘just
‘thank you’’ and ‘other’. ‘Other’ included versatile rewards such as ‘a plate of soup’ and
‘drinking beer together’. If the help was rewarded with cash or a gift, it is treated as
paid. Paying back with the service (quid pro quo) indicated a blat relationship in its
traditional meaning of ‘reciprocal exchange of favours’.
In the majority of cases, the blat was paid either with cash (25 percent) or with a
gift (13 percent), together summing up to 39 percent out of total for the consumption
side (Table 5.3a). This supports the finding that monetized blat is not a residue.
However, the results for the supply side differ significantly: paid blat sums up to only 16
percent out of total (Table 5.3b). This inconsistency in answers prejudices the
truthfulness of answers regarding the reward given for favours done.
It may be concluded that blat became partially monetised today assuming
sometimes a shape of corruption. If the reward is paid with cash or a gift in such
situations as solving problems with the traffic police, local authorities, courts, army
conscription it may be considered a bribe. However, this depends on the motives of
giving such rewards, which will be discussed further in this section.
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Table 5.3a. Spheres of consuming favours by the type of reward
Spheres
Reward given for favours received
Cash Gift
Quid
pro
quo
Just
‘thank
you’
Other Total
Medical services
40 31 33 25 7 136
29% 23% 24% 18% 5% 100%
Solving problems with the traffic police
26 5 12 11 7 61
43% 8% 20% 18% 11% 100%
Finding a job
3 11 13 34 6 67
4% 16% 19% 51% 9% 100%
Education: Places in primary-secondary and
higher education
12 13 13 13 1 52
23% 25% 25% 25% 2% 100%
Legal services and courts
12 3 8 12 2 37
32% 8% 22% 32% 5% 100%
Army conscription
7 0 1 0 0 8
88% 0% 13% 0% 0% 100%
Everyday services at better quality or better price
3 0 9 19 0 31
10% 0% 29% 61% 0% 100%
Repairs of housing, garages, dachas
9 0 11 12 2 34
26% 0% 32% 35% 6% 100%
Tickets for events, theatre, concerts
4 2 7 11 1 25
16% 8% 28% 44% 4% 100%
Hobbies and entertainment, resorts, travelling
tickets
7 7 11 18 0 43
16% 16% 26% 42% 0% 100%
Consumer goods
3 0 6 15 0 24
13% 0% 25% 63% 0% 100%
Foodstuffs
2 0 5 14 0 21
10% 0% 24% 67% 0% 100%
Communicating with local authorities
21 8 14 7 1 51
41% 16% 27% 14% 2% 100%
TOTAL
152 81 146 196 27 602
25% 13% 24% 32% 5% 100%
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Table 5.3b Spheres of providing favours by the type of reward
Spheres
Reward obtained for favours done
Cash Gift
Quid
pro
quo
Just
‘thank
you’
Other Total
Medical services
6 7 20 25 1 59
10% 12% 34% 42% 2% 100%
Solving problems with the traffic police
5 4 12 11 0 32
16% 13% 38% 34% 0% 100%
Finding a job
1 2 12 40 1 56
2% 4% 21% 71% 2% 100%
Education
1 8 11 17 1 38
3% 21% 29% 45% 3% 100%
Legal services and courts
3 3 6 7 1 20
15% 15% 30% 35% 5% 100%
Army conscription
0 0 0 1 0 1
0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 100%
Everyday services at better quality or better price
1 3 9 19 0 32
3% 9% 28% 59% 0% 100%
Repairs of housing, garages, dachas
4 1 7 10 0 22
18% 5% 32% 45% 0% 100%
Tickets for events, theatre, concerts
0 2 5 7 0 14
0% 14% 36% 50% 0% 100%
Hobbies and entertainment, resorts, travelling
tickets
0 2 6 9 1 18
0% 11% 33% 50% 6% 100%
Consumer goods
0 2 6 18 0 26
0% 8% 23% 69% 0% 100%
Foodstuffs
0 2 6 14 0 22
0% 9% 27% 64% 0% 100%
Communicating with local authorities
1 1 14 10 1 27
4% 4% 52% 37% 4% 100%
TOTAL
22 37 114 188 6 367
6% 10% 31% 51% 2% 100%
5.1.4. The relationship between people exchanging favours
The types of relationship suggested by the questionnaire for the question about the
relationship between the participant and blat providers/consumers were the following:
relative, friend, neighbour, colleague, other. The participants typically specified the
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‘other’ as friends of friends or acquaintances. Multiple answers, for instance, ‘friends
and acquaintances’ were often given.
According to Table 5.4a below, the participants most commonly obtain favours
from their friends and acquaintances/friends of friends (‘other’) (28 and 33 percent
respectively out of all responses). Serious official matters such as solving problems
with the traffic police, legal services and courts, communicating with local authorities
are usually settled with the help of acquaintances (‘other’). Favours in the spheres of
employment, tickets for events, the theatre, concerts and everyday services are most
commonly provided by friends. Domestic matters of repairs of housing, garages,
dachas, getting foodstuffs and consumer goods are more likely to be arranged with the
assistance of relatives. The favours of neighbours and colleagues are the least popular
among the population: 8 and 12 percent respectively out of total number of responses.
Although it is often argued that nowadays blat relations are more profit than socially
motivated (Arnstberg and Boren, 2003; Ledeneva, 1998; Ledeneva, 2008; Mikhailova
and Worm, 2003; Smith and Stenning, 2006), the essence of the exchange of favours
with kin, friends and friends of friends is development of the social ties. Social motives
are embedded in blat relations and this suggests the viability of the complementary
theory. Further evidence can be found in the next section on the motives for blat
participation.
172
Table 5.4a Spheres of using blat by the participants’ relationship
Spheres
Providers of favours
Relative Friend Neighbour Colleague Other
Medical services: local surgery,
hospital or bed and operation
30 38 9 18 52
20% 26% 6% 12% 35%
Solving problems with the traffic
police, registration of a vehicle
6 21 4 8 29
9% 31% 6% 12% 43%
Finding a job
21 31 5 10 17
25% 37% 6% 12% 20%
Education: Places in primary-
secondary and higher education
10 13 7 3 17
20% 26% 14% 6% 34%
Legal services and courts
4 9 1 4 21
10% 23% 3% 10% 54%
Army conscription
1 1 0 0 6
13% 13% 0% 0% 75%
Everyday services at better quality
or better price
11 17 5 6 11
22% 34% 10% 12% 22%
Repairs of housing, garages,
dachas
12 9 4 4 10
31% 23% 10% 10% 26%
Tickets for events, theatre, concerts
3 13 3 3 4
12% 50% 12% 12% 15%
Hobbies and entertainment, resorts,
travelling tickets
7 9 3 10 18
15% 19% 6% 21% 38%
Consumer goods
13 9 3 3 5
39% 27% 9% 9% 15%
Foodstuffs
10 9 3 3 4
34% 31% 10% 10% 14%
Communicating with local
authorities
7 8 4 9 31
12% 14% 7% 15% 53%
TOTAL
135 187 51 81 225
20% 28% 8% 12% 33%
The responses to the questions on the supply side slightly differ from those on the
consumption side. The most commonly cited recipients of favours were relatives (22
percent) and friends (29 percent). Only in the sphere of legal services did this differ
where the major recipients were acquaintances (‘other’) (33 percent). The participants
do favours for their neighbours and colleagues less frequently. These groups of favour
recipients are mostly helped in the sphere of medical services and employment
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matters.
Table 5.4b. Spheres of supply of blat by the participants’ relationship
Spheres
Recipients of favours
Relative Friend Neighbour Colleague Other
Medical services: local surgery,
hospital or bed and operation
31 30 14 15 16
29% 28% 13% 14% 15%
Solving problems with the traffic
police, registration of a vehicle and
10 16 4 8 7
22% 36% 9% 18% 16%
Finding a job
23 38 15 18 14
21% 35% 14% 17% 13%
Education: Places in primary-
secondary and higher education
12 21 8 7 10
21% 36% 14% 12% 17%
Legal services and courts
6 5 2 3 8
25% 21% 8% 13% 33%
Army conscription
1 1 0 1 0
33% 33% 0% 33% 0%
Everyday services at better quality
or better price
13 18 9 8 7
24% 33% 16% 15% 13%
Repairs of housing, garages,
dachas
9 10 4 3 5
29% 32% 13% 10% 16%
Tickets for events, theatre, concerts
5 9 3 4 1
23% 41% 14% 18% 5%
Hobbies and entertainment, resorts,
travelling tickets
7 9 4 4 4
25% 32% 14% 14% 14%
Consumer goods
12 15 6 8 5
26% 33% 13% 17% 11%
Foodstuffs
10 10 7 7 4
26% 26% 18% 18% 11%
Communicating with local
authorities
9 12 6 11 11
18% 24% 12% 22% 22%
TOTAL
148 194 82 97 92
22% 29% 12% 14% 14%
The descriptive statistics revealed the extent to which blat is prevalent in Mykolayiv, the
services and institution where it is most widely used as well as the types of blat
rewards and the relationship between the participants. Following this, in the next
section, an analysis of this empirical will be undertaken to evaluate critically the validity
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of the four theoretical perspectives when applied to the use of blat.
5.2. Theorising the role of blat
The aim of this section is to evaluate the prevalence and motives of using informal
connections for personal benefit, the opinions and attitudes towards such networking,
and to test the existing theories of the informal economy against the findings. This aim
could be reached by answering the questions below and thereby testing each theory.
However, at the outset, it should be noted that in this survey, when participants were
asked about what blat services they have provided they could have given answers
about two major cases. First is the case of two parties: participant provided services
under blat arrangement directly to their ‘customers’ (those who asked). Second is the
case of three or more parties: participant ‘redirected’ their ‘customers’ to their own
connections, the last wouldn’t normally accept ‘customers’ when contacted directly. It is
very important to understand that both cases are undistinguishable in the survey.
5.2.1. Is blat a residue of the pre-capitalist society?
In order to determine whether the residue theory is applicable to modern blat relations,
it would be useful to look at how prevalent such informal relations are today and how its
nature and prevalence change with time.
The previous section revealed that blat is widespread in contemporary
Ukrainian society. The share of participants who use blat in at least one sphere of their
everyday life is 84 percent. This shows that blat is by no means a residue of a pre-
capitalist society. However, as was discussed in previous sections, using connections
and namely blat in its traditional meaning has changed as a result of society
transformation from socialist to post-socialist. Therefore, it would be useful to explore
the directions of blat transformation and to evaluate whether the Soviet-style blat still
exists in Ukraine.
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Although there is no prevalent opinion on the primary importance of money or
connections resulting from the survey, the results provide strong evidence of blat
monetization. Firstly, quantitative analysis reveals that favours done by acquaintances
are paid with cash or a gift in 38 percent of cases. This confirms that while during the
Soviet period blat relations meant mutual exchange of solely favours, money is
involved in just over one-third of such relations nowadays. Secondly, these quantitative
results are supported and explained by the interviewees’ narratives. As a man, working
as a doctor, aged 56 – 65 years old asserted:
‘In the Soviet times it was enough to call the acquaintance (mainly state officials)
and the problem was solved without money. Such acquaintances were called
‘pozvonochnye’ [directly translated as ‘vertebrates’ but comes from the word
‘zvonok’ which means ‘a call’]. There are no more ‘pozvonochnye’ today.
Everything is done for money’.
As an unemployed woman commented, one does not need to have connections, when
the favour can be paid:
‘Today money is more important than connections. In any institution there are
people that are ready to carry out any your request for money. You do not need
to have connections in hospitals to obtain a health certificate from medical board.
It is enough to speak to district nurse and for 100 hryvnias get any certificate the
next day’.
A 46-55 years old man, an entrepreneur, similarly explained:
‘We tried to prepare the documents needed for the construction of a house and
were confronted with great difficulties when getting tens of approvals from
firemen, sanitation center, technical inventory bureau etc. Without gaining access
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to necessary people through our acquaintances and giving the officials presents
and money nothing would be possible…In order to give a bribe you need to find
people who can recommend you to the official - an intermediary. Otherwise it is
sometimes dangerous to offer cash to unknown people – you do not know how
much to give and whether the person will take it at all’.
According to a woman, who is employed as a medical worker, blat is an easy and quick
way of arranging matters:
‘One can solve all problems without connections and rewarding them but it will
take too much time. I am very busy and cannot ask for permission to leave during
the working day (when all these state offices work). In order to obtain a child
benefit I had to pay my colleague. She arranged everything quickly through the
people she knew’.
And finally, a young man working as IT specialist argued, that money is more important
today than being well-connected:
‘I think that the importance of money grew dramatically in comparison to
connections. While in the Soviet times it was difficult without connections, today if
you have money you just need to find a person to give them to…I had to register
my vehicle in the traffic police office. You need to stand in a long queue, several
long queues and complete a lot of procedures. This will take all the day (or two).
If you prepare for it beforehand (find a right person through someone you know
and pay money, usually 50-100 dollars) everything will be done for you in an hour
or two’.
In the majority of cases, the participants needed to involve both connections and
money in settlement of their matters. Offering cash-in-hand without an intermediary
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might be risky (as already explained). Therefore, being well-connected is still very
important in modern Ukrainian society. However, ‘favours’ that were done quid pro quo
in the Soviet times without money involvement are now financially rewarded.
Nevertheless, instances of using connections without a reward are still reported. For
example, a woman, who works as a notary officer, stated:
‘Due to my profession I communicate a lot with people of various occupations.
This gives me an opportunity to use this connections quid pro quo when visiting a
doctor or doing official examination of my vehicle in the traffic police’.
Similarly, a woman aged 26 – 35 years old, who works as a doctor, said:
‘Money is important today but connections are still in use. I lived in Kyiv and
came back to my native city especially to give birth because my parents are
doctors and have big connections here. In spite of a small official payment of 200
hryvnias to the hospital cash office and 20 hryvnias cash-in-hand to the nurse I
obtained very good treatment. And these people are not our close friends, just
colleagues’.
A retired woman working as a secretary of a school fund recounted:
‘My position gives me a very good circle of connections among pupils’ parents.
Moreover, I have been a school director for 15 years. That is why I can ask for
help the pupils’ parents (quality medical service, household appliances repair,
residence permit) and naturally will help them in solving problems with the school
administration and teachers (placing children to the best teachers, improvement
of knowledge quality and marks). My grandson graduated from the Academy of
Law but nobody wanted to employ him because of no work experience. With the
help of one of the parents I managed to find a job for him’.
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Based on an assumption that Soviet blat was mostly non-monetised as found by a
number of authors, these informal relations are in decline today and therefore may be
viewed as a residue. Moreover, the survey shows that blat in its old meaning has
already disappeared from the lives of some people being substituted by the new,
monetized blat. However, the traditional non-monetised blat still persists with two-thirds
of blat being non-monetised. It is the case, therefore, that there is a transformation
taking place with traditional-style blat in decline but it has not totally disappeared.
5.2.2. Is blat a by-product of the formal economy?
To answer this question, it is necessary at least to determine what social groups are
involved in the informal networking and whether it is a result of exit or exclusion. This
will show whether informal networking is used by marginalised population out of
necessity or, on the contrary, the prerogative of well-connected affluent populations.
Characteristics of the population involved in blat relations
In order to determine the characteristics of population which uses blat more widely,
statistical analysis of variance comparing participation in blat across income groups,
age, gender and involvement into the informal activities was undertaken. As mentioned
above, there are 13 proposed spheres of blat. For each participant the number of
spheres he/she uses blat in has been calculated. So that those who take part in blat
relations in only one sphere are the least active blat participants and those who use
blat in 13 spheres are the most active. However, the number of people that use blat in
six and more spheres is insignificant. Therefore, they were brought together in one
single group for the purposes of statistical analysis.
Table 5.5a displays that the use of blat increases with income level. There is
significant association between income and the rate of blat participation (for blat
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consumption side - Kendall’s tau = 0.217, p<0.01, for supply side - Kendall’s tau =
0.216, p<0.01). Furthermore, regressing the rate of participation in blat on income
reveals that the average number of spheres where blat is used increases by 0.44
(0.11) per income group. A t-test allows us to accept this coefficient at a 1 percent level
of significance.
Similar dependence can be seen in Table 5.5b which shows the cross
tabulation between income and the number of spheres where blat is provided. The
average number of spheres where favours are done increases by 0.3 (0.1) per income
group. Here, a t-test also allows us to accept this coefficient at 1 percent level of
significance.
Table 5.5a. The rate of participation in blat relations by income group (consumption)
Number of spheres where blat is used by the participants
0 1 2 3 4 5 6-13 Total
To
ta
l m
on
th
ly
 in
co
m
e,
hr
yv
ni
as
<2000
Count 11 14 13 7 1 0 4 50
% 22% 28% 26% 14% 2% 0% 8% 100%
2000-
3000
Count 8 4 18 7 7 2 1 47
% 17% 9% 38% 15% 15% 4% 2% 100%
3000-
4000
Count 7 14 6 10 6 7 3 53
% 13% 26% 11% 19% 11% 13% 6% 100%
>5000
Count 6 6 8 7 9 5 9 50
% 12% 12% 16% 14% 18% 10% 18% 100%
Weighted
average
Count 32 38 45 31 23 14 17 200
% 16% 19% 23% 16% 12% 7% 9% 100%
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Table 5.5b. The rate of participation in blat relations by income group (supply)
Number of spheres where blat is provided by the participants
0 1 2 3 4 5 6-13 Total
To
ta
l m
on
th
ly
 in
co
m
e,
hr
yv
ni
as
<2000
Count 30 10 2 5 0 1 2 50
% 60% 20% 4% 10% 0% 2% 4% 100%
2000-3000
Count 23 10 8 4 0 1 1 47
% 49% 21% 17% 9% 0% 2% 2% 100%
3000-4000
Count 18 15 8 6 3 2 1 53
% 34% 28% 15% 11% 6% 4% 2% 100%
>5000
Count 15 8 13 6 4 2 2 50
% 30% 16% 26% 12% 8% 4% 4% 100%
Weighted
average
Count 86 43 31 21 7 6 6 200
% 43% 22% 16% 11% 4% 3% 3% 100%
There is also a significant association between respondents’ age and the rate of blat
participation (for blat consumption side Kendall’s tau = - 0.121, p<0.05, for supply side
Kendall’s tau = - 0.170, p<0.05). Regressing the rate of participation in blat on age
displays that the average number of spheres where blat is used decreases by 0.223
(0.085) per age group and the average number of spheres where blat is provided
decreases by 0.248 (0.73) per age group. T-tests allow an acceptance of this
coefficient at a 1 percent level of significance. This means that younger people use blat
more widely than older ones.
The participants’ gender is not significantly associated with the rate of blat
usage both on the consumption (Chi-square = 4.449, p>0.05) and supply (Chi-square =
1.244, p>0.05) sides.
A chi-square test reveals that there is no significant association between
informal job participation and blat participation both from the consumption (Chi-
square=2, p>0.05) and supply (Chi-square=0.006, p>0.05) sides. Both formal and
informal workers participate in blat in almost equal proportions (Tables 5.6a and 5.6b).
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Table 5.6a. Participation in blat by the participation in the informal work (consumption
side)
Does the respondent use
blat?
No Yes
Does the respondent participate in
the informal work?
Yes 19% 81%
No 11% 89%
Total 15% 85%
Table 5.6b. Participation in blat by the participation in the informal work (supply side)
Does the respondent
provide blat?
No Yes
Does the respondent participate in
the informal work?
Yes 41% 59%
No 42% 58%
Total 42% 58%
There is similarly no significant association between breadth of blat participation
(measured in the number of spheres the respondent provide or use blat in) and
participation in the informal work: Chi-square = 10.246, p>0.05 for the demand side
and Chi-square = 7.726, p>0.05 for the supply side.
One should take into consideration, that out 80 participants somehow or other
involved in the informal economy, only 14 (17.5 percent) are fully informal. Other 66 (83
percent) have both formal and informal earnings. Therefore it would be useful to
examine, whether informal work or unemployment are associated with the use of blat.
Table 5.7a shows that the percentage of blat suppliers is slightly higher among those,
who are formally registered at least at one working place, than among those, who do
not have any formal job. However, the difference is not statistically significant (Chi-
Square = 2.863, p>0.05). Table 5.7b reveals even smaller proportion of blat
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participants among partially and fully formal workers, than among fully informal workers
(86 vs 79 percent respectively). The results, however, are not statistically significant as
well (Chi square = 1.557, p>0.05). This supports the finding above, that informal work
is not associated with participation in blat.
Table 5.7a. Participation in blat by the type of employment (consumption side)
Does the respondent
participate in blat?
Not in blat In blat
Is the respondent fully
informal
Partially informal or
fully formal
14% 86%
Fully informal 21% 79%
Does not work 27% 73%
Total 16% 84%
Table 5.7b. Participation in blat by the type of employment (supply side)
Does the respondent
participate in blat?
Not in blat In blat
Is the respondent fully
informal
Partially informal or
fully formal
42% 58%
Fully informal 36% 64%
Does not work 55% 45%
Total 16% 84%
To sum up, out of the four factors analysed above the influence of only two factors –
income and age – can be statistically proved. In addition to that one-way analysis of
variance showed that income factor has more impact than age on the participation in
blat. In more detail, income F-ratio is 3.576, p<0.01 for the consumption side, and
F=3.497, p<0.01 for the supply side. Similarly, for age factor F=2.462 p=0.026 for
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consumption side and F=1.309 p=0.255 for supply side. This evidence let us to refute a
by-product theory: blat users and suppliers are definitely not a necessity-driven
marginalised population. These are rather opportunity driven prosperous households
that have blat and can afford to use it which contradict the by-product approach.
The perceptions of getting things done by pulling strings
The next step in testing the by-product theory is the evaluation of perceptions of getting
things done by pulling strings. This will show whether the participants use blat out of
choice, or whether they are compelled to employ blat in spite of their negative attitude
towards it.
Out of 200 participants, 95 (47.5 percent) expressed very positive or positive
attitude towards blat, 90 (40 percent) were neutral (‘depends on situation’) and only 25
(12.5 percent) view blat negatively or extremely negatively.
Cross-tabulation of the frequency of blat participation (both from the supply and
demand side) and attitude towards blat shows that respondents with a negative or a
very negative attitude towards pulling strings do not participate in blat at all (64 and 80
percent from demand and supply side respectively) or take part in only one to two
spheres (36 and 20 percent from demand and supply side respectively). This indicates
that the majority of people voluntarily participate in blat and those who view blat
negatively are able to minimize their participation. This fact also leads one to discard
the by-product theory.
Similar to the findings regarding the frequency of blat participation, the ‘attitude
to blat’ variable can be cross-tabulated with the age, gender and income variables. In
contrast to blat participation frequency, attitude to blat is not significantly associated
with the income of participant (Chi-Square = 11.568, p>0.05). By analogy to the blat
participation, attitude to blat is not significantly associated with the age or gender of the
participants.
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The necessity of blat in various aspects of everyday life
To find out, how indispensable for the wellbeing of Mykolayiv population blat is, the
participants were asked whether it is possible to solve the problems they mentioned
without blat. The most common answer to this question was: ‘It is possible, but will take
too much time and effort’. Using connections at the first opportunity became a habit
and tradition, especially when it refers to the influencing of state officials. People get
used to settling matters with local authorities by drawing in connections and cash-in-
hand payments to state officials and intermediaries. Such an arrangement of matters
seems more efficient to them even when it is practically possible to obtain all necessary
documents without bribes and blat. Thus, a woman, aged 46-55 years old, who works
as an accountant, replied:
‘Once I had to gather 14 signatures in the gorispolkom [city executive committee].
The lawyer I knew took 400 dollars to help me in this matter as it seemed to take
a long time, effort and looked unrealistic. Later, one friend of mine needed to take
the same 14 signatures and did it in an hour without any unofficial payments’.
Other participant, an entrepreneur, also reported an optionality and even undesirability
of using connections:
‘Of course, it is possible to arrange matters without any connections. Why do
people use connections? From force of habit and because it gives you the feeling
of confidence. But in 70 percent of cases involving acquaintances makes the
things worse’.
In addition, even though plenty of participants reported that without blat or bribes it is
impossible to find a job, to enter a university or a good school, to obtain a driving
licence, quality medical service and necessary documents from officials, there are still
a number of cases when the affairs were settled according to common official rules. As
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a 56-65 year old man in a top management position stated:
‘I do not use blat…My son entered the university (state funded place) himself,
without any help due to his knowledge, gold medal [graduated school with
honours] and prizes from subject contests. Afterwards he easily found a job as he
obtained a red diploma [graduated a university with honours]. I never had any
problems with education and job as well…’
Similarly, a woman aged 36-45 years old, who works as a manager, told about her
experience:
‘We have an opportunity to receive orthodontic services for free for our kids. Both
my girls wear braces that were put in for free in our clinics. We are very happy
with the quality. And I am surprised as I usually pay the doctors to ensure proper
quality of treatment’.
To sum up, blat implies voluntary participation. Blat relations are not a necessity or a
survival strategy for either consumers or suppliers. This is rather the method to cope
with the inefficiencies of the system and defects of legislation and taxation. Therefore,
blat can be viewed positively even though it increases social inequalities. Thus, there is
no evidence to support a by-product theory of blat in particular or the informal economy
more widely.
5.2.3. Is blat a complement or an alternative of the formal economy?
In the two sections above, the residue and by-product theories were refuted by the
survey outcomes. Though some leftovers of the economy of shortages that fit a residue
theory were found (traditional blat), the largest part of the informal networking
(monetised blat) is rather widespread in the modern Ukrainian society. In order to
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define which theory is most appropriate, namely the complementary or alternative
perspective, various instances of blat usage including the motives, spheres and
relationships of participants need to be analysed.
Social relationship between people is the source of blat. Blat is a form of such
relationship. Thus, blat motives can be described purely by the complementary theory
to the formal economy. However, it is less straightforward when analysing applications
of blat. The participants were given nine different possible options (multiple answers
were possible) to answer the question about the reasons for doing and receiving
favours. Options chosen were selected to reflect most common reasons of using blat.
Each option represents participant’s attitude towards blat as a complement or
alternative or both, alternative and complement, of the formal economy. However,
some of the options do not have direct explanations within these theories. Table 5.8
draws a correspondence between answer options and applicable theories. Further, the
most popular motives of using blat in each sphere are explored.
Table 5.8. Correspondence between answer options and applicable theories
Answer option Corresponding theory
to circumvent the rules / laws / bureaucracy
Alternative. A result of avoiding ineffective state
system of rules and regulations.
In many cases, however, this is a crime which can
be classified as authority abuse or as corruption, if it
is monetised.
to make rules / laws work Alternative. Countermeasure to authority abuse byofficials.
to reduce final price Complementary. This is mostly a pleasant bonus to
the regular earnings. It is not the by-product theory,
since usually it is not a survival strategy.to improve quality
to get information Complementary.
to be introduced to useful people Complementary.
to receive service without a queue Alternative. Similar to ‘circumventing rules / laws /bureaucracy’.
to maintain connections Complementary theory. This is the source of blat.
other n/a
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It should be noted at the outset, that the majority of favours done by officials for money
refer to corruption. Corruption is not included in the subjects of this research and,
therefore, will not be theorised.
In general, the most common reason for asking for a favour was ‘to improve
quality’ and ‘to get information’: 24 and 23 percent respectively (Appendix C, Table 1).
The major reasons why participants’ were asked about a favour were ‘to get
information’ and ‘to be introduced to useful people’: 32 and 20 percent respectively.
According to Table 1 in Appendix C, in the sphere of medical services blat is
used to improve the quality of provision in the majority of cases (53 percent). As
discussed in the previous section on informal income, medical services are sometimes
unofficially paid, although officially free in state hospitals. According to a widespread
belief, it is impossible to receive a proper quality medical help in a state hospital without
an informal payment. However, informal relations with doctors are still important and
significantly influence treatment of a patient. This confirms the complementary theory
as money often is not as important as a willingness to help someone from your
network. One of the participants, a manager of a firm, stated:
‘If you personally know the chief physician you will get absolutely different
treatment. I always go to the doctors pulling strings. Once I recommended a good
doctor to my sister. She visited this doctor without being patronized and did not
receive proper quality and care from him as I did. Besides, there is a standard
tariff you pay unofficially for doctor’s consultation: 50 hryvnias. This gives you
some confidence of being treated properly, with due carefulness’.
However, medical workers interviewed deny the existence of the fixed tariff paid in
‘free’ state hospitals. A young woman, working as a doctor, explained:
‘Sometimes thankful patients bring me flowers or sweets; sometimes they tuck
money into my pocket after the appointment…The doctors do not have any tariffs
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for their consultation. Even though patients sometimes give me money, the
amounts vary’.
The answers cited above suggest that people from different social circles have different
ideas on attending a hospital and rewarding the doctors. For a number of participants,
it is a rule to go to a doctor only through their personal connections (69.5 percent of
interviewees reported the use of connections when receiving medical help) and pay
cash-in-hand for a consultation (35.5 percent of participants said that they reward a
doctor unofficially with cash or a gift). For the rest of respondents, it is either still not
obvious that there are informal ‘tariffs’ for the doctors’ consultations, or they just have
no connections to use, when attending a hospital.
Interestingly, in 8 percent of cases, blat was used in the sphere of medical
services with the purpose of circumventing the rules. This obviously may include
issuing of sham health certificates, medical reports and prescriptions. Talking about
importance of money nowadays, an unemployed female mentioned that one can obtain
a health certificate from the medical board for 100 hryvnias. Such abuse of authority by
health care workers is illegal.
When arranging matters with the traffic police, the main motive is to circumvent
the rules or laws. In addition, in half of all cases (51 percent) the favours are paid either
in cash or with a gift. These results confirm that blat is monetised in this sphere and
could be related to corruption. It is important to note that people may be both reluctant
and happy to speak about unlawful (although widely accepted) practices. A woman
employed in the services sector felt rather uncomfortable to talk about informal
arrangements at the traffic police:
‘No, we settled all our problems with traffic police according to the law… [in a
lower voice] Everyone after all knows how it is done here’.
In contrast, some participants openly report illegal actions of the officials, who take
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bribes. Moreover, consciously or not, they disclose their own participation in these
illegal arrangements. For example, a woman, who works as a clerk in a firm, easily
related:
‘It is well known that traffic police and firemen are the most corrupt. I regularly
have to give them bribes: when they stop us on the road for some violation, when
we need to register the vehicle, when they inspect the premises of my husband’s
firm’.
The participant here openly reports that she gives bribes, which is illegal. Similarly,
other participant, an entrepreneur, reported:
‘When firemen find the violation of the fire safety rules you must either improve
the imperfection or pay bribe (which is often cheaper). After you paid the bribe
firemen even do not check the fire security of premises. They try their best only to
find violations and rip you off. Traffic police works in the same manner: their aim
is not to prevent an accident, but to make a record and rib off’.
These answers confirm the idea that traffic police and fire safety organs are unofficially
paid in order to circumvent the law which is indicative of corruption in these spheres.
When getting a job, informal connections are used for getting information (44
percent) and being introduced to useful people (28 percent). It is often reported that
without connections it is very difficult to find a job. The participants, who claimed this,
are mostly either former technical school graduates without work experience, or
workers older than 40-50 years old. For example, an unemployed man, aged 46-55
years old, stated:
‘I worked in the plant for a long time. After the bankruptcy of the plant all my
connections are lost. Now I have to get by somehow on different temporary jobs
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because after the age of 50 years and without connections nobody wants to
employ you full-time and formally’.
An officially unemployed woman, aged 46-55 years old, who works informally, came
across a similar problem:
‘Nobody in our family works officially. My sons cannot find a permanent job after
they finished technical school. And it is very difficult to find a permanent job for
women after 40 and men after 50 years without any connections’.
The answers above have already been cited to explain the reasons for not being
officially registered. Here, it should be emphasized that it is the absence of connections
that makes official employment difficult. This means that less well-off households
cannot use blat due to the absence of useful connections or an inability to afford it. This
supports the assumption in the previous section that by-product theory is not applicable
here. Complementary theory can better explain the use of connections for getting a job.
This is because the help with finding a job is rather socially, than profit motivated and
more obtainable for well-off, well-connected households.
Places in primary schools and universities may be obtained by circumventing
the rules or laws. In some 17 percent of all cases of using blat to get a place at school
or university, the main motive was to circumvent the rules (might be referred to
corruption). However, connections were mostly used in the sphere of education to
improve quality (34 percent). For instance, a woman, who works in the services sector,
commented:
‘I asked for the help of a woman I knew when placing my son to another, better
school. My neighbour (a former teacher) advised that there is a very good school
with a competent director, good teaching staff and everything is neat and tidy.
They say it is not easy to be accepted there. That is why I asked her to
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recommend me to a director of this school’.
Thus, the best way to explain the use of blat when getting a place at school or
university is to view it as a complement to formal economy. Indeed, social relations
play a very important role here. However if these relations are monetised and favours
done are purely financially motivated, complementary blat turns into corruption.
In the legal (including justice) sphere, blat is used to get information (40
percent), to be introduced to useful people (19 percent) and to make rules / laws work
(19 percent). The last issue needs special attention.
It is a common practice in Ukraine that laws are not obeyed by officials.
Furthermore, there are special blat relations among state officials of different branches
of power, for example, violations by the police (Militsiya) may be covered by
prosecution officers (Prokuratura), which in turn may be backed by decisions of courts
of justice. Thus, everyone breaches the law in favour of others in power, and there is
no possibility for an ‘ordinary’ person, without blat, to defend his/her rights, should
he/she require protection or face an unlawful action from other parties (officers in
power or businesses) with well-established blat. For example, tax officers deliberately
levy fines based on non-existing violations of tax code by entrepreneurs. When the
entrepreneur files a claim to court of justice he/she is most likely to lose it unless
he/she has some connections with judges.
When trying to avoid obligatory service in the army blat is used to circumvent
rules and laws (67 percent). Interestingly blat in this sphere is rewarded by cash in 88
percent of cases. This indicates that, as well as in the case with traffic police, here blat
is monetised and can be referred to corruption.
In everyday services and repairs of housing, connections are used to improve
quality and reduce the price in the majority of cases. Admittedly, this means that
participants get recommendations and discounts for such services, which is a
widespread practice and characteristic not solely in Ukraine. As shown in Table 5.8,
this corresponds with the complementary theory of the informal economy.
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Hobbies, entertainment, resorts/holidays, travelling tickets (in 27 percent of
cases), tickets for events, theatre, concerts (48 percent) and consumer goods (48
percent) can be acquired at a lower price if this is done through an acquaintance. For
example, a young woman, who works as a doctor, recounted:
‘According to the law, I have the right to obtain a sanatorium voucher for 20
percent of its price every five years because of my health condition. My colleague
is responsible for the distribution of these vouchers. Last time I brought her a
souvenir from the sanatorium and now I hope to obtain discounted voucher next
year as well. It is easier ‘to make friends’ with the authorised person for 100
hryvnias than to pay 3000 hryvnias full price’.
Other participant, a young man, a musician, who has irregular informal income and
often relies on his friends in artistic community, asserted:
‘I have a lot of friends in the artistic circle. They always help me to get a free
ticket for a concert when they have an opportunity’.
Although both cases involve the use of connections with the aim of saving some
money, social ties play the most important role. This is a complement to the formal
activities, an opportunity, rather than a necessity for blat users and for blat providers. It
is a friendly help, not a source of income. Therefore, the most suitable theory to
describe blat usage, when purchasing sanatorium vouchers, tickets for events, theatre,
concerts and day-to-day goods, is complementary theory.
It is worth mentioning that the sphere of resort travel (including sanatorium
vouchers) and travel tickets requires circumventing rules or making rules work, 10 and
6 percent respectfully of blat usage cases in this sphere. There may still exist a deficit
in services supply for example train tickets in the Crimea direction during summer
holidays period, or train and bus tickets to Kyiv when the autumn term starts at the
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universities. Such a deficit creates a room for the abuse of position for people
responsible for ticket and voucher distribution as in the foregoing case on discounted
sanatorium vouchers and the following case of a man, who works as a maritime pilot:
‘Our neighbour’s sister works in the railway ticket office. In the peak season
there is often no tickets for the right date and the right train. In this case we call
our neighbour and she settles the problem. We usually bring her a box of
chocolates for the favour she does and she is happy to help us again next time’.
This example confirms that there still exists a residue of old-fashioned Soviet blat that
is used for personal consumption in conditions of shortages. However another ‘blatless’
but informal way of solving such a problem was reported by one of the participants:
‘I study in Kyiv and usually go home to Mykolayiv for holidays. I never buy tickets
beforehand and it often happens that tickets are sold out for the necessary date.
In this case I just come to the station before the departure and speak to the
conductors. They are usually happy to shelter me in their own compartment for
150 hryvnias. The bargain is often made at the price of a second-class ticket’.
Obviously, in this case no connections are used. This confirms the possibility of solving
public transport problems through circumventing the rules through cash-in-hand
payment to the unknown conductor. In this situation, blat is substituted with an informal
cash-in-hand transaction.
Although foodstuffs are largely available in the Ukrainian market today, people
still use connections to obtain goods of higher quality, since quality food (e.g. organic)
is now in a short supply or unaffordable for the majority of the population. Indeed, the
motive of quality improvement was cited in 42 percent of cases. As a woman working
as a manager asserted:
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‘I buy meat in the market as the choice is better there than in the shop. However I
always try to buy it from the farmer I know. She will advise the better slice and I
can even order the fresh poultry beforehand. When you buy in the shop or from
the unknown supplier you never can be sure of the quality or freshness’.
However, the participant considers that such use of connections for the personal
benefit cannot be called blat. Positively, the practice of buying from the person you
know is not solely a characteristic of post-Soviet countries.
Communicating with local authorities using personal connections arise from the
need of getting information (25 percent), making the rules/laws work (25 percent) and
to circumvent the rules/laws (16 percent). If linked with the information from Table 5.3a
above, on the types of reward given for favours received, it reveals the corrupt nature
of local authorities. The favours in this sphere were paid with cash in 41 percent of
cases, and a gift was given in 16 percent of cases. Only 27 percent of favours were
done quid pro quo and can be regarded as non-monetised blat. Such unpaid favours
could be viewed as an alternative or a complement to formal settling of the matters.
Alternative, because the reasons for using informal connections are complex
bureaucratic procedures and overregulation of the economy. Complementary, as
sociality motives are brought into play.
In solving more serious questions with local authorities it is not that easy to pay
for ‘a good turn’. Informal payment for getting things done (circumventing rules or
making the rules work) is obviously a bribe and theoretically is prosecuted. Therefore,
state officials may not wish to take the money from the unknown person. For this
reason money should often be complemented by connections. The bribe maker should
be recommended by someone reliable otherwise there is a risk of being exposed. As a
woman-entrepreneur stated:
‘It is impossible to run a small business today. Everyone wants to rip you off. Tax
inspection has a plan from above to gather a certain amount of tax and penalties
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from taxpayers. They have to ascribe inexistent violations to you. I won several
trials against them but they are just growing angry. I am afraid one day they are
going to ruin my business... I wish there were at least equal conditions for all
businesses. Some are but some are not pressurised by the tax inspection. This
makes competition unfair’.
In this case, money is extorted from the entrepreneur by local tax officials. The way out
of this situation is either to admit violation and pay a fine, or to give bribe to the official
to settle the matter, or take the matter to the court. Though the latter is the most
legitimate, it does not guarantee positive outcomes and sometimes expose the
business to a greater danger.
To summarise, the findings indicate that neither complimentary nor alternative
theory is capable of explaining blat usage, although complimentary theory gives a
reasonable insight into the roots of blat.
5.2.4. The big picture of blat
In Chapter 4 it was attempted to approach and understand blat in relation to the formal
economy from the same viewpoint as the informal economy, i.e. evaluating existing
theories of the informal economy against the survey results. However, none proved to
give satisfactory explanations to the complex phenomenology of blat.
A better key to understanding blat was already mentioned in the analysis in
Section 5.2.2. It showed that there is no statistically significant association between
participation in the informal economy and blat. Moreover, both formal and informal
workers participate in blat relations in almost equal proportions. From a statistical point
of view, this means that blat and the informal economy are neither complements, nor
substitutes. If they were complements, there would be positive correlation between
participation in blat and in the informal economy, and if substitutes, a negative
correlation.
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Blat and the informal economy are in essence different types of phenomena,
even separate and discrete from each other. Blat is the method of getting things done
within either formal or the informal economy. Money is a method of exchanging value
between parties in an economic transaction, and blat plays the same role – it mediates
transactions. Blat, as a method, is not exclusively a characteristic of either the formal or
informal economy – it can be used for arranging matters both in the formal and informal
economies. Furthermore, blat and money can be used together to complete a
transaction. Possible ways to get things done with blat and/or money in the formal and
informal economies are given below in Table 5.9.
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Table 5.9. The relationship between money, blat and the informal economy.
MONEY
(including in-kind transfer)
BLAT
FO
R
M
AL
Proper ‘white’ market. All transactions are
recorded and provided to authorities. Customers
and sellers do not favour each other.
Example:
- buying a car officially from an official
dealership.
Use of blat in formal enterprises. No money is
involved in transactions.
Examples:
- getting a job offer through blat relations with
executive in the formal enterprise or institution;
- getting a better service (without queue and
proper attention) in the hospital through blat
relations with the doctor.
Use of blat in formal enterprises. All cash flows are recorded and provided to authorities. Blat
relations result in exclusive possibilities or unfair competition.
Examples:
- getting an upgrade car equipment for the same money, as a present, due to blat with sales
representative in official dealership;
- asking a friend who works in Apple store to sell you the new iPhone without a queue.
IN
FO
R
M
AL
Informal economy. Cash flows are hidden from
authorities. Customers and sellers do not favour
each other.
Examples:
- buying a car (or tomatoes) in the ‘black’
market;
- unofficial payment to a conductor on a
sleeping carriage on a train to let you travel in
her/his compartment overnight.
Use of blat in informal enterprises. No money is
involved in transactions.
Examples:
- getting an informal job through blat;
- your uncle fixes your (recently bought on
‘black’ market) car for free in his unregistered
garage; common practice.
Use of blat and money in informal enterprises. All cash flows are hidden from authorities. Blat
relations result in exclusive possibilities or unfair competition.
Examples:
- being recommended to a tax inspector in order to be able to give him money for leaving the
business alone (bribery, is a crime);
- acting through a person you know or through the reference from this person decreases the risk of
purchasing a stolen or defective car in the ‘black’ market;
- buying fresher tomatoes due to blat relations with a seller on a ‘black’ market.
- when placing a child in a good school with limited places, one must be recommended to a school
director. Later, depending on a situation, a gift or cash should be given to a director or an
intermediate.
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5.3. Blat: summary of the findings
Arranging matters through the use of personal connections (blat) is rather widespread
today and has not lost its importance since the Soviet times. However, while blat
relations meant an exchange of favours and did not normally include money, today
such favours often are financially rewarded. Moreover, when such paid favours involve
an abuse of authority, it can be classified as corruption. Similar to the Soviet times, the
majority of people do not actively participate in blat relations as they simply do not have
‘useful connections’. The survey showed that only a quarter of the participants are
actively involved in blat relations (i.e., benefited from blat in more than four spheres),
whereas the majority perceive blat positively or neutrally: only 12.5 percent of the
participants view blat negatively or very negatively. Interestingly, it is possible to cope
with many tasks without the use of blat. The main reasons people still pull strings are to
save time and to feel confidence that the aim will be achieved.
The term blat is becoming more outdated today. The participants did not include
this term in their answers. Instead, the broader term ‘through connections’ was used.
This expression would better describe the way of how things are done in Ukraine
today. However, in some cases when people say that ‘connections’ are involved
(mostly when buying and selling goods and services), they describe their loyalty to
seller and his/her goodwill and reputation. This, probably, cannot be treated as blat.
Connections are the most widely used in the spheres of medical services,
finding a job, local authorities, traffic police matters and education. Moreover, in these
spheres, ‘favours’ are commonly paid according to the quantitative and qualitative data
analysis. Statistical analysis revealed that participants from the higher income groups
and lower age groups use blat more widely. In contrast, the usage of blat is not
connected with the participants’ gender and participation in the informal economy.
The purposes of using blat in various spheres are different. While in the sphere
of medical services and education the main aim of blat is the improvement of services
quality, in the realms of local authorities and traffic police the main purpose of involving
acquaintances is to bypass the rules and laws or vice versa – to make them work.
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Therefore different theories could be used to explain different instances of blat.
Non-monetized exchange of favours in the conditions of shortages still exists
nowadays and is a residue of the Soviet society. However the vast majority of modern
blat relations are based on motives other than obtaining goods in short supply and a
residue theory is inapplicable here. The by-product theory is also invalid for modern
blat relations as this is unaffordable for the marginalized population. The better
financial and social position of the household is, the more opportunities for pulling
strings exist. The alternative theory cannot perfectly explain blat phenomenon as well.
This theory does not imply social motives that are the basis for blat relations. Moreover,
formal economy and informal blat relationships are intertwined, which also contradicts
with the alternative theory. The complementary theory is more suitable to explain blat.
Indeed, favours are often exchanged with friends, relatives and acquaintances or
‘friends of friends’ (referred as ‘other’ in questionnaire), are usually not paid (similarly to
day-to-day services discussed in the previous section) and the main motive of such
relations is to build closer social network of mutual support. However, even
complementary theory fails to explain instances, when blat is used to circumvent the
rules / laws / bureaucracy, to make rules / laws work, to receive service without a
queue. In these cases blat is increasingly monetised and social motives are often
secondary in such blat relations. However, paid favours to officials (which are the main
instances of monetized blat) often signify pure corruption and are a subject of separate
research and theorisation.
To sum up, some instances of blat cannot accurately fit any of the four theories
of the informal economy. In addition, quantitative analysis revealed that blat and the
informal work are neither substitutes, nor complements. Therefore, an alternative
approach to blat theorisation is suggested in Section 5.2.4. Firstly, it views blat and the
informal work as two separate phenomena. Secondly, blat, as well as money, is argued
to mediate transactions within either formal or the informal economy. This framework is
the major theoretical contribution of the thesis: it shows the interconnection of blat and
the informal/formal economies and explains the role of blat within both. In previous
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studies this had not been done so far.
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6. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
6.1. Summary of key findings
6.1.1. Definition of the informal economy and blat
There is no uniform way to define informal work. In this thesis, the approach used by
the OECD to define informal work is adopted. According to this activity-based
definition, informal work is ‘any paid activities that are lawful as regards their nature but
not declared to the public authorities’. Self-provisioning and illegal activity are not
considered in the thesis, as self-provisioning is unpaid and illegal activity is not lawful.
The second focus of the research, namely blat, is defined as the use of personal
networks for obtaining goods and services in a beneficial way and for circumventing
formal procedures.
6.1.2. Literature review
Four theoretical approaches exist that consider informal economy as a residue of  pre-
capitalism, a by-product of the formal economy, a complement to the formal economy
and an alternative to the formal economy. The diverse nature of informal economic
activities may be explored by the instrumentality of these four theories. While in
developed countries, the complementary theory of the informal economy is mostly
applicable, the informal economy in less developed countries better fits the alternative
and by-product theories.
It is shown in the literature review that the validity of the contrasting
theorisations of the informal economy in Ukraine was evaluated only by few
commentators and the issue of blat in Ukraine was not considered at all. This doctoral
research project is aimed at filling this gap in the knowledge. It examines informal work
more directly and in detail and also blat and therefore provides clearer and deeper
understanding of informal work in an urban area of Ukraine.
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6.1.3. Methodology
In spite of epistemological contradictions, the mixed methods approach employed for
this doctoral research was beneficial for several reasons. Firstly, it gave an opportunity
to address different research questions: the extent and nature of the informal economy
and motives of and attitudes towards informal work and blat. For the former, the
quantitative method was mainly used and for the latter, mainly qualitative. Secondly,
qualitative data analysis helped to explain the results of the survey and provided an in-
depth understanding of the research question.
6.1.4. A critical evaluation of theories of the informal economy
It was found that informal work in Ukraine’s economy is quite significant: nearly 45
percent of the participants are fully or partially involved in informal activities. It should
be born in mind that the figure does not include ‘envelope wages’ (some part of salary
that is paid unofficially together with official one) to registered workers. However,
‘envelope wages’ must be included when measuring the informal economy and it was
found that nearly 30 percent of employees in Ukraine receive these partially informal
wages (Williams and Round, 2008). Therefore, supposedly, the percentage of
informality in Ukrainian economy should be much higher than the estimated 45 percent
since many jobs that superficially appear to be formal jobs possess an informal
component.
Informal work in Ukraine is diverse by nature and the motives of being informal
vary accordingly. Thus, there exists no single theory that explains the informal
economy in Ukraine. In order to find which theories are applicable to Ukrainian reality,
the survey results were evaluated against existing theories of the informal economy.
The analysis of the data revealed that the most prominent type of informal worker is the
one engaged in several activities, one of which is officially registered. This can be
either a self-employed or waged worker; 33 out of 80 participants (41 percent) can be
put into this category. They exit the formal economy in order to avoid ‘extra’ tax and
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therefore conform to the alternative theory of the informal economy.
The second most popular type of informal worker constitutes 21 out of 80
participants (26 percent). It includes students / unemployed / retired who are, as well as
the first group, informal out of choice and related to the alternative theory. Although not
supposed to work, they work informally with the motives of profit maximisation.
The next largest category is waged employees that would choose to work
formally, but cannot find a formal job. They constitute 16 out of 80 participants that
work informally (20 percent). These people have to work informally because their
employers do not want to register them in order not to pay taxes from their salary.
Thus, such workers should be considered from the structuralist point of view (by-
product theory). However, it needs to be stressed, that these are employers, who
create such informal workplaces and their aim is to reduce costs through the tax
evasion, which relates them to the alternative theory.
The last group are fully informal waged workers and self-employed. This is the
smallest group of informal workers; only 9 out of 80 participants (11 percent) do not
have any registered activity. They voluntarily exit the formal economy because of their
distrust of the government and low tax morality. These workers choose informality as
an alternative to formal work. As a result, the largest part of the informal work in
Ukraine relates to the alternative theory. This should be taken into consideration when
developing policies to combat informal work.
6.1.5. The role of informal work in the provision of everyday domestic services.
Everyday domestic activities were explored separately in detail. The most important
objective here was to evaluate what suppliers and consumers are motivated by when
participating in paid community exchange in this sphere. Are they solely profit
motivated or have other than economical reasons, such as redistribution or developing
social networks?
The survey showed that the majority of housework performed by kin, friends
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and neighbours are unpaid and represent reciprocal exchange of favours between
households. When friends and relatives are paid for their work, this is usually their
regular job and a very important source of income. In the majority of cases, the motives
of doing this work are connected with earning a leaving or just gaining an additional
income, which otherwise could not be obtained. Thus, paid informal work here
represents mostly a by-product or alternative theory of the informal economy. There is
not enough evidence to support complementary theory, as social and redistributive
motives are quite uncommon for paid work for/by close people. This theory is mostly
applicable for unpaid informal work. And finally, residue theory can be completely
refuted.
6.1.6. Theorising the contemporary role of blat
Although the term blat is becoming more outdated today, personal connections in
Ukraine are still rather important for arranging matters in a beneficial way. However,
unlike in the Soviet times when blat relations meant an exchange of favours and did not
normally include money, today such favours are often financially rewarded. This means
blat is monetised today and even takes the shape of corruption in some cases. It was
found that coping with many tasks without the use of blat is possible. However people
still try to involve connections in order to make themselves safer when arranging
matters in an alternative beneficial way. The spheres where connections are most
widely used today are medical services, finding a job, local authorities, traffic police
matters and education. Quantitative analysis showed that participants from the higher
income groups and lower age groups use connections more widely.
The purposes of using blat in various spheres are different. While in the sphere
of medical services and education, the main aim of blat is the improvement of quality of
the services, for the matters of local authorities and traffic police the main purpose of
involving acquaintances is to bypass the rules and laws or vice versa to make them
work.
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Therefore, different theories should be used to explain different instances of the
use of blat. A residue theory might be applied to the non-monetized exchange of
favours in the conditions of shortages. This theory is of little relevance to contemporary
blat in Ukraine. The by-product theory is also irrelevant to modern blat relations as no
instances of using blat as a survival strategy has been found. In addition, blat by no
means is associated with the marginal population excluded from formal economy.
The analysis showed that none of the theories was capable of thoroughly
explaining the phenomena of blat. Furthermore, no relationship between participation in
blat and the informal economy was found as a result of statistical testing.  Therefore an
alternative theorisation of blat as a method of settling matters was suggested (Section
5.2.4). It explains possible ways to get things done with blat and/or money in the formal
and informal economies. Indeed, blat could be viewed as an alternative or a
complement to formal settling of the matters. Alternative theory is applicable when blat
is used to cope with complex bureaucratic procedures and overregulation of the
economy. Complimentary theory is viable when sociality motives come into play and
thus, gives a reasonable insight into the roots of blat.
6.2. Theoretical conclusions and policy implications
This section will firstly provide a brief review of existing policy approaches to tackle the
informal economy and afterwards specific policy measures with regard to the survey
findings and theoretical conclusions will be discussed.
6.2.1. Approaches to tackling the informal economy
Williams and Renooy (2009) provide the summary of existing policies to tackle informal
work (Table 6.1). They divide these approaches into two large groups: deterrence and
enabling compliance.
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Table 6.1. Policy approaches used for combating informal work (Williams and Renooy,
2009: Table 8)
Approach Method Measures
Deterrence Improve detection  Data matching and sharing
 Joining-up strategy
 Joining-up operations
Penalties  Increasing penalties for
evasion
Enabling compliance Preventative  Simplifying compliance
 Direct and indirect tax
incentives
 Smooth transition into self-
employment
 Introducing new categories
of work
 Micro-enterprise
development
Curative Purchaser incentives:
 service vouchers
 targeted direct taxes
 targeted indirect taxes
Supplier incentives:
 society-wide amnesties
 voluntary disclosure
 business advisory and
support services
Fostering commitment  Promoting benefits of
declared work
 Education
 Peer-to-peer surveillance
 Tax fairness
 Procedural justice
 Redistributive justice
The deterrence approach is aimed at changing the behaviour of informal worker
through detection and punishment. This is the most traditional approach which is based
on the assumption that person will evade the tax unless the benefit from tax evasion is
lower than the expected cost of being detected. In microeconomics the situation of tax
evasion can be viewed from the point of consumer choice under uncertainty theory
(Katz and Rosen, 2005). It suggests that for a given probability of being detected, when
tax increases, penalties should be increased as well to discourage evasion. Since the
higher the tax rate, the greater is expected benefit from hiding each unit of income.  If
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the ‘reward’ of cheating grows, so must the fine to discourage it. Thus, one of the
benefits of reducing tax rates can be reduction in tax evasion.
Let f be the value of penalty for tax evasion, p – the probability of being
detected and t – the tax rate.
Then, by the given level of risk aversion, the expected loss of being detected
must equal the expected gain of not being caught:
p x f = (1-p) x t
or
f = (1-p) x t / p
The equation shows that the penalty rate should be at least equal to the odds of not
being detected times tax rate to eliminate tax evasion. Therefore, if the tax evasion is
high, this indicates that the risk of being detected and severity of punishment are not
tangible enough or smaller than the benefits obtained from being informal.
On the one hand, punishments and control can be strengthened, for example,
envelope wages might be tackled organizing labour inspections on the enterprises
questioning all the workers whether their rights are respected and particularly how they
receive their salaries. Although the employees could be inclined to lie to the inspectors,
there can still be a probability of detecting unlawful employers actions due to the
straightforwardness or  fear of the employees, or their willingness to cross the ’hateful
bourgeois’ up.
On the other hand, individuals’ risk aversion can be effectively changed (that is
decreasing economic gain from avoiding paying taxes) through policy modification.
Policy modification has an advantage over the increased control. There is a risk that
stricter control will open new opportunities for the corrupt inspectors. While the
pressure on small and medium businesses is already very high, enhanced control can
eradicate entrepreneurship.
The enabling approach seeks to change the behaviour of informal workers that
are viewed as inclined to comply with the law. The role of the tax authorities here is to
encourage and secure compliance and not to enforce or punish.  Williams and Renooy
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(2009) determine three different forms of positive reinforcement approach. First,
preventative measures are aimed at creating conditions to enable people to work
formally at the outset, for example, simplifying regulations and provide business
support and advice. Second, curative measures are incentives that encourage informal
workers to come out of the shadow, for example amnesties for those who transfer from
informal to formal realm. Third, commitment measures are based on improving tax
morality. For instance, raising awareness about the benefits of declared work and the
pursuit of perceived tax fairness and redistributive justice.
The enabling and deterring measures may be used in tandem or separately
depending on the nature of the informal economy that prevails in the area. In the next
sections the main problems that prevent employees and employers from declaring their
income will be outlined. Basing on this, possible policy measures to tackle informal
work will be proposed.
6.2.2. Evaluating policy approaches
The findings discussed in the previous sections provide a more nuanced understanding
of informal work in Ukraine rather than a conventional view of the informal economy as
a purely negative phenomenon and a subject for deterrence and eradication. Without
such a more nuanced understanding, the government could continue implementing
severe deterrence practices (admittedly, together with an enabling compliance
approach) which eradicate entrepreneurship and the leftovers of tax morale of
Ukrainians.
The survey findings and the previous evaluations of policy measures adopted in
other countries provide valuable guidance for developing policy solutions tailored to
each type of the informal work in Ukraine. These types can be divided into two main
groups: the informal work that is an alternative to, and that is a by-product of, the
formal economy. The most prominent types of tax evaders that choose informality as
an alternative are:
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i. Waged employed and self-employed officially registered at their main job
and receiving unofficial income from their side activity. The main reason for
being informal here is inappropriate regulation by the state, namely high
taxes, bureaucracy and corruption of local authorities
ii. Students, retired and unemployed who work informally in order to receive
additional income. Even though such informal work often represents a
survival strategy of subsistence households, informality is an exit and
therefore is still in line with the alternative theory.
iii. Fully informal waged workers and self-employed with the aim to increase
net income by means of tax evasion and/or to avoid extortion of local
officials.
iv. The last but not least (if not the most important) are the workers that
receive ‘envelope wages’ (found to be the most prominent type of informal
employee by Williams and Round (2008), although not covered by the
survey).
Altogether they constitute some 80 percent of all informal workers and only 15.6
percent of these voluntary informal workers are fully informal. The main reason for the
existence of such a large group of informal workers who voluntarily exit the formal
economy is low tax morality. It was found that improvement in tax morale can reduce
predicted tax evasion (Andreoni et al., 1998; Wenzel, 2002; Torgler, 2004). Tax morale,
in turn, ‘depends on how satisfied taxpayers are with their national officers and the
political system’ (Torgler, 2004: 20). When coping with the informal work caused by low
tax morale, an enabling approach is more preferable than a deterrence approach. This
is because a deterrence approach with its strict enforcement measures is likely to
further increase existing widespread tax evasion (Borck, 2004) and deter the
entrepreneurial endeavour (Williams, 2010a). Therefore, an enabling approach towards
compliance should be adopted with respect to informal workers (both self-employed
and waged-employed) that voluntary exit formal economy. This approach may include
tailored advertising campaigns, providing information and promoting compliance; tax
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compliance appeals in the form of notification letters; tax knowledge improvement, and
changing the attitudes of tax offices (Williams and Renooy, 2009). The most important
though could be the changes in the perceived fairness and justice of the tax system
(Kinsey and Gramsick, 1993; Hartner et al., 2008). Indeed, the survey revealed that the
main reasons for being informal are the ineffective social security system and damaged
image of the government. Therefore, in Ukrainian reality, the measures listed might be
ineffective without changes in taxation and social security systems and, more
importantly, the image of the government.
The first main issue with regard to the fairness of tax system is the fact that the
amount of personal contributions to social funds is poorly connected with the amount of
expected pension. The pension system is evidently weak and ineffective.
Improvements in this system could enhance income declaration. However, the
amendments to the system will be ineffective without changing peoples’ perception of
the state and government. The second issue is the distrust of the government and low
tax morality in Ukraine (Williams, 2009; Bunescu and Comaniciu, 2011; Gorshenin
Institute, 2007), which is confirmed by this research as well. The negative image was
built by some state officials themselves passing pro-large businesses laws, not hiding
extravagant purchases, and the mass media actively bringing this home to the masses.
To cope with the first problem, Ukraine needs a transition from a joint pension
system to an accumulative one. An accumulative pension system may be a good
incentive to contribute more to the social funds. If the amount of the expected pension
strongly depends on the amount of personal contributions, taxpayers will be willing to
pay the required sum of money. The most challenging task here is to guarantee
pension benefits in the future. Once defrauded, people prefer saving money ‘under the
pillow’ for future rather than trust it to the state.
The second problem connected with the low tax morale of Ukrainians, is the
popular belief that the money paid by ordinary people to the budget is continuously
being stolen by state officials, although taxes and social funds contributions are
supposed to be used for the welfare of state. Such public opinion is not surprising as
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mass media poorly cover the news about improvements funded from the budget
undertaken in Ukraine. Instead, discussions of state officials’ luxurious belongings and
property are rather prevalent and common. This all contributes to an extremely poor
image of the government. For example, it was broadly reported on the internet that the
new property of the President is the same area as Hyde Park – 140 hectares.
Naturally, it is perceived as a budget robbery. If people see that the money they pay to
the budget is used properly (hospitals are renovated, roads are laid, science is given
grants, pension benefits are increased etc.) and officials look modest, tax morale will
be improved. However this can only be achieved through the elite understanding that
such change will benefit the country and themselves.
Beyond fostering commitment measures, prevention and curative measures
(Williams and Renooy, 2009) could also be effective for tackling informal work. The
example of such measures might be the decrease in employer’s social fund
contributions. Comparing employer pension fund contributions in different post-socialist
countries, Ukraine obviously has the highest pension fund contribution employers pay
for their employees, and one of the smallest pension contributions deducted from
employees salaries. In 2011, the amount paid to pension funds by employers had even
increased and constituted 36.76 – 49.7 percent of employees’ gross salary. If this rate
is really tangibly reduced, for example halved, it will be more realistic for the employer
to pay it and show the full salary amount. The problem with this approach is that such a
significant decrease in tax will influence the budget revenues negatively and the state
may run into a heavy deficit in pension benefit payments, which could only be offset by
an increase in the number of registered jobs. The latter, however, has uncertain
prospect without a more complex approach to reforming the existing system. Besides,
Williams and Renooy (2009) argue that a reduction of overall tax rates may not be
effective for tackling informal work. They mention two reasons for this. Firstly, there is
no evidence that reducing tax rates will reduce the informal economy. On the contrary,
the informal economy is more prevalent in the poorer countries where the tax rates are
lower and in affluent countries the situation is the opposite. Secondly, general tax
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reforms have very broad influence on the whole economy. Therefore the authors
suggest more targeted measures to eradicate informal work.
The by-product theory of the informal economy covers a large group of informal
workers in Ukraine. These are low-paid salaried workers that would prefer to work
officially, but were refused to by their employer. They constitute 38 percent of all
informal salaried workers or 20 percent of all informal workers. Although in relation to
this type of informal worker, the deterrence approach is often suggested, it is
necessary to look at the reasons for this informal work more carefully. An alternative
rather than by-product approach should be used when considering the workers that are
excluded from the formal economy. This choice is justified by the fact that decisions of
employers seeking to reduce payroll costs are definitive for waged workers in both exit
and exclusion cases. Employers mostly decide, whether an employee should be
formal, informal or partially informal (receive ‘envelope’ wages). An employee often has
no other choice, but to accept the terms of employer, otherwise he/she risks remaining
unemployed. Taking into consideration high social security contribution charges that
employers pay for each worker, they choose not to register workers officially or
minimise workers’ reported salary paying ‘envelope’ wages. Here, therefore, the policy
measures should be mainly targeted at the employers. As in the case with informal
workers exiting formal economy, the approach may include preventative and curative
measures, for example, the reduction of employers’ contributions to the social security
funds.
As for the rest of the informal activities, they correspond to the residue and
complementary theories of the informal economy. The domestic services survey
revealed that socially-motivated favours done for relatives and friends are not paid in
the majority of cases and therefore cannot be considered as informal work (as there is
nothing to declare). Domestic services done by participants for close people were paid
(supply side) only in 11 percent of cases. Participants paid their close people for the
work done (consumption side) in only 4 percent of cases. This displays that money or
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in-kind payments to relatives and friends are not common in the area surveyed.
Furthermore, this rare monetised domestic work for/by relatives and friends is often
profit motivated, rather than socially motivated. Therefore, the complementary theory
could be confirmed the best by the unpaid community exchange and informal
networking (blat).
The examination of informal networks in Ukraine showed that traditional Soviet-
type blat is almost inexistent here as in the Soviet times blat networks were based on
the conditions of shortages of consumer goods. Today, the main issue is to find money
rather than a commodity. Therefore, blat in its traditional meaning became a residue of
a previous social system, whereas modern blat can be divided into two categories. First
is monetised blat, which often can be considered as corruption and is illegal. Second is
informal networking in the form of reciprocal favours. The former is not a subject of the
discussion and needs to be researched and theorised separately. The latter, depending
on sphere of usage (see Table 5.8, Section 5.2.3), may be explained using
complementary or alternative theories.
In sum, there is no evidence yet what policy/set of policies is more effective and
applicable to each particular type of informal work in any country. However, the
importance of an enabling approach (often in combination with deterrence) is
advocated by a growing number of authors (Williams and Renooy, 2009; European
Parliament, 2008; Mateman and Renooy, 2001; Ahmed and Braithwaite, 2005). The
compliance approach is based on the assumption that there exists an intrinsic
motivation to pay taxes, tax morale. This means, in contrast to deterrence theory, that
people pay taxes due to the belief that this is the right thing to do (Ahmed and
Braithwaite, 2005). This is explained by the fact that the deterrence approach might
negatively influence the tax morale of citizens, especially those who are normally
inclined to comply. Therefore, taking into consideration extremely low tax morale in
Ukraine, an enabling approach should be used along with the deterrence approach. If
designed carefully, these policies will allow both to improve the tax morale of the
workers that are inclined to comply (provided that tax system is fair) and to cope with
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the irresponsible non-payers of taxes. Moreover, this will allow tailoring the
combinations of measures to each type of the informal work by its nature, actors and
their motives.
6.3. Limitations of the thesis
The limitations of this research concern the scope of research, the design of the
questionnaire and issues arising during the fieldwork.
6.3.1. Limitations of the scope of research
There are two issues referring to the limitations in relation to the scope of the research.
The first is that the survey did not address the issue of ‘envelope wages’ found in other
studies and claimed to be the most prominent type of informal income (Williams and
Round, 2008). Officially registered workers that receive an official salary at formal
enterprises may also receive a ‘black’ salary not declared for tax purposes. Therefore,
the number of people participating in informal activities could be potentially higher than
80 out of 178 or 45 percent.
The second limitation regarding the scope of research relates to how the
informal economy is measured. To answer the question about the extent of informal
work, the percentage of fully informal and totally informal workers was found. However,
the monetary value of this informal work cannot be calculated. Although at least in one
section (Domestic services) the participants were asked about the amounts they paid
or received for the services, the question implied monetary value of the last transaction.
Some services are performed on a regular basis and therefore the values are not
representative of how much money was received during a certain period. However, the
amount of hidden income and other quantitative indicators might better be measured
using the indirect methods of research discussed in the Methodology section.
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6.3.2. Limitation of the questionnaire design
Although a pilot survey was carried out and corresponding amendments were made,
there are still a number of limitations found during the analysis of data.
The fourth question of the questionnaire on the total monthly income provides
five possible answer options. They are the ranges of income in Ukrainian hryvnias:
‘less than 1,000’, ‘1,000-2,000’, ‘2,000-3,000’, ‘3,000-5,000’ and more than 5,000. The
last range ‘more than 5,000’ is too loose and could be possibly divided into ‘5,000-
7,000’, ‘7,000-10,000’ and ‘more than 10,000’. However, the members of higher
income households tend not to disclose their actual income therefore ‘more than 5,000’
is much more acceptable and maybe even viable than more exact answer options.
Questions 7d and 8d that ask about the method of payment for domestic
services and aimed at identifying informal income might not be representative. The
suggested answers are ‘fully through a bank/till/ etc. or cash with receipt’, ‘partly cash
partly through a bank/till/ etc.’ and ‘cash, no receipt’. The problem is that according to
Ukrainian legislation some private entrepreneurs are not obliged to carry out the sales
through a till and to issue a receipt (i.e., a receipt only needs to be issued if the
customer requests it). Therefore, their customers cannot know whether the supplier
declares his/her income and the answers ‘Cash, no receipt’ does not necessarily
indicate unofficial transaction.
Questions 12 and 16 in the ‘Using Connections’ section of the questionnaire
asks about the way of rewarding the favours received and done for others. One of the
answer options is ‘with a gift’. Here, clarification is needed as it was found that ‘the gift’
is a loose concept. For instance, gifts can vary from a chocolate bar or a can of beer to
an expensive cognac or a computer. A really insignificant gift should not be referred to
as payment. Therefore, favours done for such gifts cannot be taken as evidence of blat
monetisation.
Tables 6 and 7 list the spheres of using blat and include ‘communicating with
local authorities in business matters’. The list should also include ‘communicating with
local authorities in personal matters’. These could be for instance the issue of a
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passport, completing the formalities for registration and even receiving a marriage
certificate. Due to this limitation, both personal and business matters were recorded
into one sphere. Obviously, it would be valuable to know which bodies are more
corrupt.
The last but not least shortcoming of the questionnaire is the lack of
consideration given to students, the retired and unemployed when talking about their
secondary employment. Question 21 provides a table where possible extra-work
places are listed. This is not clear for the retired whether their workplace is the
‘unofficial work in your regular workplace’ or ‘unofficial work outside your regular
workplace’ as their main ‘workplace’ is being on a pension. In order to avoid ambiguity,
being on pension is treated as their ‘regular work place’ (as well as study for the
students and unemployment for unemployed) and any work outside this ‘regular work
place’ is treated as work outside regular work place. It is suggested for further research
to clarify this point in the questionnaire.
6.3.3. Fieldwork limitations
This limitation refers to the survey carried out. I came across frequent refusal to
participate in the survey in general (‘no time’, ‘not interested’, ‘I do not know you’) or to
answer this particular questionnaire as it contains sensitive questions about income,
second job and not declaring economic activities. The latter are obviously frightening
and some people think that the interviewer is an agent of the tax inspection office
masked as a researcher from the University of Sheffield. Furthermore, answers of
some interviewees have been flagrantly deceitful. For example, a person from a
business-class house can answer with the ironical smile that the household income is
1000 hryvnias or a frightened person responds: ‘We do everything according to the
rules…Everybody knows how it is done…’ Such obviously deceitful interviews were
excluded from the survey.
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6.4. Future research
Although quite detailed analysis of the extent and nature of informal work was done in
this thesis, there is still much room for further research. Some of the gaps in the
knowledge that need to be covered are the following.
This thesis explores only one urban area and in only one region of Ukraine –
Mykolayiv – out of the 24 regions of Ukraine. It is important to study also rural areas as
well as other regions of Ukraine. Afterwards, the results of different regions and urban
and rural areas can be compared. Indeed, previous surveys show the different
character of informal work depending on the level of affluence and across urban and
rural areas (Williams, 2010a). Therefore a large scale survey of different regions of
Ukraine, stratified by the level of affluence and status, would be the most
representative in terms of identifying the extent and character of the informal economy
in Ukraine as a whole. The results of a country-wide survey would be crucial for the
careful development of policy addressing the informal economy.
At the moment, the government is implementing numerous reforms that
significantly impact on the informal economy. The changes are in progress at the time
of writing. A new tax code came into effect this year and numerous decrees and
directives are still emerging, a new pension system is being widely discussed and will
be approved in the near future. After all the changes that are going on right now, the
comparative study needs to be done to see how these reforms influence the extent and
nature of the informal work and the attitudes of people towards informal work and the
reforms themselves.
Only the present state of affairs is studied here. Although, this research is
attempting to look at the possible origins, it has limited outreach. Considered theories
describe the informal economy in society given a set of established rules and laws, but
none is addressing the roots of this. It is impossible to design successful measures to
tackle informal work without understanding whether the informal economy is a result of
unthoughtfully designed policies; or informal economic relations, corruption and blat are
intrinsic in the Ukrainian mentality; or it is a problem of a kleptocratic political-business
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‘elite’.
6.5. Overall conclusion
The objective of the thesis was to discover the extent and nature of the informal
economy in an urban area of Ukraine and as such to cover the existing gaps in the
knowledge. To fulfil this, the survey consisting of 200 semi-structured interviews was
conducted and existing theories of the informal economy were evaluated against the
survey findings. Thus, new evidence was gathered on the informal economy in
Ukraine, in-depth qualitative research was carried out and a more nuanced
understanding of the nature and causes of the informal economy emerged. This
allowed theoretical conclusions about the informal economy in Ukraine.
An insight was provided into modern blat relations, and how they compare with
the Soviet era blat. It showed that blat is not simply a part of the informal economy but
a separate phenomenon, which is nevertheless highly intertwined with the informal
economy. It is a striking manifestation of the nation’s culture.
The major contribution of the research to the existing body of knowledge is a
new approach to blat theorisation. This thesis suggests viewing blat as a mediator of
transactions both within formal and informal economy, rather than a phenomenon
parallel to the informal economy. To better explain the role of blat, a structured table
depicting possible transactions (in the formal and informal economy using blat or
money or both) is provided.
The thesis affirms that informal activities are varied and are driven by a variety
of motives. As such, policy responses need to be tailored in order to effectively deal
with the challenges faced by the different types of informal activity. Such a response is
more likely to result in the formalisation of such activities by removing the barriers to
formalisation and nurturing fledgling business activities rather than simply trying to
eradicate them.
However, even carefully designed policies will not be effective unless better
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transparency in governance is reached. Pension reform cannot be implemented
without guaranteeing the safety of pension savings contributed by people. The image
of the government cannot be improved just by rendering only ‘right’ information through
the mass media – the behaviour of the officials should be changed. And finally, a
decrease in tax cannot bring any positive results unless corruption pressuring
entrepreneurs is eradicated.
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APPENDIX A
QUESTIONNAIRE
1) GENERAL INFORMATION
1. How many years have you lived in this city? _________
2. How many years have you lived in this house? _________
3. Who else lives in this house/ flat?
Table 1.General information about family members that live with the respondent
Family
members
Cod
e
(a)
Gender
(М/F)
(b)
Age
(c)
Employme
nt
(d)Employ
ment
history
1. Respondent A
2. B
3. C
4. D
5. E
Codes for the Table 1:
Location
Date
(a)
Gender
(b) Age (c) Employment (d) Employment history
1. Male 1. 0 - 16 1. Full-time employment 1. Never in formal
employment
2. Fema
le
2. 16 - 25 2. Part-time employment 2. Mostly not in formal
employment
3. 26 - 35 3. Self-employment 3. Mostly in formal
employment
4. 36 - 45 4. Unemployed (< year) 4. Always in formal
employment
5. 46 - 55 5. Unemployed (> year)
6. 56 - 65 6. Registered unemployed
but working informally
7. > 65 7. Full-time housework
8. Retired
9. Student
10. Registered disabled,
incapacity  benefit etc
11. Other
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4. Total Monthly income of the family, in Ukrainian Hryvnias
1. < 1000 2. 1000-2000
3. 2000-
3000
4. 3000-
5000 5. > 5000
5. Which activity from the Table 2 is the most important for the standard of living
of you and your family?________
6. Which activity from the Table 2 is the second most important for the standard
of living of you and your family?’________
Table2. Sources of income (Codes for questions #5 и 6)
1 Our own self-provisioning (e.g., growing own food, doing own home maintenance& repair)
2 What we get as favours/ the help from friends and relatives
3 Cash-in-hand earnings (e.g., from second job/incidental earnings)
4 Earnings from regular job
5 Pension/unemployment benefits
6 Dividends
7 Don’t Know
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2) COPING PRACTICES USED BY HOUSEHOLDS
WORK DONE FOR YOU
7. How do you usually get the work done about the house? From the table
below, what work have been done in your house / flat in the last 12 months or
so? Who carried out this work for you? Please, fill in Table 3 on the page 5
answering the questions (a)-(g)
(a) Have the following jobs
been completed for you?
1. YES
2. NO, no opportunity to be done
3. NO, no need to be done
(b) If YES, who completed it last time?
1. Male household
member
5. Friend or neighbour or colleague
2. Female household
member
6. Firm or business
3. Male and female
household member
jointly
7. Self-employed individual
4. Relative (but not
household member)
8. Other (please
describe)____________
(c) Were they paid in some way to do this job?
1. No 4. Yes, with cash
2. Yes, quid pro quo 5. Other _________
3. Yes, with a gift
(d) If cash, how did you pay?
1. Fully though a bank/till/ etc. or cash
with receipt
2. Partly cash partly through a bank/till/
etc.
3. Cash, no receipt
(e) How much did you pay last time?
(f) Why did they do it rather than someone else? ________
(g) If you had the choice, how would you have got the task done?
1. Self-provisioning - male
2. Self-provisioning - female
3. Self-provisioning - female and
male jointly
4. Non-monetary gift – relative
5. Non-monetary gift – friend
6. Non-monetary gift – Neighbour
7. Paid informal work – neighbour
8. Paid informal work – relative
9. Paid informal work – friend
10. Paid informal work - self-
employed individual
11. Paid informal work firm /
business
12. Unpaid exchange – neighbour
13. Unpaid exchange – relative
14. Unpaid exchange – friend
15. Unpaid exchange - voluntary
group or other
16. Formal employment
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Table 3. Types of works done in your household
REPAIRS (last 5 years) a b c d e f g
1. Painting
2. Wallpapering
3. Tiling
4. Replace a broken window
5. Maintaining  and/or installing domestic electric
appliances
6. Windows / doors installation
7. Plumbing
8. Heaters / boilers installation
9. Electrical mounting
ROUTINE HOUSEWORK (last month) a b c d e f g
10. Cleaning
11. Shopping
12. Washing / ironing
13. Cooking
14. Dish washing
15. Dacha work
MAKING AND REPAIRING GOODS (LAST
YEAR) a b c d e f g
16. Clothes making/ repair / fit
17. Shoes repair
18. House hold textile making/ repair
19. Furniture making / repair
20. Household appliances repair
21. Car repair
22. Computer repair
CARING ACTIVITIES (last 3 months) a b c d e f g
23. Hairdressing
24. Manicure
25. Massage
26. Baby-sitting
27. Tutoring
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3) WORK UNDERTAKEN FOR OTHERS
8. Following questions are about the same services, but performed by you or
your family members. Answer the questions filling in Table 4 on the page 7.
(a) Has anybody in this household recently done any of the same tasks for
anybody else?
1. YES 2. NO (If NO, move to the part “Acquiring of goods”)
(b) If YES, who did you/ they do the work for?
1. Relative
2. Friend
3. Neighbour
4. Colleague
5. Other
(c) Were you/they rewarded somehow?
1. No
2. Yes, with cash
3. Yes, with a gift
4. Yes, quid pro quo (possibly after some time)
5. Yes, other
(d) If cash, how were you/they paid?
1. Fully through a bank/till/ etc. or cash with receipt
2. Partly cash partly through a bank/till/ etc.
3. Cash, no receipt
(e) How much?
(f) Why did you/they perform the job? ( Need money /  just to help / we
always support each other)
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Table 4. Types of work undertaken for others by you or your family members
REPAIRS (last 5 years) a b c d e f g
1. Painting
2. Wallpapering
3. Tiling
4. Replace a broken window
5. Maintaining / installing dom. electric appliances
6. Windows / doors installation
7. Plumbing
8. Heaters / boilers installation
9. Electrical mounting
ROUTINE HOUSEWORK (last month) a b c d e f g
10. Cleaning
11. Shopping
12. Washing / ironing
13. Cooking
14. Dish washing
15. Dacha work
MAKING AND REPAIRING GOODS (last year) a b c d e f g
16. Clothes making/ repair / fit
17. Shoes repair
18. House hold textile making/ repair
19. Furniture making / repair
20. Household appliances repair
21. Car repair
22. Computer repair
CARING ACTIVITIES (last 3 months) a b c d e f g
23. Hairdressing
24. Manicure
25. Massage
26. Baby-sitting
27. Tutoring
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4) USING CONNECTIONS
(DOES ANYBODY HELP YOU?)
9. What is your attitude towards having things done by pulling strings/using
connections/blat?
1 2 3 4 5
Very
positively
Rather
positively
Neutrally Rather
negatively
Very
negatively
Please, fill in Table 6 answering questions #11 - 13 for each sphere
Table 6. Spheres of using connections
Spheres 11 12 13
Medical services: local surgery, hospital or bed and operation
Solving problems with the traffic police, registration of a
vehicle and MOT
Finding a job
Education: Places in primary-secondary and higher education
Legal services and courts
Army conscription
Everyday services at better quality or better price
Repairs of housing, garages, dachas
Tickets for events, theatre, concerts
Hobbies and entertainment, resorts, travelling tickets
Consumer goods
Foodstuffs
Communicating with local authorities in your business matters
(e.g. tax inspection)
10. Did anyone ever help you to achieve a goal / solve a problem / receive extra
benefits?
1. No
2. Yes, to circumvent the rules / laws / bureaucracy
3. Yes, to make rules / laws work
4. Yes, to reduce final price
5. Yes, to improve quality
6. Yes, to get information
7. Yes, to be introduced to useful people
8. Yes, to receive service without a queue
9. Yes, to maintain connections
10. Yes, other ______________
11. If yes, did you reward your connections? (several answers are possible)
1 2 3 4 5
With cash With a gift Quid pro quo Just ‘thank you’ Other _________
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12. What is your relationship with the people you usually ask for help?
1 2 3 4 5
Relative Friend Neighbour Colleague Other __________
13. Were you able to achieve this aim without connections? If NO, why?
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
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5) USING CONNECTIONS
(DO YOU HELP ANYBODY?)
Please, fill in Table 7 answering questions #15 – 17 for each sphere
Table 7. Spheres of using connections
Spheres 15 16 17
Medical services: local surgery, hospital or bed and operation
Solving problems with the traffic police, registration of a
vehicle and MOT
Finding a job
Education: Places in primary-secondary and higher education
Legal services and courts
Army conscription
Everyday services at better quality or better price
Repairs of housing, garages, dachas
Tickets for events, theatre, concerts
Hobbies and entertainment, resorts, travelling tickets
Consumer goods
Foodstuffs
Communicating with local authorities in your business matters
(e.g. tax inspection)
14. Did you ever help anybody to solve problems in the following spheres?
1. No
2. Yes, to circumvent the rules / laws / bureaucracy
3. Yes, to make rules / laws work
4. Yes, to reduce final price
5. Yes, to improve quality
6. Yes, to get information
7. Yes, to be introduced to useful people
8. Yes, to receive service without a queue
9. Yes, to maintain connections
10. Yes, other ______________
15. If yes, what do you usually receive as a rewards for your services? (several
answers are possible)
1 2 3 4 5
With cash With a gift Quid pro quo Just ‘thank you’ Other_________
16. Who are the people you usually do favours to?
1 2 3 4 5
Relative Friend Neighbour Colleague Other__________
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17. What is more important now, in 90’s, in Soviet times: connections or money?
Why? Please, give examples.
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
_____________________
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6) SECONDARY EMPLOYMENT
18. Alongside your first/main employment do you work for another firm or
business?
1 2 3 4
No Yes Do not know Refuse toanswer
19. Are you officially registered at your main workplace?
1 2 3 4
No Yes Do not know Refuse toanswer
20. Where does your extra work take place?
Possible extra-work places Numbers of extra-work places
I II III IV V
1. In your work place during work time (moonlight) 1 1 1 1 1
2. Official work in your regular work place 2 2 2 2 2
3. Unofficial work in your regular work place 3 3 3 3 3
4. Official work outside your regular work place 4 4 4 4 4
5. Unofficial work outside your regular work place 5 5 5 5 5
6. Self employment with formal registration 6 6 6 6 6
7. Self employment without formal registration 7 7 7 7 7
21. How important is informal work to your household budget?
1 2 3 4
Very important Rather important Not so important Does not contribute
22. Have you ever experienced any difficulties from the state over your informal
work – such as interference from the tax police? Please, give comprehensive
answer.
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
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___________________________________________________________________
_____________________
23. Does anyone in your household receive benefits from the state?  If yes were
they difficult to obtain? Are they paid regularly?  Please, give comprehensive
answer.
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
_____________________
24. Why do you register / not register your activity? Please, give comprehensive
answer
.___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX B
Table 1 The first and the second most important sources of households’ income. (in percentages of households)
Secondary
Self-
provisioning
Unpaid community
exchange
Cash-in-hand
earnings
Earnings from
official job
Pension/ benefits/
scholarship
Dividends,
rent
Do not
know
No 2nd source
of income Total
P
rim
ar
y
Self-
provisioning 0.0% 1.0% 1.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 3.0%
Unpaid
community
exchange
0.0% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0%
Cash-in-hand
earnings 1.5% 1.5% 0.5% 4.0% 2.0% 0.0% 1.5% 0.0% 11.0%
Earnings from
official job 4.5% 13.5% 22.0% 0.5% 11.0% 9.5% 1.5% 6.0% 68.5%
Pension/
unemployment
benefits
3.0% 3.5% 6.0% 0.5% 0.0% 1.5% 0.5% 0.5% 15.5%
Total 9.0% 20.0% 30.5% 5.5% 13.5% 11.5% 3.5% 6.5% 100.0%
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Table 2. How do you usually get the work done around the house? Breakdown of tasks by the nature of work
Types
of work
How it
was done
P
ainting
W
allpape ring
Tiling
R
eplace a broken w
indow
M
aintaining and/or
installing dom
estic electric
appliances
W
indow
s/doors installation
P
lum
bing
H
eaters/boilers installation
E
lectrical m
ounting
C
leaning
S
hopping
W
ashing/ironing
C
ooking
D
ishw
ashing
D
acha w
ork
C
lothes m
ak ing/repair/fit
S
hoes repair
H
ousehold textile
m
aking/repair
Furniture m
aking/repair
H
ousehold appliances
repair
C
ar repair
C
om
puter repair
H
airdressing
M
anicure
M
assage
B
aby -sitting
Tutoring
TO
TA
L SE
R
V
C
ES
R
E
C
E
IV
E
D
:
SP 51 49 23 12 26 16 27 20 33 188 190 188 187 194 95 24 9 15 10 20 11 18 11 26 8 15 1 1467
UCE 24 20 5 3 4 4 14 1 4 5 6 5 9 4 7 5 2 1 1 2 4 11 16 28 7 7 1 200
IW 50 52 54 3 30 54 54 36 37 5 2 3 3 1 1 53 108 14 20 17 18 20 113 59 36 4 25 872
FORMAL 4 3 1 0 6 21 4 9 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 7 3 12 14 16 11 23 2 2 0 0 145
TOTAL 129 124 83 18 66 95 99 66 75 198 198 199 199 199 103 85 126 33 43 53 49 60 163 115 53 26 27 2684
SP, % 40 40 28 67 39 17 27 30 44 95 96 94 94 97 92 28 7 45 23 38 22 30 7 23 15 58 4 55
UCE, % 19 16 6 17 6 4 14 2 5 3 3 3 5 2 7 6 2 3 2 4 8 18 10 24 13 27 4 8
IW, % 39 42 65 17 45 57 55 55 49 3 1 2 2 1 1 62 86 42 47 32 37 33 69 51 68 15 93 32
FORMAL, % 3 2 1 0 9 22 4 14 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 4 6 9 28 26 33 18 14 2 4 0 0 5
TOTAL, % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Excluding SP:
UCE, % 31 27 8 50 10 5 19 2 10 50 75 45 75 80 88 8 2 6 3 6 11 26 11 31 16 64 4 16
IW, % 64 69 90 50 75 68 75 78 88 50 25 27 25 20 13 87 92 78 61 52 47 48 74 66 80 36 96 72
FORMAL, % 5 4 2 0 15 27 6 20 2 0 0 27 0 0 0 5 6 17 36 42 42 26 15 2 4 0 0 12
TOTAL, % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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Table 3. Work undertaken for others. Breakdown of tasks by the nature of work
Types
of work
How it
was done
P
ainting
W
allpapering
Tiling
R
eplace
a
broken
w
indow
M
aintaining
and/or installing
dom
estic
electric
appliances
W
indow
s/do ors
installation
P
lum
bing
H
eaters/boilers
installation
E
lectrical m
ounting
C
leaning
S
hopping
W
ashing/ironing
C
ooking
D
ishw
ashing
D
acha
w
ork
C
lothes
m
aking/repair/fit
S
hoes repair
H
ousehold textile
m
aking/repair
Furniture m
aking/repair
H
ousehold appliances
repair
C
ar repair
C
om
puter repair
H
airdressing
M
anicure
M
assage
B
aby -sitting
Tutoring
TO
TA
L SE
R
V
C
ES
R
E
C
E
IV
E
D
:
UCE 36 37 13 8 15 9 15 10 20 22 29 13 17 15 28 6 0 1 3 7 5 12 12 5 2 17 7 364
IW 6 5 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 3 1 1 1 1 1 7 0 1 3 1 1 1 2 1 0 2 12 55
FORMAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
TOTAL 42 42 15 8 15 9 17 11 20 25 30 14 18 16 29 13 0 2 6 8 7 13 14 6 2 19 19 420
UCE, % 86 88 87 100 100 100 88 91 100 88 97 93 94 94 97 46 0 50 50 88 71 92 86 83 100 89 37 87
IW, % 14 12 13 0 0 0 12 9 0 12 3 7 6 6 3 54 0 50 50 13 14 8 14 17 0 11 63 13
FORMAL, % 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL, % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 - 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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APPENDIX C
Table 1 Consumption of favours by the purposes of asking for it
Spheres
The purpose of using the favours
To circumvent
the rules /
laws
To make
rules / laws
work
To reduce
final price
To
improve
quality
To get
information
To be
introduced to
useful people
To receive
service without
a queue
To maintain
connections Other
Medical services: local surgery, hospital
or bed and operation
11 0 5 74 26 8 13 2 0
8% 0% 4% 53% 19% 6% 9% 1% 0%
Solving problems with the
traffic police
21 13 4 1 12 7 15 3 0
28% 17% 5% 1% 16% 9% 20% 4% 0%
Finding a job 7 0 0 2 34 22 2 2 99% 0% 0% 3% 44% 28% 3% 3% 12%
Education: Places in primary-secondary
and higher education
9 7 1 18 9 7 1 1 0
17% 13% 2% 34% 17% 13% 2% 2% 0%
Legal services and courts 2 8 0 3 17 8 2 2 05% 19% 0% 7% 40% 19% 5% 5% 0%
Army conscription 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 067% 0% 11% 0% 0% 0% 0% 22% 0%
Everyday services 1 0 10 14 10 2 4 2 1
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Spheres
The purpose of using the favours
To circumvent
the rules /
laws
To make
rules / laws
work
To reduce
final price
To
improve
quality
To get
information
To be
introduced to
useful people
To receive
service without
a queue
To maintain
connections Other
2% 0% 23% 32% 23% 5% 9% 5% 2%
Repairs of housing, garages, dachas 0 2 10 15 6 3 0 1 00% 5% 27% 41% 16% 8% 0% 3% 0%
Tickets for events, theatre, concerts 0 0 12 4 5 0 2 1 10% 0% 48% 16% 20% 0% 8% 4% 4%
Hobbies and entertainment, resorts,
travelling tickets
5 3 13 9 7 4 4 3 0
10% 6% 27% 19% 15% 8% 8% 6% 0%
Consumer goods 0 0 15 7 6 1 1 1 00% 0% 48% 23% 19% 3% 3% 3% 0%
Foodstuffs 0 0 6 10 7 0 0 1 00% 0% 25% 42% 29% 0% 0% 4% 0%
Communicating with local authorities in
your business matters
11 17 0 2 17 9 6 6 0
16% 25% 0% 3% 25% 13% 9% 9% 0%
TOTAL 73 50 77 159 156 71 50 27 1111% 7% 11% 24% 23% 11% 7% 4% 2%
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Table 2 Provision of favours by the purposes of being asked for it
Spheres
The purposes of providing favours
Yes, to
circumvent
the rules
Yes, to
make rules
/ laws work
Yes, to
reduce final
price
Yes, to
improve
quality
Yes, to get
information
Yes, to be
introduced to
useful people
Yes, to receive
service without
a queue
Yes, to
maintain
connections
Yes,
other
Medical services: local surgery, hospital
or bed and operation
2 0 6 19 12 10 7 2 0
3% 0% 10% 33% 21% 17% 12% 3% 0%
Solving problems with the traffic police,
registration of a vehicle and
5 3 1 1 6 7 4 0 0
19% 11% 4% 4% 22% 26% 15% 0% 0%
Finding a job 3 3 0 1 25 18 2 0 45% 5% 0% 2% 45% 32% 4% 0% 7%
Education: Places in primary-secondary
and higher education
6 3 0 9 15 6 2 2 1
14% 7% 0% 20% 34% 14% 5% 5% 2%
Legal services and courts 0 1 1 3 8 5 2 0 00% 5% 5% 15% 40% 25% 10% 0% 0%
Army conscription 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 00% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Everyday services at better quality or
better price
0 0 3 7 12 6 3 0 0
0% 0% 10% 23% 39% 19% 10% 0% 0%
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Spheres
The purposes of providing favours
Yes, to
circumvent
the rules
Yes, to
make rules
/ laws work
Yes, to
reduce final
price
Yes, to
improve
quality
Yes, to get
information
Yes, to be
introduced to
useful people
Yes, to receive
service without
a queue
Yes, to
maintain
connections
Yes,
other
Repairs of housing, garages, dachas 0 0 5 8 3 1 1 2 20% 0% 23% 36% 14% 5% 5% 9% 9%
Tickets for events, theatre, concerts 0 0 1 0 4 1 2 1 00% 0% 11% 0% 44% 11% 22% 11% 0%
Hobbies and entertainment, resorts,
travelling tickets
0 0 0 3 5 3 2 1 1
0% 0% 0% 20% 33% 20% 13% 7% 7%
Consumer goods 0 0 7 5 9 5 2 0 00% 0% 25% 18% 32% 18% 7% 0% 0%
Foodstuffs 0 0 2 3 10 2 0 1 00% 0% 11% 17% 56% 11% 0% 6% 0%
Communicating with local authorities in
your business matters
1 5 1 4 8 8 6 3 0
3% 14% 3% 11% 22% 22% 17% 8% 0%
TOTAL 17 15 27 63 118 72 33 12 85% 4% 7% 17% 32% 20% 9% 3% 2%
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APPENDIX D
Information Sheet
Tackling the Informal Economy in Ukraine
Dear Interviewee,
You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide it is
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.
Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you
wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take
time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this.
The survey is carried out by the PhD candidate Olga Onoshchenko at the University
of Sheffield Management School within the bounds of her thesis. The expected end of the
research is September, 2012.
The aims of the project are:
 to evaluate opinions and attitudes towards participation in undeclared work;
 to evaluate the goods and services purchased on an undeclared basis in the past 12
months;
 to evaluate the prevalence of envelope wages (under-declared formal employment) in
Ukraine;
 to evaluate the prevalence and nature of undeclared work in Ukraine;
 to measure the extent of using informal connections in achieving personal goals
(‘blat’).
For the selection of respondents a probability sampling method is used. That is, a
number of sampling points will be drawn with probability proportional to population size (for
total coverage of the country) and to population density and the distribution of the resident
population in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas. In each of the selected sampling
units, a starting address will be then drawn at random. Further addresses (every nth
address) will be subsequently selected by standard “random route” procedures from the
initial address. In each household, meanwhile, the respondent will be drawn at random
(following the “closest birthday rule”). The projected number of respondents recruited is 200.
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you
will be given this information sheet to keep (and be asked to sign a consent form) and you
can still withdraw at any time without it affecting any benefits that you are entitled to in any
way. You do not have to give a reason.
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The interview will take you 1-2 hours. You will be asked to respond to the open as
well as closed-ended questions listed in the questionnaire. The questionnaire consists of the
following sections:
1. Background
It includes short closed-ended questions concerning general information about
respondent, e.g. sex, age, work status.
2. Coping practices used by households
You will be shown the list of work types to find out if these jobs have been
completed in your own house in the last 12 months or so, and who carried out
the work. Then the same will be asked concerning work completed by your
household members for others.
3. Acquiring goods
One short closed-ended question about how you got hold of various items for
your home.
4. Secondary employment
The topic will be discussed more in-depth, using open as well as closed-ended
questions to find out the type of secondary work, whether it is done formally or
informally, the importance of this job and the problems connected with it.
5. Blat
Both open and closed-ended questions will be asked about using connections for
personal benefits. Your personal perception of ‘blat’ will be discussed in-depth.
If for any reason you have a complaint regarding your participation in the research,
you can contact the Supervisor of the project:
Colin C Williams
Professor of Public Policy
School of Management
University of Sheffield
9 Mappin Street
Sheffield S1 4DT
E-mail: C.C.Williams@sheffield.ac.uk
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Should you feel your complaint has not been handled to your satisfaction you can
contact the University’s Registrar and Secretary:
Registrar and Secretary's Office
Firth Court
Western Bank
Sheffield, S10 2TN
All the information that we collect about you during the course of the research will be
kept strictly confidential. You will not be able to be identified in any reports or publications.
The results of the research are likely to be published in 2011, you will be able to
obtain a copy of publication from Olga Onoshchenko. You can find contact information
below.
This project has been ethically approved via Management School ethics review
procedure.
Contact for further information:
Olga Onoshchenko
PhD Student
School of Management
University of Sheffield
9 Mappin Street
Sheffield S1 4DT
E-mail: o.onoshchenko@sheffield.ac.uk
Thank you for taking part in the project!
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Participant Consent Form
Title of Research Project: Tackling Undeclared Cashflows in Ukraine
Name of Researcher: Olga Onoshchenko
Participant Identification Number for this project: Please initial box
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet
dated 15 October 2012 explaining the above research project
and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the project.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw
at any time without giving any reason and without there being any negative
consequences. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular
question or questions, I am free to decline.
3. I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential (only if true).
I give permission for members of the research team to have access to my
anonymised responses. I understand that my name will not be linked with
the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the
report or reports that result from the research.
4. I agree for the data collected from me to be used in future research
5. I agree to take part in the above research project.
________________________ ________________         ____________________
Name of Participant Date Signature
(or legal representative)
_________________________ ________________         ____________________
Name of person taking consent Date Signature
(if different from lead researcher)
To be signed and dated in presence of the participant
_________________________ ________________ ____________________
Lead Researcher Date Signature
To be signed and dated in presence of the participant
Copies:
Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the signed
and dated participant consent form, the letter/pre-written script/information sheet and any
other written information provided to the participants. A copy of the signed and dated consent
form should be placed in the project’s main record (e.g. a site file), which must be kept in a
secure location.
